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Abstract
If elections are instruments of democracy, are governing parties more likely to address citizens’ con-
cerns when pressures from electoral competition arise? This research tests expectations from the
competitive theory of democracy and argues that government responsiveness, between elections, is
more likely to occur in presence of a set of electoral incentives. This dissertation’s focus is on govern-
ment attention to public issue priorities on three policy venues (executive speeches, public spending
and legislation) across a range of policy domains in Canada, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. This research shows that government responsiveness to public priorities is
higher inmore symbolic policy venues and tends to decrease inmore substantive policy venues. Sim-
ilarly, electoral incentives seem tohave amore beneficial effect on responsiveness in the agenda-setting
stage than in thepolicy-making stage. This suggests that incentives fromelectoral competitiondonot
have the same impact on responsiveness when government attention is considered and that theories
of party competition have a delimited applicability to the study of dynamic representation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
OnMarch 17, 2011, in a private conversation in the corridors of the historic Montecitorio – home of
the Italian Chamber of Deputies – far from indiscreet ears, the Minister of Environment, Stefania
Prestigiacomo, secretly talked to theMinister of Economy, Giulio Tremonti, and theUndersecretary
to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Paolo Bonaiuti, joined by the Minister of Economic
Development, PaoloRomani. TheMinister of Environment freely expressed her own feelings about
the fate of nuclear energy policy in Italy after the nuclear disaster of Fukushima in Japan: “It’s over,
we can’t jeopardise the elections because of nuclear energy. Let’s not mess everything up” (ANSA).1
Six days later the government announced a moratorium suspending all nuclear plans in Italy.
The anecdote of the Italian minister summarises the essence of this dissertation. The U-turn
of the Italian government on nuclear energy policy was the product of a combination of factors.
Whether more or less informed and knowledgeable, the large majority of the public was clearly
against the construction of nuclear plants in Italy. The closeness of the local elections inMay 2011, in
combinationwithbothdistributions ofpublic opinion (inpolls andon the streets) andmostpolitical
parties against the government’s proposal, threatened the Italian government and brought it to stop
their nuclear energy plans in the country. It does not matter that the government was subsequently
defeated at the local elections, less than two months after the announcement of the moratorium.
Whatmatters is that the government was afraid of losing the elections which was a crucial factor that
1The original statement is slightly more colourful than my English translation: “E’ finita, non possiamo mica ris-
chiare le elezioni per il nucleare. Non facciamo cazzate” (ANSA, 17 March 2011).
1
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led the government to respond to public pressures.
Asmany scholars havewritten, elections are instruments of democracy. Yet this dissertation is not
about elections and their consequences. This dissertation is about what happens during the election
cycle, that is, about the incentives elections produce and whether they are taken into account by a
government when it decides to respond, or not, to the public.
1.1 The Puzzle and Hamlet
Does electoral competition matter for the responsiveness of governments to public opinion? This
is the main research question at the basis of this dissertation and is clearly an empirical one. How-
ever, the starting point of this research is normative and links democratic procedures to democratic
substance. This normative assumption is that competition is good for democracy and that the former
mighthavebeneficial effects for the latter. This unintended responsive effect of competition is achieved
by introducing Friedrich’s (1963) “mechanism of anticipated reactions”. Only if politicians are wor-
ried about the reactions of voters will they be “constantly piloted by the anticipation of those reac-
tions” (Sartori 1977: 350). These are Mansbridge’s (2003) anticipators. A theory of democracy based
on the representative’s anticipation of reward and punishment “orients government responsiveness
toward fundamental needs and values of the people rather than toward ephemeral or weakly held
policy preferences” (Page 1978: 221-2). Yet this mechanism of democracy is an indirect mechanism
since “there is no sense in which the people’s will is translated directly into law”; therefore, politi-
cians are “obliged to respond to the electorate’s preferences by anticipation” (Miller 1983: 134), and
this is the key for understanding why competition is relevant.
If politicians aim to improve their chances of reelection, they are led to sympathetically respond
to their (potential) voters’ demands. This proposition is considered by a remarkable part of the con-
temporary democratic theory (Dahl 1956; Downs 1957; Pitkin 1967; Dahl 1971; Sartori 1987; Bartolini
1999; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Powell 2000). Yet, though at a theoretical level there is
an agreement that competition is important for responsiveness, it is disputed whether competition
has an impact on responsiveness on empirical grounds. We know that, in reality, politics is not only
led according to competitive behaviours of the political elites, but also, and perhaps especially, by
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collusive behaviours among these elites (Katz and Mair 1995; Bartolini 1999). More than that, the
latter seem to be much more common than the former, at the expense of responsiveness to public
opinion. Therefore, this is the first reason why it is worth assessing this relationship empirically.
The second motivation behind this research is that we have knowledge about the determinants
of government responsiveness but we still do not have enough confidence about their external valid-
ity. The majority of studies on responsiveness are, in fact, country specific or compare two or three
countries atmost. In particular, this dissertation focuses on the electoral determinants of responsive-
ness and conceives the latter in terms of dynamic representation, that is, that public opinion at time
t-1 has an effect on public policy at time t.2 To the best of my knowledge, most of the studies devoted
to analysing the impact of competitive incentives on government responsiveness to public opinion
are from theUS (Stimson,Mackuen, andErikson 1995; Erikson,Mackuen, and Stimson 2002;Manza
andCook 2002;Canes-Wrone 2004;Canes-Wrone andShotts 2004)with only a fewnonUS-basedor
comparative efforts (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Hakhverdian 2010; Soroka and Wlezien 2010;
Chaqués Bonafont and Palau 2011; Bertelli and John 2012; Hakhverdian 2012; Wlezien and Soroka
2012; Pickup and Hobolt 2015; Soroka andWlezien 2015). Yet, among these studies, there is no clear
conclusion about the influence of competitive incentives on responsiveness, except probably for the
impact of the proportionality of electoral systems (Wlezien and Soroka 2012; Soroka and Wlezien
2015).
If we agree that electoral competition is likely to be important for responsiveness, the follow-up
question would then be what dimensions of competition really matter. Very often competition is
approached in terms of competitiveness, conceived as a quantity to be maximised; in other words,
as “more” or “less” competition. However, since this dissertation is about responsiveness pre-post
elections, competitiveness of elections is not the focus of this work. The effort is rather to introduce
a framework that accounts for the relevant incentives from party competition that can be treated
as facilitating conditions for the government to respond, and this is the third and final reason that
2Some scholars look at responsiveness as a result dimension of the quality of democracy (Diamond and Morlino
2004; Lijphart 1999;Morlino, Piana, and Raniolo 2013; Morlino 2011; Powell 2004b; Roberts 2010); in this literature sat-
isfaction with the way democracy works, confidence in (public) institutions and government popularity become proxies
of responsiveness. However, such proxies have serious limitations, as they are not as much indicators of responsiveness
but rather consequences of it and, more than that, they seem to be more related to the output side of the democratic
process and to accountability.
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motivates this work.
A final caveat needs to be addressed, that is, the Hamletic doubt of responsiveness. The study
of governmental responsiveness to public opinion has been commonly engaged under two differ-
ent perspectives. The first perspective looks at responsiveness in terms of position and investigates
whether levels of/changes in citizens’ preferences have an impact on levels of/changes in the govern-
ment’s position on a given issue. The second perspective looks at responsiveness in terms of attention
and investigates whether levels of/changes in citizens’ priorities have an impact on levels of/changes
in the government’s priorities on a given issue. Although some scholars may identify responsiveness
with policy change, hence prioritising position and discounting attention, both are relevant for rep-
resentation. In fact, beyond partisan opinions, there is no wrong answer to the normative question
of what is good representation. A government is a responsive representative if it changes its policy
positions in line with its citizens’ preferences. However, a government is also a responsive represent-
ative if it responds to the issues its citizens prioritise by emphasising such issues in its policy agenda,
legislative priorities or budget allocations. Whatever we prefer, there is no good answer a priori. This
dissertation is about responsiveness not to public preferences but to public priorities, hence respons-
iveness is not studied in terms of position but in terms of attention.
1.2 Synopsis and Prognosis
Building on theoretical studies on political competition as a multidimensional concept (Bartolini
1999, 2000; Strøm 1992) and on classical theories of party competition (Downs 1957; Robertson 1976;
Budge and Farlie 1983), I develop a stylised framework of competition for responsiveness. For doing
so, Chapter 2 first disentangles the differences between competition, competitiveness anddemocracy,
introduces the dimensions of competition, defines what responsiveness is and is not, introduces the
puzzles of responsiveness, and reviews the studies that link dynamic representation and electoral
competition. In Chapter 2 I select a set of conditions of competition, which I refer to as competitive
incentives, the impact ofwhichwill find empirical assessment on threeways of analysing government
responsiveness to public priorities: by looking at responsiveness in amore symbolic policy venue (ex-
ecutive speeches) as well as inmore substantive policy venues (budgetary policy and legislation). The
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idea of this dissertation is that different competitive incentives matter differently depending on the
stage of responsiveness.
If elections are instruments of democracy and governments aim to be reelected, then this will
be more likely if governments respond sympathetically to citizens’ concerns and demands. Govern-
mentswould then bemore likely to beworried about voters’ reactions if some competitive incentives
are present. The economic theory of democracy (Downs 1957; but see also Strøm 1992 and Bartolini
1999) and congressional studies (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1977) suggest that policy makers are afraid of
losing the elections and, hence, electoral vulnerability would make them more responsive in order
to achieve their goal. Other work based on issue ownership theories of party competition (Budge
and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996) points to different conditions that can be understood as incentives for
responsiveness. More specifically, I refer to what the literature calls the associative dimension of issue
ownership (Walgrave, Lefevere, andTresch 2012). Indeed, the fact that a party is associatedwithorhas
a good reputation on a given issue can increase the likelihood that the partywill prioritise those issues
at the expense of others and respond on those issues that the public also cares about. However, what
parties offer is also important. Governing and opposition parties’ policy proposals have serious im-
plications not only for voters and electoral outcomes, but also for responsiveness and representation.
Hence, ifwhat parties signal is clear anddifferentiated, then the consequences for responsivenessmay
be different than if what parties signal is unclear and undifferentiated (Bartolini 2000). Finally, the
electoral connection is also a very powerful incentive for governments to respond to what the public
wants (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999), therefore prox-
imity to elections is another crucial condition that may increase the likelihood of responsiveness.
Chapter 3 is devoted to themeasurement of both responsiveness and the competitive incentives.
On the government side of the opinion-policy link, what the government does is measured in three
different ways: executive speeches, public spending and legislation. On the citizens side, public opin-
ion is measured as public issue priorities (public preferences are only used in one empirical chapter).
For what concerns the competitive incentives, the focus is on those ones for which specific expecta-
tions are provided. Inparticular, I develop adynamicmeasure of governments’ electoral vulnerability
based on polling data on party support that tries to capture how vulnerable or safe governments are
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between elections. For the measurement of the other variables of competition I rely on established
measures.
Chapters 4 to 6 constitute the empirical part of the dissertation. Chapter 4 on rhetorical re-
sponsiveness asks whether governments (de-)emphasise certain issues in their policy agendas under
some specific incentives coming from party competition. Using data on executive speeches from
the Comparative Agendas Project in Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
this chapter produces evidence that has implications for both the policy agenda of governments and
government responsiveness to citizens’ priorities. First, when the issue is salient to the public and
the government is perceived as competent on the issue, electoral vulnerability does not have any
enhancing effect on responsiveness. Vulnerability matters to the extent that the government is not
associated with the issue. Second, independently their potential vulnerability at the polls, govern-
ments tend both to respond to the public and emphasise those issues in which they are perceived as
competent on, but the effect of competence is greater than the effect of salience. Third, there is no
evidence in the analysis that governments are more responsive when elections are approaching.
Chapter 5 on budgetary responsiveness askswhether governments respond to public priorities or
to public preferences and focuses on three competitive incentives. Using data on outlays in Canada,
Germany, Spain, theUnitedKingdom, and theUnited States, this chapter finds that public spending
does not respond to the most important problem/issue and that governments, in turn, respond to
preferences in spending. However, when it comes to budget, the effects expected from electoral com-
petition are limited. In particular, while vulnerable governments are notmore likely to be responsive
than safe ones, there is mixed evidence that a more differentiated political offer is a condition for re-
sponsiveness and electoral proximity seems to matter little, though more for preferences than for
priorities.
Chapter 6 on legislative responsiveness provides an alternative way of analysing policy respons-
iveness and uses data on enacted legislation from the Comparative Agendas Project in Spain, the
UnitedKingdom and theUnited States. This chapter finds that governments’ electoral vulnerability
seems not to have a conditional effect on legislative responsiveness and that, despite law productiv-
ity decreases when elections are approaching, legislative responsiveness seems to actually be higher
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in the election year compared to other years, meaning that policy makers are willing to play the sa-
liency card to increase their chances of reelection. At last, the chapter finds mixed results in relation
to the expectation that public priorities would have a greater effect on legislative priorities when the
government is associated with the issue and the issue is salient to the public.
Chapter 7 discusses the main findings of the dissertation and their implications for representa-
tion, but also describes its limitations and outlines developments for future research.
Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
This chapter bridges the literature on party competition and dynamic representation with its main
goal being to provide an empirical framework for governmental responsiveness to public opinion.
By selecting from the broad and extensive literature on party competition those dimensions that
are likely to influence, directly, governmental responsiveness, this chapter aims to offer a framework
that will be applied in the three empirical chapters of this dissertation. The chapter is structured as
follows.
The first section is devoted to disentangling the conceptual differences among the dimensions of
political competition at the basis of the competitive theory of democracy (Schumpeter 1954; Downs
1957). Such an exercise is useful to trace boundaries among these related concepts and, at the same
time, highlighting competitive incentives relevant for responsiveness. However, since this disserta-
tion is not about democracy, but about just one aspect of it, i.e., responsiveness, I refer the reader
to the conceptual literature about the similarities and differences among the notions of competi-
tion, competitiveness and democracy (D’Alimonte 1989; Strøm 1992; Bartolini 1999). The second
and third sections draw attention to the other main concept at the basis of this work. The second
section defines the concept of responsiveness from its neighbours. Indeed, responsiveness is often
confusedwith terms such as congruence, responsibility or accountability. The third section discusses
responsiveness in relation to specific theoretical and empirical issues and its aim is to come to an em-
pirical definition of responsiveness that will be utilised in this work. The fourth section reviews the
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few studies linking electoral competition and governmental responsiveness. Finally, the fifth section
proposes and discusses, in detail, the framework.
2.1 The Dimensions of Political Competition
Political competition is amulti-dimensional concept. Some dimensions of competition are therefore
more relevant than others for responsiveness. Through a discussion of the literature on the concept
of party competition, the goal of this section, though tedious, is to identify those dimensions that
will be eligible to be considered as necessary conditions for governments to respond to the public.
Electoral Uncertainty and the Demand Side of Competition
The first task is to clarify the difference between competition and competitiveness. Sartori enlight-
ens us when he says that “competition is a structure, or a rule of the game [while] competitiveness is
a particular state of the game”. [...] “Since competition includes competitiveness as a potentiality,
competition is equal to, and can be defined as, potential competitiveness. Conversely, competitiveness
presupposes competition [...] and is something to be measured in outcome [...]. Thus competitive-
ness is one of the properties or attributes of competition” (Sartori 1976: 218, emphasis in original).
This distinction is useful, asD’Alimonte (1989: 308-9) recognizes, inorder todifferentiate between
non-competitive and competitive party systems andwithin the latter, where a high level of symmetry
in the distribution of votes between the main parties is present. So, whereas the concept of compet-
ition is defined in terms of the number of parties, the concept of competitiveness is linked to the
distribution of votes among these parties (D’Alimonte 1989: 307). More precisely, “competition is
‘competitive’ when two ormore parties obtain close returns andwin on thinmargins” (Sartori 1976:
218). Clearly, Sartori is interested in the direction of competition – i.e., whether it is centripetal or
centrifugal – in relation to the format and mechanics of party systems.1
A more contemporary definition which isolates both structural and behavioural elements has
been given by Strøm (1990: 581): “electoral competition is the process by which parties exchange
1See also Mair (2002), who proposes a different typology where the open or closed structure of competition is an
important factor when examining party system change.
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[policy] benefits (or promises thereof) derived from their control of political institutions for elect-
oral support”, whereas “electoral competitiveness is the aggregate uncertainty of electoral contests
as perceived by party leaders. Specifically, competitiveness is the degree to which electoral results are
expected to vary across the set of feasible policy positions. The more electoral outcomes are expec-
ted to vary across policy positions, the more competitive the election” (Strøm 1990: 582). According
to Strøm (1989: 280), competitiveness “is probably the most common way in which the concept of
competition is used in party politics”.
Both Sartori’s and Strøm’s definitions relate to the competitiveness of the elections, and both
somehow incorporate the concept of electoral uncertainty. However, the crucial downside of these
definitions is that they refer to the uncertainty parties face at election time instead of the uncertainty
about future election outcomes (Elkins 1974). The concept of uncertainty in-between elections is
found in the literature and assumes different names. For Strøm (1989: 280-1) it is performance sensit-
ivity, for Bartolini (2000) incumbent vulnerability. In theAmerican context elite vulnerabilitymeans
competition, but different terms have been adopted such as closeness, uncertainty, decisiveness of
elections (Powell 1989), and changeability (Elkins 1974). Performance sensitivity is purely behavi-
oural and “depends both on the proportion of voters open to party persuasion and on the likelihood
that such persuasion will affect the aggregate results” (Strøm 1989: 281).2 Vulnerability of the incum-
bent refers to the degree of uncertainty about electoral results, but also captures party’s perception
of electoral uncertainty over time. It is when politicians perceive themselves to be more vulnerable
that they aremost inclined to choose policies closer to citizens’ desires (i.e. be responsive). According
to Bartolini (2000: 52-3), both the dimensions of actual past record and present uncertainty should
be incorporated into the idea of vulnerability. Indeed, the potential competitiveness is much more
relevant than the actual one (Barry 1970: 153), hence potential vulnerability is identified as the most
important dimension of competition for responsiveness.
2Note that performance sensitivity resembles one ofD’Alimonte’s (1989: 304-5) conditions of competition,meaning
the presence of a quota of available voters determines electoral success. This is essentially what Bartolini (1999) calls
electoral availability. It appears clear that in the literature there is no full agreement on whether to consider this quota of
available voters part of the notion of electoral vulnerability or embedded in the notion of electoral availability. The final
section of this chapter concludes that electoral availability is not a necessary condition for responsiveness and Chapter 3
gives a solution to this conceptual tension in the measurement of the concept of governments’ electoral vulnerability.
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The Supply Side of Competition
When parties elaborate their political offer they take on different policy positions. They can do
that in many ways. Parties can either compete in a cruder and directly confrontational way, as the
Downsian theory predicts, or they can compete in a more dynamic and smooth way emphasising
and de-emphasising certain issues, as the saliency theory suggests. Parties can even blur their posi-
tions on issues that would penalise them. Whatever they do, parties signal something to voters. If
what parties signal is clear and differentiated then the consequences for representation and respons-
ivenessmay be different than if what parties signal is unclear and undifferentiated. This is at the heart
of the concept of electoral decidability coined by Bartolini (2000) and characterises the supply side
(D’Alimonte 1989: 303) of party competition.
Whereas the emphasis at the basis of the Downsian theory of democracy, and its wide develop-
ment in the spatial modelling tradition (e.g., Enelow and Hinich 1984; McKelvey and Ordershook
1987; Riker and Ordershook 1968, 1973), is on the demand side of competition, in Downs and his
followers the supply side does not shine in its own light. InDowns (1957), in fact, political parties are
obliged to take account of the preferences of the electors, they are involuntarily forced while pursu-
ing their goal of votemaximization (see also Barry 1970). This is where the unintended social value of
competition lies: politicians are led to sympathetically respond to the citizens’ requests. Accordingly,
procedural democracy can become substantial democracy (Bartolini 1999: 448).
In opposition to the Downsian theory of democracy, different theories of party competition de-
veloped and assigned greater credit to the importance of what parties in competition offer.3 These
theories are based on concepts such as valence politics (Stokes 1963; Clarke et al. 2004), issue sali-
ence (Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie 1983; Budge et al. 2001; Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987;
Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994), issue ownership/issue competence (van der Brug 2004;
Bélanger and Meguid 2008; Green and Hobolt 2008; Petrocik 1996; Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch
3The exogeneity ofpreferences as oneof the crucial assumptions of economicmodels of competitionhasbeen largely
questioned (Zaller 1992; Dunleavy and Ward 1981; Dunleavy 1991; Meyer and Miller 2013) and studies consider that the
preferences of the public are not fixed but they can be manipulated by politicians (Zaller 1992; Hill and Hurley 1999;
Hakhverdian 2012; Lenz 2012). Though not the focus of this dissertation, this issue is clearly relevant for responsiveness
too, for it connects to the question of whether politicians are responsive at all, whether they simulate or pander (see
Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).
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2012) and issue competition (Carmines and Stimson 1993; Green-Pedersen 2007).
In particular, issue ownership theory posits that parties use rhetoric to direct citizens’ attention
towards issues the party “owns”, in the sense that the party has developed a long-term reputation
for competently handling these issues (e.g., Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Green and Hobolt
2008). In particular, the theory posits that mainstream, centre-right parties, notably conservative
and ChristianDemocratic parties, enjoy public images for competence on issues pertaining to crime,
national defense, and (arguably) immigration, whereasmainstream leftist parties, such as labour and
social democratic parties, enjoy superior images for managing social welfare domains. Issue own-
ership theory implies that parties benefit when the issues they own increase in public salience, so
that parties have electoral incentives to emphasise their core issues in order to direct voters’ attention
to these domains. Indeed, empirical research by Hobolt, Klemmensen, and Pickup (2009) docu-
ments that political parties’ policy rhetoric influences citizens’ issue priorities and extensive research
documents that political parties emphasise their core issues (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996;
Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch 2012).
Whereas other dimensions of competition such as electoral vulnerability and electoral contest-
ability (see below) can be conceived as systemic-level dimensions – as the former focuses on govern-
ments’ vulnerability and the latter on the “quality” of the political system – issue ownership involves
political parties more directly and introduces a puzzle for reelection-seeking governments. Govern-
ments face, in fact, a dilemma: if they aim at being reelected, are governing parties more likely to
reach this goal if they emphasise those issues the public is more concerned about or those issues they
are perceived as competent on? While poorly explored in comparative research, this question is relev-
ant and will be extensively addressed in Chapter 4, for issue ownership may undermine government
responsiveness to public concerns and demands if the issues that are salient to the public are not the
issues the government has a long-term reputation for.
To sum up, we can say that the supply side of competition contains two relevant dimensions:
one has to do with the polarisation of the political offer on a given issue, in other words, what Barto-
lini (2000) calls electoral decidability; the other dimension emphasises, instead, whether parties are
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perceived as competent on and cognitively associated with certain issues.4
The Procedural Side of Competition
The possibility to enter the race or, simply, to compete is the “politico-electoral market in which the
freedom of access is guaranteed both from the demand side (the electors) and the supply side (the
parties)” (D’Alimonte 1989: 303). Scholars commonly refer to this dimension of competition as elect-
oral contestability (Strøm 1989, 1992; Bartolini 1999) and here is where democracy and competition
overlap. Contestability “refers to potential, rather than actual, competition” (Strøm 1989: 279), that
is, to the requirements to enter the race, the possibility of accessing the resources necessary for an
electoral race, and the possibility of being represented in legislative bodies (Bartolini 1999).5
There are, at least, three types of barriers to entry: registrationbarriers that a newparty has to face
after its formation; recognition barriers in access to media and campaign funding; representational
barriers related to the electoral system that prevents competitors from winning seats and represent-
ation. In general, high barriers may discourage new entries and the incumbent political elite would
have strong incentives for collusion which may reduce responsiveness.6 However, low barriers may
allow excessive fragmentation of the political offer leading, at the extreme, to political chaos. So, it
should be desirable to strike a balance.
As discussed throughout the chapter, scholars’ attention has been primarily focused on repres-
entational barriers and, especially, on the link between proportionality of electoral systems and re-
sponsiveness (Wlezien and Soroka 2012; Soroka andWlezien 2015). Yet, as argued in the final part of
this chapter, electoral contestability, however relevant, cannot be considered as a necessary condition
4However, “competence” is not the only dimension of issue ownership; “associative” issue ownership is “the con-
sequence of long-term party attention to the issue” and refers to the “spontaneous identification of parties with issues in
the minds of voters, regardless of whether voters consider the party to be the most competent to deal with these issues”
(Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch 2012).
5It is worth making a distinction here between contestability and competitiveness. Although there might be a pos-
sible empirical overlap among their indicators, these two concepts are theoretically different. The former is the potential
or opportunity to take part in competitive interactions, the latter is the intensity of competition itself (Bartolini 1996:
218-9).
6This is in contrast with the theory of the cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995), which suggests the opposite, that is,
high barriers encourage collusion and then discourage new entries. InDownsian theory, parties act as perfect competitors
therefore no possibility of collusion among each other is considered. In Downs the mechanism preventing collusion is
the threat of new parties emerging and the cost of entering the competition is supposed to be very small (Miller 1983:
148). In politics, such barriers are much higher than in the economy and can originate from different sources, such as
access to registration, media, campaign funding, and representation.
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for responsiveness.
These are the conditions of competition that are directly or indirectly related to responsiveness
and that will be discussed in detail when the empirical frameworkwill be introduced. The next three
sections are, instead, devoted to responsiveness. In the first, the latter is defined a contrario clarifying
what responsiveness is not; in the second, the puzzle of responsiveness is unpacked and a definition
is given; the third section revises the empirical studies linking electoral competition and dynamic
representation.
2.2 What Responsiveness Is and Is Not
There is little disagreement among scholars about whether the notion of responsiveness is confused
with other neighbouring concepts such as accountability, responsibility or representation; however,
responsiveness is sometimes conflated with the notion of congruence. Although for Pitkin (1967:
209), political representationmeans “acting in the interest of the represented, in amanner responsive
to them”, substantive representation is only one meaning of representation and representatives can
act according to different styles of representation (see Eulau et al. 1959;McCrone andKuklinski 1979;
Strøm 2000).
Though strictly related,7 rarely is responsiveness conflated with accountability. Indeed, “ac-
countable means subject to the obligation to report, justify and be ‘responsible’ for his/her own
action before somebody else, rather responsive points to a ready and sympathetic response, to be-
ing receptive of somebody else’s requests and opinion” (Bartolini 1999: 448). So, “an accountability
theory of democracy requires only a regular renewal of the mandate to rule, and it is not concerned
by what politicians should be accountable for”; a responsiveness theory of democracy, instead, needs
“accountability to be transformed into the need to respond” (Bartolini 1999: 448-9). Thismeans that
accountability and responsiveness are not only different notions, but also different goals of demo-
cracy.
Responsiveness is also different from responsibility and it is hard to get a representative who is
7The link is well highlighted in Eulau’s and Prewitt’s words: “the men who rule are responsive to the preferences
of the ruled because the rulers, as elected officials, can be and are held accountable through the simple mechanism of
eviction from office” (Eulau and Prewitt 1973: 446).
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highly responsive and highly responsible at the same time (Sartori 1968: 469). This incompatibil-
ity had been already raised by Sartori (1987: 170), for whom responsiveness and responsibility are
two intrinsic ingredients of representation, but the former is detrimental to the latter as a responsive
government can also be a very irresponsible government. This is a crucial point concerning demo-
cratic theory as governments are called to act both responsibly and responsively. However, while
responsibility would be associated with long run behaviour, by providing consistency and predict-
ability (Downs 1957: 105), responsiveness deals more with the short run. This is due to the fact that
public opinion can change its mind over and over again – and this implies a more responsive rather
than responsible behaviour – but also because a change in the government from one election to an-
other might imply an interruption in policy continuity.
More problematic is the difference between congruence and responsiveness, for the notion of
congruence is found in the literature of representation associated with several meanings. While in
Miller and Stokes (1963) and Page and Shapiro (1983) congruence is actually used as a measure of re-
sponsiveness, there are at least two other approaches in which it is defined as something different.8
On the one hand, congruence takes the meaning of mandate responsiveness. In Klingemann, Hof-
ferbert, and Budge (1994) citizens are totally excluded, as congruence becomes the correspondence
between what parties say and what governments do (essentially, what responsibility is for Downs).
Hence, congruence is measured by the correspondence between party manifestos and public ex-
penditures on certain policy domains. Is this responsiveness? It depends onwhether we acceptman-
date responsiveness as a kind of responsiveness, or whether for us it is just amatter of fulfilling prom-
ises. Mandate responsiveness occurs if a politician or partymakes clear campaignpromises and fulfills
these promises once in office (Stokes 2001). According toRoberts (2010: 38), thisworks prospectively
as follows: (1) parties present clear and distinct programs (programmaticness), (2) voters understand
campaigns and choose based on them (issue voting), (3) governing parties follow through on their
promises (promise fulﬁllment). So, if we accept that the majority of citizens at elections choose a cer-
8Lax and Phillips (2009: 368) do not simplify the picture when they differentiate between policy “responsive to
policy specific opinion” and policy “congruent with the preferences of opinion majorities” (emphasis in original). For
them, responsiveness occurs when there is a positive and significant correlation between opinion and policy (if support
for a policy grows, so does the probability of its adaption). Congruence, instead, occurs when policy matches majority
opinion.
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tain political offer among available party programs or coalition agreements, and if the government,
once in office, is responsive to the mandate, then we can also accept that the government is not only
directly responsive to themandate but also indirectly responsive to themajority of citizens that chose
that political offer. Yet it has to be clear that, given this indirect link, through elections, “a first pref-
erence for a party cannot be interpreted as a first preference for a specific policy” (van der Brug 2001:
115).
On the other hand, congruence is conceived as the correspondence between citizens’ issue prefer-
ences and party positions on those issues.9 The justification is that citizens have policy positions and
the position that has the best claim to represent the “most preferred” policy is the position of theme-
dian voter. On a single issue, or a single-issue dimension, if we assume that the preferences of voters
are single-peaked, the position of the median voter is the only policy that is preferred to all others by
amajority of voters (Huber and Powell 1994: 292-3). Scholars tend to assume that party competition
is structured along a left-right dimension, which is a summary of political positions and a political
orientation that helps individuals to make political choices (Dalton 1985; Klingemann, Hofferbert,
and Budge 1994; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999). This meaning of congruence adopts the distance
between citizens and governments to analyse how close the latter is to the former. The closer the
parties in government to the citizens on the left-right scale, the higher the congruence; conversely,
the larger the distance, the lower the congruence. The point is that, in this operationalisation, con-
gruence handles ideological positions not government outputs. As also Powell (2000) recognises,
we are comparing only differences in general orientations, we are definitely not looking at specific
policies or at implementation of policy positions. For this reason if we use this approach we have to
be aware that we are not capturing responsiveness but congruence.
What Responsiveness Is
As Sartori reminds us, “the crux of defining consists of separating thedeﬁning properties (or necessary
characteristics) from the accompanying properties (contingent or accidental characteristics)” (1984: It.
ed. 2011, 190). Now, what are the defining properties of responsiveness? Firstly, responsiveness re-
9For a summary of the approaches used to measure ideological congruence see Powell (2009), whereas for a review
of the recent contributions see Arnold and Franklin (2012).
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quires the existence of two actors: the public (citizens or voters), on the one hand, and politicians
(governments or representatives), on the other hand. Secondly, responsiveness is a relationship-wise
concept linking citizens and politicians. However, this property would not differentiate responsive-
ness fromother “neighbouring” concepts such as accountability or responsibility, so the relationship-
wise element is crucial but not sufficient to distinguish responsiveness from other concepts. What
is still missing is the term correspondence. However, to say that there must be a correspondence
between what the people want and what the government does, i.e. a correspondence between input
and output, means essentially congruence rather than responsiveness. I remind that there is congru-
encewhen the position of the citizen/voter and the position of the party/government are equivalent.
Responsiveness, instead, means that someone (the government) in the current period is responding
to someone else’s (the public) previous preferences/priorities. Since this dissertation is concerned
about government’s issue attention and not government’s issue position, I define responsiveness as
an increase in levels of government attention in the current period as a consequence of an increase in
levels of public issue salience in the previous period.
2.3 Electoral Competition and Dynamic Representation
The connection between citizens and politicians has been fundamentally studied under three per-
spectives: as (1) dyadic representation (Bartels 1991; Eulau et al. 1959; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979;
Miller and Stokes 1963; Soroka, Penner, and Blidook 2009), (2) collective representation (Brooks
1985; Erikson, Wright, and Mciver 1989; Monroe 1979; Page and Shapiro 1983; Weissberg 1978), and
(3) dynamic representation (Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Wlezien 1995; Erikson, Mackuen,
and Stimson 2002; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka andWlezien 2010; John, Bevan, and Jen-
nings 2011; Bertelli and John 2012; Bevan and Jennings 2014). In this section, I will only concentrate
on the third approach, as I am interested in governmental responsiveness, and focus specifically on
those studies linking dynamic representation and electoral competition.
Work that studies the effects of electoral competition (or, to put it broadly, institutional com-
ponents) on dynamic representation is rare. Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson’s (1995) seminal work
can be acknowledged as the first effort to introduce a dynamic feature in the study of representa-
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tion and responsiveness. Public opinion moves meaningfully over time, government officials sense
this movement, those officials alter their behaviour in response to the sensed movement (Stimson,
Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002). Here policy responsiveness acts
through twomechanisms: (1) elections change the government’s political composition, which is then
reflected in new policy (electoral turnover) and (2) policymakers calculate future (mainly electoral)
implications of current public views and act accordingly (rational anticipation). The advantage is
that there are two avenues, one acts through parties (partisanship of government) while the other is
a dynamic direct component. Public opinion influences election outcomes and both have an impact
on public policy.
When political institutions are added to dynamic representation the picture becomes extremely
complex. Only a few studies introduce the institutional component to dynamic models. In their
comparative study on Denmark, the UK and the US, Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) classify re-
sponsiveness as rhetorical, when analysing executive speeches, and eective, when dealing with gov-
ernment expenditures. Citizens’ priorities are captured using the so-called “most important prob-
lem”question. Assuming that issue salience is a key component of political competition,Hobolt and
Klemmensen select two main institutional factors and conceptualise competition as contestability,
defined as the uncertainty facing the executive in electoral contexts (for a different conceptualisation
see Bartolini’s (1999) and Strøm’s (1989) work), and executive discretion, which refers to the con-
straints faced by the executive in the legislative process. Though the impact of institutional features
(electoral system, separation of powers, conflict of interest between the executive and the legislature)
is tested in their study, the most interesting hypothesis for my project is the one regarding electoral
uncertainty: the greater the uncertainty about future electoral contests, the higher the responsive-
ness of the executive (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008: 314), which is confirmed in some policy areas
but not in others (see also Hakhverdian 2010).
More recently, Pickup and Hobolt (2015) use the Canadian case to continue where Hobolt and
Klemmensen (2008) stopped. Motivated by the perennial debate between representativeness and ef-
fectiveness, they analyse how government majority/minority status and popularity shape the trade-
off between government responsiveness and effectiveness. Looking at legislative outputs and public
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expenditures, they find that minority governments are more responsive to the median voter – for
minority governments would face legislative constraints that incentivize them to be responsive to
the public – but less legislatively effective thanmajority governments. Government popularitymod-
erates these effects in the way the competitive theory of democracy would suggest.
In parallel,Wlezien and Soroka (2012) and Soroka andWlezien (2015) introduce the institutional
component in the connection between their thermostatic model and three kinds of institutions:
(1) the parliamentary/presidential dimension, (2) the central/federal dimension, and (3) the propor-
tional/majoritarian dimension of the electoral system. According to this approach, a responsive pub-
lic behavesmuch like a thermostat (Wlezien 1995), that is, the public adjusts its preferences for “more”
or “less” policy in response to what policymakers do. When policy increases (decreases), the pref-
erence for more policy decreases (increases) (Franklin and Wlezien 1997; Wlezien 2004; Soroka and
Wlezien 2010). Here, “the opinion-policy relationship suggests not just that policymakers respond to
the public, but that the public adjusts its preferences over time in reaction to policy change” (Soroka
and Wlezien 2004a). Soroka and Wlezien find that political institutions matter for representation
and responsiveness and that they matter in different ways. In particular, in contrast with previous
work (Powell 2000; but see also Golder and Stramski 2010), their results indicate that governments
in proportional systems are less responsive to changing public opinion (Wlezien and Soroka 2012)
and that this effect is mediated by party fragmentation (Soroka andWlezien 2015).
Similarly to the work by Sara Hobolt and colleagues, Soroka and Wlezien (2010: 137-140) test
the marginality hypothesis in the US, the UK and Canada using their thermostatic model for social
domains. The authors find that the interaction between marginality and preferences is negative and
significant only for the US, meaning that when vote margins increase, governmental responsiveness
to public preferences decreases. They account for the negative findings for the UK and Canada sug-
gesting that, perhaps, governments are more sensitive to vote intentions rather than vote shares and
that marginality probably does not adequately capture the effects of disproportionality (Soroka and
Wlezien 2010: 140).
Finally, recent work linking public and government priorities in their policy agendas, known
as dynamic agenda representation, has also been open to include electoral factors and institutional
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components. In particular, testing the electoral connection hypothesis for which representatives are
more likely to be responsive when elections are approaching, Chaqués Bonafont and Palau (2011)
find that responsiveness is higher in the first year after elections, probably because of a honeymoon
effect (Green and Jennings 2014) between voters and the newly (re)elected government. Moreover,
in their comparative study of the UK and the US, Bevan and Jennings (2014) find that responsive-
ness of policy agendas to public priorities is greater when institutions are subject to less friction, and
declines as friction against policy change increases. Interestingly, using the business metaphor, Ber-
telli and John (2012) build a theory of public-policy investment, tested in theUK,where government
responsiveness to the public is moderated by policy risk and return as well as manifesto promises and
issue ownership incentives.
To sum up, with few exceptions, there is still much to explore in relation to the conditioning ef-
fects of incentives coming from electoral competition on government responsiveness. The next and
final section brings the dimensions of competition back in and presents the framework for respons-
iveness that will be tested along the empirical chapters.
2.4 A Framework for Responsiveness
If we think of responsiveness not as a dichotomous concept (yes/no), but in terms of degrees, then
we can identify a set of stages or levels of responsiveness. A similar way of approaching the issue
has also been used by other scholars (Eulau and Karps 1977; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Schu-
maker 1975; Cohen 1997).10 While Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) distinguish between rhetorical
and policy responsiveness, Schumaker (1975) elaborates five types of responsiveness (access, agenda,
policy, output, impact). Cohen (1997: 26-28) is a kind of in-between since he distinguishes between
symbolic and substantive policy activities of presidents, claiming that presidential responsiveness to
public opinion is higher in the former and thendeclines as decisions becomemore substantive. How-
ever, he also analyses responsiveness in four presidential policy activities: problem identification in
10A different approach is used, for instance, by Powell, who defines responsiveness as “the democratic process which
induces the government to form and implement policies that the citizens want” (2004b: 91). If we follow this definition,
then any other government action which is not implementing policies would not be considered as responsive. However,
this would reduce the dynamics of politics dismissing a set of intermediate situations where the government somehow
reacts, though without changing its mind in terms of policy change.
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agenda setting, position taking in agenda setting, policy formulation, and position taking on roll
calls before Congress. Eulau and Karps (1977) propose different components of responsiveness but
related to the representative level, though they also talk about policy responsiveness.
Figure 2.1 shows the stages of responsiveness. The lowest level implies what I call input receptiv-
ity of a given issue, which recalls what Schumaker (1975: 494) names access responsiveness and what
Morales (2013) simply calls increased attention.11 Empirical examples of input receptivitymay be gov-
ernment’s declarations to the media which acknowledge that the government became aware of the
increase of public salience in a given issue. This can be seen as the first stage of the ladder and the
prior step of a government’s increased attention on the issue in its policy agenda. When the govern-
ment starts talking about this issue in its policy agenda, then it indicates a concern for the issue, an
openness to address it and a willingness to search for a solution for it. This stage can be called rhet-
orical responsiveness, as the government responds in words but not yet in actions. If the government
reacts through legislative actions or by setting the budget, then we can talk about responsiveness in a
more consistent way. However, policy responsiveness can also show different levels. For this reason,
Morales (2013) introduces the distinction between moderate and substantive policy responsiveness.
There ismoderate policy responsivenesswhenminor aspects of the policy change or minor changes in
legislation occur; we can rather talk of substantive policy responsiveness when there is a major policy
change in linewith the citizens’ demands. I exclude Schumaker’s types four and five (output respons-
iveness and impact responsiveness) as they imply responsiveness of thewhole political systemandnot
only the government’s.
In the empirical part of this study, I only focus on the rhetorical responsiveness and the policy
responsiveness stages (see Table 2.1 and Chapter 3 for details). I warn the reader that, if it is conceptu-
ally reasonable to distinguish betweenmoderate and substantive policy responsiveness, the empirical
approach chosendoes not easily accommodate this distinction, for it is hard to consider public spend-
ing and legislation as eithermoderate or substantive policy reactions. This is primarily due to the fact
that responsiveness is here analysed as attention rather than position.
In the light of this necessary discussion, I canmove to introducing the framework adopted in this
11In his Italian writings on democracy, Sartori translates responsiveness as receptivity, though here it takes the mean-
ing of lowest stage in the ladder.
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Figure 2.1: Stages of responsiveness
Source: Author’s own, adapted fromHobolt and Klemmensen (2008) andMorales (2013).
dissertation. The theoretical framework stylised in Figure 2.2 builds on the so-called Friedrich’s (1963)
“mechanismof anticipated reactions” and argues that if governments aim to be reelected, theywill be
more likely to reach such a goal if they respond sympathetically to citizens’ preferences and priorities
(see Bartolini 1999). The argument is cynical in the very Downsian sense that governments pursue
policies in order to be reelected rather than seeking reelection in order to implement policies (but
seeWittman 1977; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).12 Only if politicians are worried about the reactions of
voters will they be “constantly piloted by the anticipation of those reactions” (Sartori 1977: 350).
12Of course, reelection is not the unique goal of politicians, as Strøm (1990), for instance, recalls. Nonetheless, politi-
cians couldnot achieve other goals unless they are able to remain in office (though see the special case of parties supporting
single-partyminority governments). This is particularly true for legislators (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1977; Sulkin 2005), but
the same logic can be easily applied to the incumbent government as well.
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Figure 2.2: Simplified framework of electoral competition for responsiveness
Source: Author’s own.
Governments would then be more likely to be worried about voters’ reactions if some compet-
itive incentives occur. Such an expectation is given by the dashed line in Figure 2.2, which captures
the interactive effect of the competitive incentives on responsiveness. Note that, although respons-
iveness can be directional – from opinion to policy and vice versa –my project focuses on the impact
of public opinion and specifically, public priorities, on government activity. This causal relationship
is given by the solid line.
As mentioned previously, not all dimensions of competition are direct incentives for respons-
iveness. Table 2.1 enumerates these dimensions based on their status as (un)necessary conditions for
responsiveness. Electoral contestability represents the procedural dimension of competition, that is,
the barriers parties have to face for entering competition. Electoral availability depicts the demand
side of competition, given by the fraction of voters willing to switch from one party to another. The
supply side of competition includes both the positional and valence components. The former is em-
bodied by electoral decidability, meaning how clear and differentiated the political offer is, while the
latter is portrayed by issue competence, defined as the historical reputation a party is associated with
on a given issue. Lastly, electoral uncertainty between elections is captured by the concept of elect-
oral vulnerability, and electoral proximity is the final incentive for governments to respond. Each
competitive incentive and its expectation for responsiveness will be briefly discussed below.
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Table 2.1: Dimensions of electoral competition and status
Dimension Necessary condition Expected effect Empirical test in chapter
Electoral Vulnerability Yes + 4, 5, 6
Electoral Decidability Yes + 5
Issue Competence/Ideological Proximity Yes –/+ 4, 6
Electoral Proximity Yes + 4, 5, 6
Electoral Contestability No n.a. n.a.
Electoral Availability No n.a. n.a.
Source: Author’s own.
Necessary Conditions for Responsiveness
Incumbent vulnerability is at the core of the connection between responsiveness and competition. If
the mechanism of democracy stems from the potential electoral sanctions or, in other words, on the
will of being reelected, and if the incumbent aims to achieve this goal, he/she will need to anticipate
sympathetically voters’ preferences. This mechanism will perform better if the incumbent perceives
himself/herself as vulnerable (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1977). Strøm (1989: 280-1) calls this mechanism
performance sensitivity, Bartolini (2000) uses the term incumbent vulnerability, which is the one
adopted here. What differentiates the notion of vulnerability from other variants of competitive-
ness used in the literature, such as closeness, uncertainty, decisiveness of elections or changeability, is
that all these terms refer to the vulnerability of governments at the election time. The main differ-
ence with the notion of vulnerability preferred in this dissertation lies on the fact that governments
can also feel vulnerable during the electoral cycle. In other words, the interest is not in the actual
vulnerability of governments but in their potential vulnerability as a driver of responsiveness, simply
because responsiveness occurs between elections. Though both dimensions of actual past record and
present uncertainty should be incorporated into the idea of vulnerability (Bartolini 2000: 52-3), the
potential vulnerability is much more relevant than the actual one.
Pressure may come on governments when elections are approaching. I refer to the behavioural
element often called electoral connection (Mayhew 1974), or electoral proximity (Canes-Wrone and
Shotts 2004). In fact, politicians in general are interested in reelection and concerned when elec-
tions are approaching, for elections are described as a very powerful potential driver of responsive-
ness (Stimson,Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999). In fact, politicians
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will find it faster and less risky to respond to public opinion rather than to attempt to change it (see,
e.g. Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). Moreover, because voters are unlikely to observe the outcome of a
policy choice made shortly before an election, presidents are more likely to cater to current opinion
as the next election is coming (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004: 693).
The third main electoral incentive is given by electoral decidability and requires a bit more elab-
oration. Politicians are ambiguous because it is in their rational self-interest to be so, in order to
maximise support (Downs 1957: 132-139; in contrast, see Shepsle 1972). The spatial model of elections
predicts that voters evaluate where parties stand on issues (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984).
In its original formulation, the spatial model of elections predicts that for parties it is rational to be
ambiguous about their policies in order to maximise their support in a two-party system; parties, in-
stead, try to be relatively unequivocal about their policies in a multi-party system, since they appeal
directly only to a narrow range of voters (Downs 1957: 160, 132-139). Empirical research found that
this prediction is only partially confirmed. In fact, parties do actually differentiate their policy posi-
tions from one another (Adams 2001; Budge 1994; Budge et al. 2001) and voters weight issues most
heavily when there are clear differences between the parties on the issues (Alvarez and Nagler 2004).
If being broadly-appealing can be a winning strategy to gain votes (Somer-Topcu 2015), it would
be instead not beneficial for responsiveness. If the political offer is unclear and undifferentiated, i.e.
undecidable, and parties can blur their policy positions then it will be harder for voters to choose
the offer that is rationally closer to their preferences (Key 1966; Page 1978; Alvarez and Nagler 2004;
Wessels and Schmitt 2008; Lachat 2008, 2011). This is where other factors different from policy
arguments can prevail for voters to decide on their political choice. Such elements can be related,
for instance, to phenomena of party identification or issue competence (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960;
Stokes 1966; Green and Hobolt 2008).13 In this case, the choice of voters will not essentially be the
13However, recent research on valence voting and party system polarisation shows that the two things are not unre-
lated. For example, Clark and Leiter (2013: 19) find that “parties’ character-based valence attributes have a greater effect
on vote shares when the parties become more ideologically dispersed” (emphasis in original). In line with these results,
Pardos-Prado (2012) finds no evidence suggesting that valence is associated with consensus; instead, party competence
perceptions are positively correlated with party ideological polarisation. Moreover, Vegetti (2014) argues that, in po-
larised contexts, citizens are more likely to be attached to a party and hence to perceive it ideologically closer and more
competent. The implication is crucial because, “when polarisation is high, themeaning of the vote choice can be reduced
to nothing more than an expression of partisan loyalty” (Vegetti 2014: 240). In this sense, positional and valence ways of
thinking are not contradictory (Pardos-Prado 2012) but rather two extremes on the same continuum (De Sio 2010).
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consequence of the political offer or, at least, not only of that, and a retrospective evaluation will
prevail (Key 1966). So far so good if we were interested in explaining patterns of voting behaviour
and accountability. A step forward is required to move from an accountability to a responsiveness
evaluation.
Theoretically, if party responsiveness to public opinion is understood in terms of policy and if
the choice of voters is successfully deviated from their policy choice, then for parties it is no longer
strictly necessary to respond to the policy preferences/priorities of the public, because if the political
offer is undecidable the choice of voters cannot be interpreted in response to the political offer itself
(Bartolini 2000). This makes it difficult to say whether we can still talk about policy responsiveness.
Indeed, this makes it difficult to say whether we can talk about responsiveness at all: “since govern-
ment actions are concealed from the citizens, there is no need to do what the people want” (Page
1976: 750). If parties are able to collude and deviate the attention on other issues that are not related
to policy then the choice of voters will be hardly interpretable as policy preference and this would
create a clear incentive for parties not to respond to public policy preferences.
This theoretical insights about the political offer, originatingwithDowns and developed by Bar-
tolini, would be perfectly suitable if I looked at public preferences. However, this work is about
public priorities, therefore, an adaptation is required to avoid a disconnection between theory and
operationalisation.14 This adaptation is given by the saliency theory of party competition (Budge
and Farlie 1983; Budge, Robertson, andHearl 1987;Klingemann,Hofferbert, andBudge 1994; Budge
et al. 2001), according towhich parties take positions by emphasising the importance of certain issues
or, better, policy areas, compared to others.15 This way of approaching party competition in terms
of emphasis rather than directionality relates well with the idea that, before showing preferences,
people have priorities and evaluate issues according to their perceived importance (seeWlezien 2005;
Bevan and Jennings 2014: 39). That is why comparing the priorities of the public and the positions
emphasised by parties does have sense.
Finally, issue ownership can also be conceived as necessary condition for responsiveness. Yet its
14The justification of this choice is well explained in the next chapter.
15Thisway of conceptualising party competition differs fromDowns’s where parties compete by opposing positions,
but also differs from the directional theory of voting (Rabinowitz andMacdonald 1989), which assumes thatmost people
have a diffuse preference for a certain policy direction and this preference varies in intensity across people.
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direction is less straightforward. As Iwill better explain inChapters 4 and6, it is, in fact, reasonable to
expect a trade-off between (agenda) responsiveness to the issues prioritised by the public and respons-
iveness to the issues on which governmental parties have a good reputation (Chapter 4). Sometimes,
in fact, the issues the public cares about and the issues the government is competent on are not the
same. However, it can also be plausible to expect that there might be an interactive effect between
government ideology and public opinion (Chapter 6), meaning that (legislative) responsiveness to
public priorities might increase on those issues the government is ideologically closer to.
Non-Necessary Conditions for Responsiveness
Electoral contestability is not a necessary condition for responsiveness (Bartolini 2000: 56). The link
between these two concepts leaves room for ambiguity. While any actual barrier for entering com-
petition is an incentive for collusion among incumbents – hence, an opportunity for reducing re-
sponsiveness – electoral contestability might have an indirect effect on responsiveness through other
dimensions of competition. See, in particular, the case of electoral vulnerability, where established
parties will feel more vulnerable and, hence, compelled to respond, when new challenging parties
face lower barriers to access the party system. Although lower barriers mean higher representation,
this does not necessarily imply an increase in responsiveness, too. Certainly, barriers created by the
electoral system are the most relevant in relation to responsiveness; this finds confirmation in the
large number of studies analysing how electoral institutions influence electoral outcomes and from
more recent studies on governmental responsiveness (Pickup and Hobolt 2015; Soroka andWlezien
2015). However, for the reasons just mentioned, in the empirical chapters no hypothesis theorising
the linkage between this dimension of competition and responsiveness will be proposed.
Electoral availability, as well as electoral contestability, is not expected to influence responsive-
ness directly. Electoral availability is instead a necessary but not sufficient condition of both electoral
decidability and electoral vulnerability (Bartolini 2000: 56). The availability-decidability connec-
tion is bidirectional and given by the fact that available voters are motivated by the differentiation of
the political offer (and the consequent perception of different potential outcomes). Indeed, a clear
and differentiated political offer is also a condition facilitating the available voters’ decision (see also
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Wessels and Schmitt 2006: 5). What is critical for decidability is not the number of available voters
themselves, but their preferences, as long as there are “some” voters available. In turn, availability is
necessary for parties to elaborate a stable political offer.
Electoral availability is also a condition of electoral vulnerability and implies what competition
for votes, essentially, is. Competition exists to the extent that voters are willing to consider more
than one party as an acceptable choice, that is, “when there are voters in competition” (Mair 1997:
157). As van der Eijk and Oppenhuis (1991: 56) recall, “the concept of electoral competition is, in
its essence, dispositional in character”. For this reason, “actual behaviour (i.e. party choice) cannot
reveal its existence; it refers only to the final result of competition” (van der Eijk and Oppenhuis
1991: 57). As it will be clear from Chapter 3, this potential component of electoral availability can be
incorporated in themeasurement of electoral vulnerability as one of its features (Kroh, van der Brug,
and van der Eijk 2007; Orlowski 2013; Wagner 2013). If the availability relevant for decidability has
a negative connotation – the lower the availability, the better for the stability of the political offer –
the availability as condition of vulnerability embodies, instead, a positive element in terms of voter’s
propensity to switch party – the higher the availability, the higher the vulnerability. Both are equally
important.16
As for electoral contestability, no empirical expectations on a direct link between electoral avail-
ability and responsiveness will be theorised and tested. However, note that an empirical control for
electoral contestability will be included in the empirical models and the underlying notion of uncer-
tainty present in the concept of electoral availabilitywill be taken into considerationwhenmeasuring
electoral vulnerability.
2.5 From Theory to Practice
This chapter has critically discussed the literature on party competition and responsiveness and how
the two concepts are linked together. The aim was to introduce all the relevant elements to get to an
essential empirical framework that gives me the instruments for analysing whether electoral incent-
16Paraphrasing the distinction formulated by Sartori (1976: Ch. 10) between domains of identiﬁcation and dimen-
sions of competition, when voters are available, the dimensions of competition are open and when voters are, rather, not
available, domains of identification prevail.
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ives matter for governmental responsiveness to public priorities. Only the impact of those dimen-
sions of competition defined as necessary conditions for responsivenesswill be tested in the empirical
chapters (4, 5, and 6). Though specific hypotheses will be presented in each chapter and counter-
arguments will be formulated, the general orientation is that the presence of the selected electoral
incentives (see Table 2.1) would help increase the likelihood of responsiveness. In particular, govern-
ments’ electoral vulnerability and electoral closeness are considered key incentives for governments
to respond. However, whether what the major competitors offer is decidable for voters and whether
governing parties are perceived as competent on the issues may also have a facilitating effect on re-
sponsiveness.
The next chapter discusses how the concepts defined here are measured and which data are
used in the empirical analyses to test the broader expectations introduced in the final section of this
chapter. On the one hand, Chapter 3 gives an overview of how the empirical analysis is conducted
and of the data collected to measure public opinion and government reaction. On the other hand,
among the competitive incentives, special attention is given to how electoral vulnerability and elect-
oral decidability are measured.
Chapter 3
Measurement and Data Overview
This chapter is devoted to explaining how dependent and independent variables are measured and
withwhichdata. The chapter develops as follows. First, a discussion recalling the stages of responsive-
ness introduced in the previous chapter to explain how government action (the dependent variable)
is operationalised. Second, the other side of the responsiveness relationship is considered. Public
opinion is, in fact, measured through public priorities and this pragmatic choice accounts for the de-
bate between attention and position. A third section is dedicated to the competitive incentives and
how they are operationalised. In particular, I am interested only in those that are directly related to
responsiveness, but some room is left for those dimensions of competition that are not considered
as necessary conditions for responsiveness.
3.1 What the Government Does
Government responsiveness can theoretically vary fromno reaction to ahigh reaction in termsof sub-
stantive policy responsiveness. In my dissertation, I analyse responsiveness by focusing on two types
of reaction: amore symbolic and rhetorical reaction, using issue emphases in executive speeches, and
amore substantive reaction, utilising both budget allocation in government spending and legislative
priorities by looking at enacted laws. This section deals with the upper side of Figure 3.1, while the
lower side will be addressed next.
The debate around whether we analyse responsiveness in a more symbolic or substantive fash-
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ion recalls the Hamletic doubt on the distinction between attention and position exposed in the
Introduction. Responsiveness, in fact, has been analysed under two different perspectives. The first
perspective looks at responsiveness in terms of position and investigates whether levels of/changes
in citizens’ preferences have an impact on levels of/changes in the government’s position on a given
issue. The second perspective looks at responsiveness in terms of attention and investigates whether
levels of/changes in citizens’ priorities have an impact on levels of/changes in the government’s prior-
ities on a given issue. My argument is that, although some scholars may identify responsiveness only
with policy change, hence prioritising position and discounting attention, there is no right or wrong
answer to the question of who is a good representative, for they are both relevant for representation
1.
Figure 3.1: Empirical analysis of government responsiveness
Source: Author’s own.
Precisely, agenda responsiveness is not simply an increase in government attention to citizens’ pri-
orities, for it can be translated into policy. In fact, there is evidence for agenda responsiveness in the
US (Edwards andWood 1999), consistency between executive agendas and legislative outputs in the
UK (Bara 2005; Bevan, John, and Jennings 2011), and comparative evidence of congruence between
party rhetorics and party policy outputs in parliament (Bischof 2014). Yet the issue of whether re-
sponsiveness can also be found in governments’ agenda and not only in substantive policy is still
controversial. While policy agenda scholars are open to apply the term “policy-opinion responsive-
ness” to governments’ reaction in their policy agendas (seeBevan and Jennings 2010; John, Bevan, and
Jennings 2011; Bertelli and John 2012), students of responsiveness/representation are, instead, more
1Note that the boundary between attention and position is not always as clear as I have presented it. Sometimes, in
fact, salience or attention means position. This is the case, for instance, of the environmental issue for a green party and,
perhaps, the case of crime and public order for a conservative party.
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conservative, narrowing responsiveness to policy only (Powell 2004a; Soroka andWlezien 2010).
Since we can think of responsiveness in terms of degrees of reaction, my perspective is that atten-
tion matters as well as position and that in order to have the latter, in principle, we first need to have
the former.
Rhetorical Responsiveness
Rhetorical responsiveness on the government side is measured using data on executive speeches as
collected by theComparativeAgendas Project (CAP) in linewith the codebook originally created for
the Policy Agendas Project (PAP). The CAP is a large project that extends comparatively the PAP,
which was initiated by Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner in the US in 1993. The CAP collects
an enormous amount of data on governments’ policy agendas in different policy venues (i.e., party
manifestos, executive speeches, parliamentary questions, bills, laws, expenditures – together with
court cases and media coverage).
Research on government agendas tells us that, given the complexity and the amount of public
demand, attention is a scarce good (Kingdon 1995)whichhas consequences for agenda representation
(Jones and Baumgartner 2004; Jones, Larsen-Price, andWilkerson 2009). Governments cannot pay
attention to all issues of public concern, therefore they will select those issues that are salient for
the public (Mortensen et al. 2011) and avoid those ones the public is less concerned with, managing
“the amount of risk they bear from choosing to stress some policy issues more than others” (Bertelli
and John 2012: 741). The key finding from the CAP is that policy agendas behave in the way that
has been called “punctuated equilibrium” (True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007), meaning policy
agendas follow a pattern of relatively stable proportions of attention punctuated by rapid changes in
short periods. This finding has been used to critique incrementalism and policy heritage models.
To be clear, the CAP codes are mostly concerned with attention – devoted to different issues at
different times by different actors in different venues – and not with position, and this is also one of
the major critiques directed at their approach (for a detailed discussion, see Dowding, Hindmoor,
andMartin 2013). I also note that the advantage of using data from the CAP is clear. Given that my
dissertation is about responsiveness between elections, data covering the whole electoral cycle are the
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gold standard for studying dynamic representation. However, the contingent disadvantage is that
a unified CAP database is not ready as yet and data on some countries and policy venues are not
publicly available at the time of writing. Given that data on the dependent variable must match the
data on the independent variables, the number of available countries is markedly reduced.
In the rhetorical responsiveness chapter (Chapter 4), I look at executive speeches from the CAP.
The policy content of these speeches is divided into quasi-sentences, with each quasi-sentence as-
signed a single unique topic code. The dependent variable is then the number of quasi-sentences
assigned to each macro topic in a set of policy domains. The head of state or head of government,
depending on the political system, delivers an annual formal statement on behalf of the executive,
setting out the government agenda for the year ahead (Cohen 1995; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2005,
2008; Jennings, Bevan, and John 2011; Bevan, John, and Jennings 2011). Executive speeches thus have
a prospective function communicating the government’s general priorities as well as more specific
measures that the executive intends to address in the forthcoming year. For this reason, speeches are
a costly signal and “create future potential costs for the prime minister and the government, if the
priorities in the speech are not followed by policy outputs” (Bevan, John, and Jennings 2011; but see
also Bertelli and John 2012).
Policy Responsiveness
To analyse policy responsiveness I use both data onbudgetary policy (Chapter 5) and legislative prior-
ities (Chapter 6). AlthoughWlezien and Soroka (2003: 273-4) note that expenditures are not policy
per se, so using appropriations would be better than outlays, they also acknowledge the former are
not easily available comparatively. Due to such limitations, I use data on government expenditures
by policy function.2 Tomeasure legislative responsiveness I use data on enacted laws from the CAP.
I argue that, when studies on governmental policy responsiveness in comparative perspective exist,
they mainly look at policy in terms of public spending (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and
Wlezien 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2012; Soroka and Wlezien 2015), while the comparative literat-
ure on policy agenda priorities is still underdeveloped (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Green-Pedersen and
2Data are combined from a variety of sources: OECD Social Expenditure Database, SIPRI Military Expenditure
Database, World Bank Development Indicators, and Eurostat.
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Walgrave 2014). In particular, comparative studies using legislation as an indicator of policy respons-
iveness are even rarer (e.g., Bevan and Jennings 2014), when compared to single country studies (see,
for instance, the chapters included in the recent volume edited byGreen-Pedersen andWalgrave 2014
and in the recent article by Pickup and Hobolt 2015).
3.2 What the Public Wants
Without fully committing to the idea that polls are public opinion (Geer 1996) and that they fairly
represent citizens’ opinions (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Althaus 1998; Berinsky 2002), this dis-
sertation assumes that what public opinion expresses through surveys is somewhat meaningful and
reliable. Though the debate around public ignorance is a century old, going back to the battle for
male universal suffrage (Schumpeter 1954), and questions surround the assumptions that people in-
vest in information (Lupia andMcCubbins 1998), havemeaningful beliefs (Converse 1964) as well as
informed (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), stable and consistent preferences (Bartels 2003), and are
able to connect their interests into political preferences (Bartels 2005), my design is much humbler.
The focus of my dissertation is not, in fact, to investigate the accuracy of opinion polls research, but
rather on how public opinion influences government’s policy.
Scholars of responsiveness usuallymeasure public opinion through survey data over time. I recall
that, since this study is interested in responsiveness between elections, elections do not enact policies
but, rather, elect who will enact them (Sartori 1987: 108). Therefore, elections reveal opinions rather
than preferences (Sartori 1993: 75), the evolution of which is better understood across time through-
out the electoral cycle.
Given this crucial distinction, public opinion is essentiallymeasured in the literature on respons-
iveness in terms of preferences or priorities.3 Preferences are the gold standard, for they allow the
researcher to analyse the direction of change in public opinion. Such data are common in the studies
of budgetary responsiveness (e.g., Soroka and Wlezien 2010), where public preferences in spending
3Note that in parallel to the literature on government responsiveness proceeds the research on party responsiveness
to voter’s preferences (Adams et al. 2004; Ezrow et al. 2010; Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011) and to voter’s priorities
(Spoon andKlüver 2014;Wagner andMeyer 2014; Klüver and Spoon 2014). This heterogeneous field of research includes
studies that analyse whether parties respond to public preferences or priorities in their manifestos.
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are used. However, since survey data on preferences are hard to find for time-series cross-section
analyses and students of responsiveness themselves have recognised that not only citizens but also
governments do not have perfect information on “how much” the public wants of a given policy
(Soroka and Wlezien 2010; but see also Althaus 1998),4 scholars have relied on the alternative based
on public priorities. In other words, they assume that if an issue is more salient to the public, the
public is more concerned about it, so, want the government to invest more attention to the issue.
Public priorities are then measured by using the most important problem/issue (MIP/MII) ques-
tion. While some surveys ask respondents to identify the most important problem their country is
facing, other surveys ask them to identify the most important issue.
Though theMIP/MII question iswidely used as an indicator of public opinion both in the stud-
ies on dynamic agenda representation and government responsiveness, such a question has been cri-
ticised for several reasons. These include conceptual fuzziness between importance and salience, on
the one hand, and issues and problems, on the other (see Wlezien 2005; Jennings andWlezien 2011).
Nevertheless, when comparing MIP and MII, Jennings and Wlezien (2011) find that, despite vari-
ation existing for some issues, they essentially mean the same for respondents. While the MIP/MII
question might be more problematic when associated with indicators of government activity that
contain policy directionality (for instance, more or less spending on a given issue), it matches quite
well with government priorities and is frequently used in studies on dynamic agenda representation
(Jones and Baumgartner 2004; John, Bevan, and Jennings 2011; Bevan and Jennings 2014).
Throughoutmy dissertation, I follow the pragmatic choice, implemented by other scholars (e.g.,
Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Pickup and Hobolt 2015), of using priorities as a proxy for prefer-
ences, relying on national survey institutes. The reader may wonder why I do not rely on Euroba-
rometer data, which are available for a large number of countries. The issue is that the MII ques-
tion is asked across countries only since 2003. For longer time-series I then rely on national opinion
polls that provide more data points. Since time-series ofMIP/MII in the UK and Spain are available
4To be fair, Soroka and Wlezien might respond to Althaus’s (1998: 545) point – that “correcting for information
asymmetries reveals that many collective policy preferences would look quite different if all citizens were equally well
informed about politics” – by arguing that it may not matter for responsiveness whether the error is systematic in the
aggregation, for what they care about is not the level of but the change in preferences. Following this argument, increase
or decrease in preferences is more meaningful than the point estimate itself.
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from Gallup/Ipsos-MORI and the CIS Barometer, respectively, in more than one data point per
year (depending in which months the question has been asked) and polling institutes in these coun-
tries provide the two and three most important problems/issues combined, respectively, responses
are then averaged on a yearly basis and standardised to total 100 percent to make them comparable
to the Politbarometer’s MIP series in Germany and the Gallup’s MIP series in the US. Since data for
the Gallup’s MIP question in the UK are not available after 2001, Ipsos-MORI’s MII data are also
used. When overlapping in the period 1980-2000, the two series are combined and averaged.
However, in the light of recent findings suggesting that MIPs/MIIs are not good indicators of
public opinion for budgetary responsiveness, because they donot allow tomeasure directionality but
only attention (Jennings and Wlezien 2015a), in my budgetary responsiveness chapter (Chapter 5) I
alsomeasurepublic opinionbyusing relativepreferences in spending. While throughMIPs/MIIs it is
possible to argue that, especially for valence issues such as crime, environment, but also health, higher
public concern does imply more spending (Jennings and Wlezien 2015a: 19), spending preferences
allows the directionality issue to be better addressed, as the public can say whether it wants more or
less spending on a given issue. Data on preferences in spending are taken from the Soroka-Wlezien
dataset used forDegrees of Democracy, but they are available only for a subset of countries.
3.3 Measuring Competitive Incentives
Electoral Vulnerability
I define incumbent vulnerability as the electoral uncertainty the government faces between elections.
Reasoning on its measurement, vulnerability can be broken up into two components: (1) actual
vulnerability and (2) potential vulnerability. With the former I refer to those measures based on
aggregate electoral data such as indices of electoral competitiveness, the closeness of electoral result,
and the frequency of turnover (Schlesinger 1955, 1960; Ranney 1965; Stern 1972; Meltz 1973; Elkins
1974; Ferejohn 1977; Patterson and Caldeira 1984; Endersby, Galatas, and Rackaway 2002; Anderson
et al. 2007; Blais and Lago 2009; Grofman and Selb 2009; Kayser and Lindstädt 2015). With the
latter I refer to those measures based on survey or opinion poll data such as voter’s propensity to
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vote (van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1991; Tillie 1995; Kroh, van der Brug, and van der Eijk 2007) and
vote intentions/presidential approvals (Stimson 1976; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Hobolt and
Klemmensen 2008; Hakhverdian 2010; Green and Jennings 2012a).
Government vulnerability becomes a function of the existence of potential vote switchers. On
these premises, Kroh, van der Brug, and van der Eijk (2007) identify voters who are subject to intense
competition and those who are beyond competition on the basis of their probability to switch vote.
When people have high preferences for more than one party, the parties involved have to compete
for these voters. In other words, “the closer a voter’s preferences are for their first and second most
preferredparties, the stronger the competitionbetween these parties for their voter’s support” (Kroh,
van der Brug, and van der Eijk 2007: 212). Themost likely switchers are those who see their twomost
preferred parties as almost equally attractive (ibidem). Here the focus moves from party choice to
party preference or the propensity to vote (PTV) for a party. The advantage of using PTV scores is
that they allow capturing both identified voters beyond competition and switching voters for whom
competition is intense.
Themeasures outlined above, however, involve relevant issues when we want to explain govern-
ment responsiveness with electoral vulnerability, for two reasons. First, responsiveness occurs not at
election time but between elections (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999;Narud and Esaiasson 2013)
therefore usingmeasures of vulnerability based on election datawould be problematic if notmislead-
ing. Second, such measures of actual vulnerability are time invariant, artificially static for the whole
election cycle, which is not the ideal solution if something better can be used. Using measures based
on voter’s propensity to vote (Kroh, van der Brug, and van der Eijk 2007; Tillie 1995; van der Eijk and
Oppenhuis 1991; Wagner 2013) would not be a panacea since such data come from pre-election sur-
veys and hence not available at least on a yearly basis. Whatmattersmost is whether governments feel
vulnerable before the elections. This is about uncertainty. Sometimes, the margin of victory might
be larger than what surveys were anticipating and, importantly, they can change between elections.
It is much better, both from a validity and degrees of freedom/variability perspective, to measure
vulnerability with survey estimates for each year, rather than using the single value of the posterior
elections for all the 3-5 years prior to the elections. For these reasons, I propose a measure of govern-
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ments’ electoral vulnerability based on opinion poll data and I test it in some advanced democracies.
Thismeans that I amnotmeasuring the overall vulnerability of the party systemand that I am instead
focusing on vulnerability only from an electoral perspective (indeed, governments can be vulnerable
for many other reasons not directly connected to elections).
Popularity vs. Vulnerability
As previously anticipated, other scholars have used a different measure of government’s potential
vulnerability, simply using vote intentions and presidential approvals as such. My approach diverges
from the idea of a measure of vulnerability based only on the level of government popularity, leav-
ing out the other major competitors. In the popularity approach, what counts is government’s own
popularity, no matter how the other parties are doing. I would call this the Popularity perspective.
Probably the argument for supporting such a choice relies on the fact that parties in government do
not care how their competitors are placed in the opinion polls; rather they only care about them-
selves and whether their own popularity goes up or down, and react accordingly. The purpose of
mymeasure is to offer a more fine grained way of capturing the potential vulnerability governments
encounter. My argument is different, in the sense that governments care about the gap separating
them from the relevant opposition parties and are worried about their competitors. I would call this
the Vulnerability perspective.
Advocates of the Popularity perspective might answer that there is no need to account for op-
position parties in the measure since they are already implicitly included. In fact, they would say,
if government popularity goes down, then as a consequence, opposition popularity goes up. Al-
though both measures are closely related (their correlation is 0.75), I am not genuinely convinced by
this argument, since, first of all, if government popularity goes down, it does not necessarily mean
that opposition popularity is going up. In other words, vote intentions for the opposition do not
increase just because those for the government are decreasing, as voters might also prefer to abstain
rather than reward the opposition parties. Secondly, even if vote intentions for the government go
down, the government might still be safe: vulnerability occurs when the potential success of main
competitors are also included in the picture.
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Government Potential Vulnerability
For decades, governments have monitored the public opinion mood through surveys and opinion
polls and are worried about its reactions. This idea depends, then, on the concept of uncertainty
about future election outcomes (Elkins 1974). The literature has produced several efforts to capture
actual vulnerability, but its potential element has been so far underestimated. An exception is given
by a recent attempt byOrlowski (2013). Building on the work by Immergut andAbou-Chadi (2010),
Orlowski proposes a measure of incumbent vulnerability that depends on three main factors: (1) the
fragmentalisation of the party system, (2) the partisan constellation of government and opposition,
and (3) voters’ willingness to switch votes. The first two factors are supposed to be central for a
government’s insulation from vote shifts. This is because incumbents’ insulation depends, in turn,
on the number of parliamentary seats held by incumbent parties, the size of government coalitions,
the fragmentation and polarisation of the party system, and the disproportionality of the electoral
system. Moreover, as the author recalls from Bartolini’s and Strøm’s work on political competition,
“onlywhen a significant share of voters is indeedwilling to shift their vote betweendifferent parties in
two consecutive elections, party competitionwill have a significant impact on policy responsiveness”
(Orlowski 2013: 6). All these institutional factors plus voters’ electoral availability can affect electoral
vulnerability.
The advantage of Orlowski’s measure of incumbent vulnerability is that both institutional and
behavioural elements are taken into account. However, indicators such as seat volatility, the size of
governments and governing coalitions, the fragmentation and polarisation of the party system, and
the disproportionality of the electoral system are all partly time invariant, in the sense that they vary
only from election to election. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that such a measure is more
associated with an actual level of vulnerability.5 What I am, instead, interested in capturing is the
potential side of incumbent vulnerability.
Mymeasure holds the aspect of voters’ willingness to shift their vote at the centre of its definition
5Recently, André, Depauw, and Martin (2014) have proposed two innovative comparative measures of “vulnerab-
ility to defeat” under different electoral institutions, that is, inter-party and intra-party vulnerability. Yet these measures
aremore likely to fall in the actual vulnerability category as they use information on votes, seats and electoral systems and
are constructed to measure legislators’ vulnerability.
CHAPTER 3. MEASUREMENT AND DATA OVERVIEW 40
and is based on vote intentions. There is then no need to weight the measure by the strength or size
of government and opposition since it is already embedded in the vote intention’s decision. Indeed,
when a voter assigns her preference for a party she is already reasonably aware of the strength of her
preferred party and the other relevant parties in the party system. My measure is very simple and
straightforward: governments’ electoral vulnerability is computed by subtracting for each year the vote
intentions for the relevant opposition parties to the vote intentions of the governing parties (Iwill explain
what Imean by relevant opposition in amoment). The same logic applies to presidential approvals.6
In this case, disapprovals are subtracted from approvals. To put it formally:
V ulnit =
V ote Int Govtit (Approval)− V ote Int Oppit (Disapproval)
(3.1)
where i is the party in government and t is the given averaged yearly value. The measure can
be applied to both majoritarian and proportional systems. Though multi-party governments are
more complicated in nature than single-party governments, the desire to be reelected is a common
assumption. I am aware that, perhaps, bigger partners are more likely to seek reelection than smaller
partners, whomay prefer to implement policies they have the ownership of or influence the action of
certainministries. Sometimes governing parties are not soworried about losing votes simply because
their capacity to stay in governmentmight not even depend entirely on votes. Some parties are more
driven by policy –nomatterwhat thiswill result in at the next election– therefore they push through
reforms which harm their election results. Given this complexity, I explicitly do not prioritise party
goals and assume that all coalition members are interested in reelection to some extent.
Now, themain question becomeswhich parties to include. For the government the job is simple,
as all parties in government should be considered. What is harder is defining what the relevant op-
position is. By relevant opposition, I mean those parties receiving vote intentions the government
might be vulnerable from, including those who are not direct rivals in the competition for govern-
ment but also those ones that have coalition potential and blackmail potential (Sartori 1976). There-
6Although being approved is not necessarily the same as being popular (Stimson 1976), presidential approvals can
be used as a reliable indicator of government popularity (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004).
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fore, it would not be logical to include all opposition parties, as well as it would be misleading to
include only the two main competitors. In fact, if “party A will almost always focus on party B, and
vice versa” then “each may fail to respond to shifts that threaten to condemn both to a marginal
position” (Mair, Müller, and Plasser 2004: 271). To define an opposition party as relevant, the party
must fulfill the following criteria: (1) the partymust have been in government throughout the period
of reference or (2) gained at least 5 percent of the votes and 5 seats in at least two elections. Such a
decision has been already applied in other studies of responsiveness (Morales et al. 2014; Parks, Bern-
ardi, and Morales 2016) for party selection and imposing a quantitative threshold is important to
make the measure transparent and reliable for comparative research.
Whatmatters for the stability of themeasure is that relevant opposition partiesmust be included
all the time. Indeed, the partial inclusion of somepartiesmight seriously underestimate or overestim-
ate vulnerability in a given country. Below I show how the measure is constructed for the countries
included in the analyses (Canada, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
Note that, due to data availability reasons, not all countries are included in all empirical chapters and
for the same time period. Therefore, for the sake of comparison, here I only report the values of
governments’ electoral vulnerability for the common period 1980-2010.
Given the low number of relevant parties and that usually a single-party government takes place,
the UK is a good and simple example to start with. A measure based only on the difference of vote
intentions between Conservative and Labour might not be extremely efficient. Since the Liberal
Democrats, while in opposition, may increase the government’s electoral vulnerability, they should
also be included in the measure. Panel (d) in Figure 3.2 shows vote intentions for the three major
political parties in the UK. The Liberal Party is electorally dangerous for the government in at least
two occasions, in the 1980s and in the 1990s. In fact, in combination with the Social Democratic
Party, born from a split of the Labour Party, the Liberals attract more support in the opinion polls
than either of its two big rivals in the two years before 1983 election (Butler and Kavanagh 1984:
3). For ten years the Liberals seem to be out of the game until 1993-1995 when, at the European
elections, the Conservatives have the lowest vote share ever registered so far in a national election
(Butler and Kavanagh 1997: 12-13). The peak in 2010 corresponds to the last election in which a
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coalition government between Conservatives and Liberals is formed. To sum up, in the UK, the
measure takes account of the LibDems for all the period under examination, given that the party can
damage both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party when they are in government.
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Figure 3.2: Vote intentions and government approvals, 1980-2010 (percentage values)
Note: Vote intentions for Canada, Germany, Spain and the UK; government approvals for the US.
Source: Environics Focus (Canada), Politbarometer (Germany), Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Spain), Ipsos
MORI (UK), Gallup (US).
Spain presents a similar situation to the UK’s, as the main competition is between the Popular
Alliance / Popular Party (AP/PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE).Unlike theUK, Spain has a propor-
tional representation (PR) system with low district magnitude, overrepresentation of large parties
andmany regional parties (Hopkin 2005). However, if the competition in the UK is conditioned by
the existence of a strong centrist party (LibDem) during the period analysed, in Spain the threat does
not come as much from the centre but more from the extreme and from only one side of the polit-
ical spectrum. In fact, whereas there has never been a real challenger on the right of PP, the threat for
PSOE comes not only from itsmain competitor but also from theCommunist Party of Spain (PCE),
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before, and from the United Left (IU), after (see panel (c) in Figure 3.2). Since the figure shows the
period 1980-2010, it also includes Adolfo Suárez’s Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) that led
the Spanish transition to democracy and was in government until the 1982 elections.7 To measure
vulnerability in Spain, PCE and IU are included along with Convergence and Union (CiU).8
The role of the electoral system inGermany (Shugart andWattenberg 2001;Massicotte and Blais
1999) matters to ensure both governability and a more proportional representation. Germany is in
fact, defined as amixed-member system (Scarrow 2001) allowing the formation of pre-electoral coali-
tions and producing a bipolar pattern conducive to high levels of cabinet durability (Saalfeld 2005).
TheLiberals (FDP) played a pivotal role inGermany almost in all ChristianDemocrats (CDU/CSU)
and Social Democrats (SDP) coalition governments until the 1998 election (Mair 1997: 208). The
German Greens should also be included, given that not only are they able to steal votes from the
SPD, but they also have experienced being in government in coalition with the SPD in 1998 and
2002 (Poguntke 2002). Vote intentions for Germany are shown in panel (b), Figure 3.2. In the meas-
ure, the Greens are included because they have been junior coalition partners of SPD governments
andThe Left (PDS/Die Linke) are included because they fulfill the vote/seat criteria. Due to the fact
that the FDP formed coalition governments with both CDU and SPD in the past, the Liberals are
also considered as relevant and, therefore, included.
A special case is given by the 2005 grand coalition in Germany (Scarrow 2012). How to deal
with vulnerability when the two major parties are coalition partners in the same government? One
strategy would be to consider both of them as incumbents at the same time. An alternative theor-
etical argument would be based on power and on the assumption that both parties dislike grand
coalitions for two reasons. First, one of them will most likely lose electoral support, for one is still
perceived as the smaller and weaker part of the coalition. Second, even if one is the stronger part
7The IU was created as an electoral coalition with PCE and several minor left-wing groups only some weeks before
the 1986 general elections but its nature is still complex and undefined, since it clearly is neither a party nor a coalition
(the PCE remained the only political party within IU after 2001) (Ramiro-Fernández 2004). The creation of the IU
mostly lies in the electoral incentive felt by the leaders of PCE, who considered the PSOE no longer a left party, given the
moderate policies the Socialist Party was promoting in government. Therefore the strategy adopted by the IU until 2000
(when IU signed an agreement with PSOE) was to avoid any alliance with the Socialist Party and stress its differences
from the latter – it is not coincidence that its best results are in the period 1989-1996 (Ramiro-Fernández 2004).
8Note that parliamentary support from non-statewide parties to minority governments, as for instance happened
in the 1990s to both PSOE and PP (Hopkin 2005: 389), is not counted in the government side of the measure because
those parties are not officially in government.
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of the coalition, such a situation will force it to compromise more than in a minimal willing co-
alition. Therefore, even the stronger part looks towards a different coalition government after the
next election. According to this argument, coalition partners still perceive each other as the strongest
contenders and, for this reason, computing the difference of vote intentions between the two is still a
reasonable choice. However, since it is not clearwhich party should be considered in government and
which in opposition and how to compute the measure with the inclusion of FDP and the Greens, I
decided to adopt the first strategy and treat both CDU/CSU and SPD as in government.
Canada is a difficult and contradictory case since it combines a disproportional electoral sys-
tem (first-past-the-post) and single-party governments with a high level of electoral fractionalisation
(Johnston 2008). If until the early 1990s the Canadian case can reasonably fit into the label of a “two-
party-plus” system (Epstein 1964), the 1993 electoral earthquake and the results of the 1997 and 2000
elections indicate “a transformation into a genuine multiparty system” (Scotto, Stephenson, and
Kornberg 2004: 464). The domination by a centrist party – the Liberal Party – inducing centrifugal
tendencies elsewhere in the system and other peculiar features brought Johnston (2008) to define
Canada as a case of polarized pluralism. In the 1993 election the Conservatives suffered a humiliating
defeat (from 169 to just 2 seats in Parliament, with an electoral volatility of 42 percentage points) in
favour of the Liberals, and the Bloc Québécois becomes the Official Opposition (Carty, Cross, and
Young 2000; Endersby, Galatas, and Rackaway 2002). In the following elections, the Liberals retain
majority status but lose several seats and the biggest change in Parliament is the substitution of the
ReformParty for the BlocQuébécois as theOfficial Opposition. Besides this change in the Canadian
party system, scholars tend to agree that after 1988 electoral competitiveness declines until the 2004
elections and that the Liberals in this period are never seriously vulnerable (Johnston and Baumann
2007; Scotto, Stephenson, and Kornberg 2004). This also confirmed by opinion polls, where only
in the period 1988-1991 vote intentions for the Conservative Party and the New Democratic Party
get closer to those for the Liberals. In 2004 the Liberal-Conservative gap reduces but still stays high
(more than 7 percentage points). Panel (a) in Figure 3.2 shows the vote intentions for the five parties:
Liberal Party (LP), Progressive Conservative/Conservative Party (PCP/CPC), BlocQuébécois (BQ),
CHAPTER 3. MEASUREMENT AND DATA OVERVIEW 45
NewDemocratic Party (NDP) and Reform Party/Canadian Alliance (RPC/CA).9
Asdescribed above, given the high fragmentationof its party system,Canada is themost complex
case in the sample. Five parties have been selected, but only two of them (Liberals and Conservat-
ives) have traditionally formed single-party (minority) governments. The fact that in the 1980s the
number of parliamentary parties was significantly low and only three parties (LP, PCP, and NDP)
were gaining seatsmade some scholars suggest that a successful cartel was formed among these parties
(Young 1998). However, the political scene changed in 1992 when the three major parties supported
the constitutional CharlottetownAccord, basically creating space for the Reform Party and the Bloc
Québécois (Young 1998: 343). The 1993 electoral earthquake, a disaster for both PCP and NDP, is
the consequence of such a disclosure. In the light of this, NDP, RPC and BQ are added as relevant
opposition parties for the period of their existence. Appendix A shows in detail how the measure of
vulnerability has been constructed for each year in every country.
Finally, theUS are the least problematic case as pure two-party system formed by theDemocratic
Party and the Conservative Party. To calculate the measure of incumbent vulnerability government
approvals are used. The measure is then simply the difference between approvals and disapprovals.
Government approvals for the US are shown in panel (e), Figure 3.2.
Table 3.1 summarises how the measure of vulnerability is constructed by government (for all
available years see Appendix A) and Figure 3.3 plots themeasure for each country in the period 1980-
2010. A threshold of 5 percent above which governments can be said to be safe has been graphic-
ally imposed to facilitate the reading of the figure. The level of vulnerability changes considerably
across countries and time. Not surprisingly, Liberal governments in Canada (panel a) since the early
1990s appear to be largely out of reach and the trend goes for Conservative governments too, though
smoothly declining. Germany (panel b) is the case with the lowest variation, where most govern-
ments lie close to the 5 percent threshold. The 2005 grand coalition is the only exception, given that
the summed vote intentions for CDU/CSU and SPD exceed enormously those for FDP andGreens.
While Spain (panel c) presents governments that are both vulnerable and safe, including the Liberals
9During the selected period, there have been fewmajor party changes. The Progressive Conservative Party, dissolved
in 2003, formed a new party called Conservative Party with the Canadian Alliance (previously Reform Party), the latter
running only for the 2000 federal election.
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for the whole period increases government’s vulnerability in the UK (panel d). In fact, if Thatcher
is perceived utterly vulnerable, only Blair seems to be genuinely safe in the UK. Governments in the
US (panel e), since the 1980s on, show high levels of popularity with only a few cases where the gov-
ernment was seriously contested. The only case of strong vulnerability is the Bush government in
mid-2000s, although Obama, elected in 2008, seems to be on the edge.
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Figure 3.3: Governments’ electoral vulnerability, 1980-2010 (percentage values)
Source: Environics Focus (Canada), Politbarometer (Germany), Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Spain), Ipsos
MORI (UK), Gallup (US).
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Table 3.1: Measure of electoral vulnerability by government, 1980-2010
Year Canada Germany Spain United Kingdom United States
Gov’t Opp Gov’t Opp Gov’t Opp Gov’t Opp Gov’t Opp
1980 LP PCP +NDP SPD + FDP CDU/CSU +GREENS REP DEM
1981 UCD AP + PSOE + PCE + CiU
1982 SPD + FDP CDU/CSU +GREENS PSOE UCD +AP + PCE + CiU
1983 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS CON LAB + SDP/LIB Alliance
1984 PCP LP +NDP REP DEM
1985
1986 PSOE AP + IU + CiU
1987 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS CON LAB + SDP/LIB Alliance
1988 PCP LP +NDP REP DEM
1989 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
1990 CON LAB + LD
1991 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS + PDS/LINKE
1992 CON LAB + LD DEM REP
1993 LP PCP +NDP + RPC + BQ PSOE PP + IU + CiU
1994 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS + PDS/LINKE
1995
1996 PP PSOE + IU + CiU DEM REP
1997 LP PCP +NDP + RPC + BQ LAB CON + LD
1998 SPD +GREENS CDU/CSU + FDP + PDS/LINKE
1999
2000 LP PCP +NDP + CA + BQ PP PSOE + IU + CiU REP DEM
2001 LAB CON + LD
2002 SPD +GREENS CDU/CSU + FDP + PDS/LINKE
2003 LP PCP +NDP + CA + BQ
2004 LP CPC +NDP + BQ PSOE PP + IU + CiU REP DEM
2005 CDU/CSU + SPD FDP + GREENS + PDS/LINKE LAB CON + LD
2006 CPC LP +NDP + BQ
2007 LAB CON + LD
2008 CPC LP +NDP + BQ PSOE PP + IU + CiU DEM REP
2009 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS + PDS/LINKE
2010 CON + LD LAB
Note: The year corresponds to the time when a government took office. See Appendix A for full party names and country/year availability.
Due to comparative constraints, the table excludes the Canadian LP 1984a and PCP 1993a governments for which only the PrimeMinister changes.
CHAPTER 3. MEASUREMENT AND DATA OVERVIEW 48
Electoral Decidability
The theoretical implications outlined in the previous chapter constitute the basis to construct ameas-
ure of electoral decidability that stems fromparty policy positions. The issue ofmeasuring the policy
position of political parties is well explored in political science and important volumes have been re-
cently published evaluating the advantages and drawbacks of different approaches and proposing
more or less innovative solutions (e.g. Laver 2001b; Benoit and Laver 2006; Meyer 2013). My goal
is to find (1) a measure of decidability that tells how much the political offer on a certain policy is-
sue is differentiated between government and opposition and (2) this measure must be comparable
across space and time. In order to fulfill these two criteria I rely on a measure of decidability based
on party manifesto data from the Comparative Manifestos Project. The reason for this choice will
be explained as follows.
Why CMP Data?
A variety of methods can be used to measure party policy positions including expert surveys, mass
surveys, elite surveys, roll call votes, manifesto analysis (Mair 2001; Benoit and Laver 2006: 58, Table
3.1). Given its dynamic effort, this work requires the availability of data that change over time and
across countries. For this reason, the best candidate becomes inevitably the Comparative Manifes-
tos Project (CMP) which analyses party manifestos for 56 countries throughout the post-war period
(Volkens et al. 2014). Within the project, trained human readers code manually the content of party
manifestos into a predefined 56-category coding scheme using “quasi-sentences” as the unit of ana-
lysis.
Although it is well known that few voters actually read partymanifestos, they are nevertheless of-
ficial party documents published during election campaigns (Laver 2001a: 72). They state the official
party issue positions binding party leaders andmaking them accountable to voters andmembers for
failure to implement policies pledged in themanifesto. The principle alternative to party manifestos
are expert judgements of party positions (Castles andMair 1984; Laver andHunt 1992; Inglehart and
Huber 1995; Benoit and Laver 2006; Bakker et al. 2012). Yet few of these major expert surveys locate
party positions over policy issues other than the left-right “super issue” (e.g. Laver and Budge 1992),
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which makes it harder to have enough cross-time variation. Related to this point, as urged by Mair
(2001: 19), expert surveys should be taken as snapshots of the moment they are run, since party po-
sitions are not fixed and it would be implausible to conceive them to be the same over time. Lastly,
as a general concern, not all expert surveys are wholly reliable as they are the product of subjective
observation and experienced students may not necessarily be also experts, therefore “expert surveys
should [not] always be treated as ‘expert’ surveys” (Mair 2001: 24).
CMP data are not full of grace either. Their advantages and disadvantages are well known to
the scientific community despite their wide use by scholars of parties and representation. This is
not the venue to debate in detail the limitations involving the CMP data, both in terms of theory
and methodology. I therefore refer to more precise and attentive analyses (Budge 2001; Laver 2001a:
72-73; McDonald andMendes 2001; Pelizzo 2003; Benoit and Laver 2006: 64-69; Meyer 2013: Ch. 3;
Zulianello 2013) and limit the discussion to those aspects that are relevant for ameasure of decidability
based on such data.
Firstly, to measure how much the political offer on a given policy issue is decidable party posi-
tions on that issue are required. The question then becomeswhetherCMPdata are collected in away
such that allows tomeasure party positions. According to the authors themselves (Budge et al. 2001),
the CMP data are grounded in the “saliency theory” of party competition, which builds on the the-
ory of “selective emphasis” previously developed by Robertson (1976). In line with the theory, data
are collected under a saliency criterion operationalised as the relative emphasis given to the issue in
the partymanifesto. As Laver (2001a: 73) well explains, saliency theory assumes a strong relationship
between party position and party emphasis which legitimises CMP data on “policy emphasis to es-
timate substantive party positions” (emphasis in original).10 In fact, as McDonald andMendes (2001:
91) write, “[i]n most instances, the [CMP] categories are easily interpretable as policy options [and]
[f]ifty-four of the fifty-six categories involve clear value statements”. In their classification, 13 out of
56 policy categories are coded as either positive or negative, such as “more or less protectionism” or
“more or less centralisation” (McDonald and Mendes 2001: 93, Table 7.1). In substance, as Benoit
and Laver (2006: 66) conclude, “the CMP coding scheme is not in practice a ‘pure salience’ scheme”
10It is the equation “direction equals emphasis” (Laver 2001a: 73) that brought Pelizzo (2003) to argue that CMP
data measure direction rather than position.
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but more a positional coding scheme.
The flexibility of the CMP data, at least for some categories, is just that they allow to construct
measures of salience as well as position. For example, summing up the pro / con categories of a
given issue tells us the relative emphasis the manifesto devotes to that issue, rather subtracting the
positive category from the negative category of a given issue gives us the party position on that issue.11
Probably the best solutionwould be the one implemented byWagner (2012), whouses expert surveys
to measure party issue positions and CMP data to measure party issue salience, however his analysis
is only cross-sectional which makes the choice more viable. Yet, since in my case time is involved, a
measure based on party positions is extrapolated using CMP data rather than expert surveys. Using
respondent’s perception of party location is also problematic because people are usually asked to
place parties on a left-right scale rather than on specific issues. Electoral surveys sometimes ask these
questions but inconsistency is high as issues can change across countries and elections. This iswhy the
CMP data become a one-way choice for data are widely available over time and across party systems.
AMeasure for Decidability
Though the concept of electoral decidability is potentially broader andmore than one indicator can
be proposed to capture its sub-dimensions, I focus on the key aspect of the concept, which refers to
the dispersion of the political offer on a given issue in a given party system. The literature provides
valuable measures which have been applied to other research questions. Except for one measure
(Somer-Topcu 2015) that uses the different logic of perceived disagreement, all the others are based
on the Taylor and Herman (1971) index, which is nothing different than the variance. Nevertheless,
some authors refer to this concept as the dispersion of the political offer (Alvarez and Nagler 2004;
Ezrow 2007; Wagner 2012), while others talk of party system polarisation (Sartori 1976; Sani and
Sartori 1983; see also Dalton 2008; Lachat 2008; Pardos-Prado and Dinas 2010), that is, in terms of
ideological spread of parties on a left-right scale, and some others of policy extremism (Ezrow 2008;
Wagner 2012). Though these concepts – differentiation/dispersion of the political offer, ideological
11As Zulianello (2013) recalls, it would be more precise to talk in terms of policies rather than issues, given that the
CMP categories can be much broader than specific issues. Yet, maybe wrongly, often in the literature they are used
interchangeably, even though they do not mean exactly the same thing.
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polarisation and extremism – do not necessarily mean the same thing, they are essentially measured
in the same way with some variation.
Thesemeasures are presented inTable 3.2 and are variations of the statistical concepts of variance
and standard deviation. While the measures of polarisation are essentially an adaptation of Hazan’s
(1995) index, the other measures of party system, dispersion and policy extremism, are a develop-
ment of Alvarez and Nagler’s (2004) measure of party system compactness. The exception is given
by Somer-Topcu’s (2015)measure of ambiguity, which applies ameasure of perceptual agreement de-
veloped by van der Eijk (2001) that can be used as a proxy tomeasure party positions.12 Suchmeasures
are either based on voters’ perception of party positions or on experts’ assessment of party positions.
Only one measure relies on coding of party manifestos and uses CMP data, which I recall does not
include any information from voters about their issue positions or their perceptions of party issue
position.
While some of these measures are weighted by party size, some others are not and both sets of
authors provide arguments in favour of weighting as well as notweighting. The reason forweighting
is that small parties de factowould have no political influence therefore their policy proposals would
“not enlarge the menu of policy choices available to voters in any meaningful sense” (Ezrow 2007:
186). The opposite perspective underlines that weighting would be arbitrary and that the policy
influence of a party is not necessarily correlated with its votes or seats. Moreover, even small parties
can fulfill the function of channeling voters’ policy preferences, regardless of the parties’ influence
on government policy outputs.
Since I also rely on data from theComparativeManifestos Project, I apply Ezrow’s (2007) version
of party system dispersion not to the left-right ideological position – as he does – but to specific
policy categories. Given that Ezrow’s measure is a variation of Alvarez and Nagler’s party system
compactness, I first briefly review this measure, then I explain Ezrow’s development and finally my
application to the CMP policy categories.
12The idea behind implies that higher perceived disagreement on whether to locate a given party means that the
party is more ambiguous about its position. van der Eijk (2001) shows that such a measure would be preferable than
using standard deviations around party’s average perceived opinion which might be a biased measure for agreement.
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Table 3.2: Recent comparative measures of dispersion, polarisation and extremism
Study Measure Weight Data
Hazan (1995) Left-Right Polarisation Yes Respondents’ Party Placement
Alvarez and Nagler (2004) Party System Compactness Yes/No Respondents’ Party Placement
Ezrow (2007) Party System Dispersion Yes/No Party Manifestos
Dalton (2008) Ideological Polarisation Yes Respondents’ Party Placement
Ezrow (2008) Party Policy Extremism Yes/No Expert Surveys
Lachat (2008) Party System Polarisation Yes Expert Surveys
Pardos-Prado and Dinas (2010) Electoral Polarisation Yes Respondents’ Party Placement
Wagner (2012) Ideological Distinctiveness Yes Expert Surveys
Wagner (2012) Positional Extremeness No Expert Surveys
Somer-Topcu (2014) Ambiguity No Respondents’ Party Placement
Source: Author’s own.
Alvarez andNagler’s measure of party system compactness aims to overcome the common prob-
lem in survey research that respondents do not perceive the questions or the scale in the same way.
For this reason, they develop “a measure of the dispersion of the parties relative to the voters, not a
measure of the dispersion of just the parties on some abstract scale” (Alvarez and Nagler 2004: 48).
Thus their measure relies on surveys allowing voters to place the parties in their own countries. The
point of reference is then the dispersion of the voters in the issue space calculated as the standard
deviation of respondents’ self-reported positions on the kth issue (σk). To tell how far apart any two
parties j and l are on an issue k, the absolute distance between them is computed, wherePjk andPlk
denote the placement of the jth and lth parties on the kth issue, respectively. The basic measure of
compactness would then be (Alvarez and Nagler 2004: 49):
CPk =
σk
max|(Pjk − Plk)| ∀j, l. (3.2)
The larger the value ofCPk, the greater the ratio of dispersion of the voters to the dispersion of
the parties, that is, the more compact the issue space.
The authors also propose a secondmeasure based on the former, which takes into account party
size, as minor parties might alter the compactness measure. This second measure accounts for the
vote shares of the major parties in each election and the relative position of all viable parties in the
issue space (Alvarez and Nagler 2004: 50). The vote-weighted compactness is given by:
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VWCPk =
σk∑N
j=1 Vj|(Pjk − P¯k)|
(3.3)
where P¯k is the weighted mean of parties on the issue and Vj is the jth party’s vote share.
Ezrow essentially bases hismeasures of party system dispersion on a simplified version ofAlvarez
andNagler’s measures. The unweighted party system dispersion is, in substance, “the standard devi-
ation of all of the parties’ policy positions that are reported by the Comparative Manifestos Project
for a given election” (Ezrow 2007: 186) while the weighted party system dispersion is given by:
WPSD =
√∑
j=1
V Sj(Pjk − P¯k)2 (3.4)
where P¯k is theweightedmean of all the parties’ left-right ideological positions in country k,Pjk
is the ideological position of party j in country k, and V Sj is the vote share for party j.13
I explain my application of Ezrow’s measure using the issue of education as an example. The
CMP assigns two categories for education: “education expansion” (per506) and “education limita-
tion” (per507). To get the actual party position on the issue, I subtract the negative category from
the positive category in absolute terms in order to avoid negative values: |per507-per506|. Then I
proceed with the computation as Ezrow (2007) explains in note 9, p. 186. Using his example of the
1983 elections in Great Britain, the unweighted party system dispersion with four parties (Labour,
the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Conservative Party) is calculated as:
UPSD =
√
(3.74− 5.17)2 + (5.07− 5.17)2 + (5.07− 5.17)2 + (6.81− 5.17)2
4
= 1.09
(3.5)
where 5.17 represents the mean party position, and 3.74, 5.07, 5.07, 6.81 represent the positions
of the four parties, respectively.
Following Ezrow’s example once again, the weighed party system dispersion is calculated as:
13Note that Hazan’s and Dalton’s measures are very similar to Ezrow’s, as Hazan uses the variance instead of the
standard deviation while Dalton divides the WPSD by the number of parties.
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WPSD =
√
.289× (3.74− 5.17)2 + .122× (5.07− 5.17)2+
.144× (5.07− 5.17)2 + .445× (6.81− 5.17)2 = 1.31 (3.6)
where the parties’ deviations from the weighted party mean (5.46) are weighted by their vote
shares.
Ezrow’s measure as well as the others reported in Table 3.2 are weighted only by party size. Yet
howmuch parties emphasise an issue in their manifestos can also matter. For this reason, I include a
third version of party system dispersion weighted by salience. In essence, it is sensible to empirically
test all the three versions of thismeasure: unweightedparty systemdispersion (UPSD), voteweighted
party system dispersion (VWPSD), and salience weighted party system dispersion (SWPSD). The
three measures will be tested in Chapter 5, because both arguments for weighting and not weighting
are convincing.
However, someone may argue that, in the eyes of voters, it is sufficient for the political offer on
a given issue to be decidable between government and opposition and not across the whole party
system, for what matters is that voters are able to understand what the main competitors are offer-
ing. Note that, although electoral competition should lead to constant and smooth adaptation of
parties’ preferences to voters’ demands (Downs 1957), parties actually change their positions slowly
(Budge 1994;Walgrave and Nuytemans 2009), so one should not expect governments to quickly ad-
apt their positions to changes in public opinion. Following this argument, the assumption is that
party preferences are quite stable during the electoral cycle but can change from one election to the
other. For these reasons, if electoral decidability does matter for responsiveness, I would expect a
weighted measure to have a greater impact than an unweighted measure.14
14In Appendix C, I will also provide additional analysis by using a different measure only based on the change in the
distance between the government and the biggest competitor.
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Other Competitive Incentives
Issue competence is measured in terms of government’s relative advantage on the issue. Themeasure
used in Chapter 4 is strongly dependent on data constraints. In fact, it is really hard to find survey
data across countries and over time such as to build a reasonably long time-series of issue competence.
For this reason, I choose Petrocik’s (1996) definition of issue ownership emphasising in my measure
the importance of citizens’ perception of party issue competence from a historical perspective rather
than focusing on how such a perception changes from one election to another. Since the question
wording in the surveys differs across and within countries, only the questions asking to rate both
the government and the main opposition party are considered. The measure is then constructed
averaging competence on a given issue (issues have been recoded in line with the major topics used
for the dependent variable) by decade. Given that opinion polls may contain some measurement
error, the party leading the government is considered as competent if the difference with the main
oppositionparty is higher than 3percent. Adummyvariable for issue competence is then constructed
to capture whether the government has an advantage on the issue compared to its main opponent. I
am aware of the existence of more elegant and sophisticated measures of issue competence (see, for
instance, the ones recently proposed by Green and Jennings 2012a,b), but the inclusion of a dummy
variable capturing a party’s historical advantage on the issues by decade gives an idea of whether the
government is perceived as competent over time (see Pope andWoon 2009; Egan 2013).
A rougher variant of this measure of issue competence called issue ideological proximity is used
in Chapter 6. The difference between the measure used in the rhetorical responsiveness chapter and
the one used in the legislative responsiveness chapter is due to the fact that, in the latter, I am more
focused onwhether the government is more likely to produce legislationwhich is closer to its ideolo-
gical position, rather than legislation on issues for which is perceived as more competent. Therefore,
I use a dummy variable which is equal to government partisanship.
Electoral proximity is also measured in a dichotomous way, but its construction changes across
chapters. Since in the rhetorical responsiveness chapter (Chapter 4) I can rely on the date of the
speech, I can propose a more fine grained measure based on the distance between the delivery of the
speech and the election day. Since, in the other chapters, I do not have information about the date in
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which the budget has been approved and when the law has been introduced, I simply use a dummy
variable for the election year as a proxy of electoral proximity.
Finally, though electoral contestability is not conceived as a necessary condition for responsive-
ness, where appropriate, I will use ameasure that captures its most related component to responsive-
ness, given by the barriers parties face for being represented. The electoral system is clearly the most
relevant factor here, as other studies of responsiveness already show. I will, hence, use a measure of
disproportionality of the electoral system based on Gallagher’s (1991) Least squares index.
Chapter 4
Rhetorical Responsiveness
4.1 Introduction
Democratic governments need to talk about issues, they are reactors to their environment. They
cannot leave the public agenda open to themedia and the opposition (Soroka 2002; Green-Pedersen
andStubager 2010;Green-Pedersen andMortensen 2010). In reality, unlike oppositionparties, which
are freer than government parties to focus on the issues they have an advantage on, the government
agenda is essentially a mix of its manifesto, the needs of governing, events and the opposition agenda
(Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). Democratic governments also seek re-election. But, what
do they do when they are vulnerable? Governments face three puzzles. The first puzzle posits that
governments can either focus on those issues that are salient to the public – as research on respons-
iveness and government agendas would suggest (e.g., Burstein 2003; Hobolt andKlemmensen 2008;
Jennings and John 2009) – or they can emphasise those issues on which they have a good reputation
– as issue ownership would predict (e.g., Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Green and Hobolt
2008). The second puzzle is even more intriguing. When governments are competent on the issue
and the issue is also more important to the public, I expect the conditional effect of electoral vulner-
ability not to have any enhancing effect on government issue emphasis: governments are likely to
emphasise that issue in their agenda. However, what happens when the government is not compet-
ent on the issue? I argue that, in this situation, governments aremore likely to emphasise those issues
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that are salient to the public when they are electorally vulnerable rather than when they are elector-
ally safe. Finally, the third puzzle relates to the pressure arising from upcoming elections: if elections
are considered as a powerful incentive to respond, are governments more likely to emphasise those
issues the public is more concerned with or those ones they “own” when elections are approaching?
To date, I am unaware of comparative studies that jointly consider how government agendas
react to public priorities and issue ownership and how government electoral vulnerability influ-
ences agenda responsiveness. That is what I present here. Using data on issue emphases in executive
speeches, based on codings from the Comparative Agendas Project, and survey data on public issue
priorities, vote intentions and issue competence in four advanced democracies –Germany, Spain, the
United Kingdom, and the United States – my analysis produces two main findings. First, when the
issue is salient to the public and the government is perceived as competent on the issue, electoral vul-
nerability does not have any enhancing effect on responsiveness. Vulnerability matters to the extent
that the government is not associated with the issue. Second, governments tend both to respond to
the public and to emphasise those issues on which they are perceived as competent, independently
of their vulnerability. However, my analysis suggests that governments rely much heavily on the is-
sues they have a good reputation on. No evidence is, instead, found that governments increase issue
emphasis either in those issues salient to the public nor in those issues they are competent on when
elections are approaching.
My results pertain to governing parties’ electoral strategies and to mass-elite linkages. The find-
ing that governing parties adjust their policy agendas by emphasising both the issues that are sali-
ent to the public and the issues they own, but relying much more on the latter, independently of
their potential vulnerability at the polls, resolves the first dilemma. Issue salience and issue owner-
ship are already sufficient conditions for government agendas to respond and governments use both
strategies. This reflects the fact that, in reality, government agendas respond to the needs of govern-
ing (e.g., Green-Pedersen andMortensen 2010). The finding that government electoral vulnerability
influences agenda responsiveness to public priorities only when the government is not competent
on the issue contributes to the research on government responsiveness (Hobolt and Klemmensen
2008; Soroka andWlezien 2010). Unlike previous studies which find that electoral vulnerability is an
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important incentive per se for governments to respond to public concerns, my analysis suggests that
the role of vulnerability is more niche than mainstream and occurs only in specific circumstances.
4.2 Vulnerability, Issue Ownership, and Electoral Connection
From research on government responsiveness and government agendas we learned at least twomajor
lessons. Responsiveness is more likely to occur for those issues that are salient to the public (e.g.,
Miller and Stokes 1963;Hobolt andKlemmensen 2008; Jennings and John 2009; Soroka andWlezien
2010) and varies by agenda (e.g., Jones, Larsen-Price, andWilkerson 2009; Bevan and Jennings 2014).
Research on government agendas also tells us that, given the complexity and the amount of public
demands, attention is a scarce good and this has consequences for agenda representation (Kingdon
1995; Jones and Baumgartner 2004; Jones, Larsen-Price, andWilkerson 2009). Governments cannot
pay attention to all issues the public is concerned about, therefore theywill select those issues that are
most salient for the public (Mortensen et al. 2011) and ignore those ones the public is less concerned
about, thusmanaging “the amount of risk they bear from choosing to stress some policy issues more
than others” (Bertelli and John 2012: 741).
However, issue ownership theories (Budge and Farlie 1983) tell us a different story, that is parties
give priority only to those issues for which they have a historically good reputation for competence
(Petrocik 1996). Parties which own the issue and have a good reputation on it will be more likely to
emphasise that issue in their political agenda. Indeed, parties tend to increase the salience of an issue
they hold an advantageous position on and ignore or try to mute those issues that do not benefit
them (Rovny 2012), simply because they will not be credible in the eyes of voters and this would only
be a safe road to an electoral defeat.1
If an issue is salient to the public and the government has a good reputation on the issue, the
government faces no selectionproblems. If governments are not under electoral pressure, in linewith
issue ownership theories, there is reason to believe that governments would prioritise those issues the
public ismore concernedwith. Butwhat happens, between elections, when the government is under
1However, cases of “issue trespassing” and “issue convergence” are also documented (e.g., Damore 2004; Sigelman
and Buell 2004), when parties in government will try to challenge their competitors on an issue they do not have a good
reputation on in order to gain votes.
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pressure? In that case, I argue that governments face a first policy agenda dilemma: do they respond
to public concerns – prioritising salience over ownership – or do they choose to emphasise those
issues they have a good reputation on – prioritising ownership over salience?
The conditional effect of government electoral vulnerability on government responsiveness finds
recognition in both theoretical (e.g., Sartori 1987; Strøm 1992; Bartolini 1999, 2000) and empirical
studies (e.g.,Manza and Cook 2002; Hobolt andKlemmensen 2008; Hakhverdian 2010; Pickup and
Hobolt 2015). Whereas the former argue that electoral vulnerability has a beneficial effect on respons-
iveness, the latter suggest that the vulnerability thesis finds support in different institutional arrange-
ments and state that electoral pressure or uncertainty is a powerful incentive increasing government
responsiveness to citizens’ (preferences and) priorities.
According to the research on responsiveness, which emphasises the importance of public issue
salience as an incentive for governments to respond, I would expect that, when vulnerable, govern-
ments will emphasise in their agendas those issues that are salient to the public and adjust their agen-
das accordingly. Yet the alternative argument supported by issue ownership theories is also plausible.
According to issue ownership, vulnerable governments will go for the safe option and emphasise in
their agendas those issues they have a good reputation on in order to reacquire popularity. This argu-
ment is plausible because popular governments would have a wide range of issues on which they are
rated positively, therefore they are freer to respond to public concerns than unpopular governments
(Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Green 2011). As both arguments expressed are reasonable, I present
themmore formally as competing hypotheses:
H4.1a. The Issue Salience Hypothesis. Vulnerable governments will be more likely to emphasise,
in their policy agendas, those issues the public is more concerned with.
H4.1b. The Issue Ownership Hypothesis. Vulnerable governments will be more likely to emphas-
ise, in their policy agendas, those issues they have a good reputation on.
The arguments presented above relate to the fact that governments would face a trade-off when
called to choose between salient issues and owned issues. However, should I expect any influence of
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government electoral vulnerability on government issue emphasis when the trade-off is not existing,
namely when the issue is salient to the public and the government is competent on the issue? There
is, in fact, a tendency for issues to receive more attention by the government, when the government
does well on that issue and when the public cares about it (Walgrave and De Swert 2007; Walgrave
and Lefevere 2013). In this case, I would expect vulnerability not to have any enhancing effect on
government issue emphasis, for issue competence and issue salience already incentivise the govern-
ment to increase attention on that issue. I argue, instead, that there might be room for an enhancing
effect of vulnerability when the issue is salient to the public but the government is not perceived as
competent on.2 To put it formally:
H4.2. The Enhancing Vulnerability Hypothesis. Government electoral vulnerability has an en-
hancing effect on government issue emphasis when the issue is salient to the public and the govern-
ment is not competent on the issue.
Finally, I askwhether the competing issue salience and issue ownership expectations are still valid
when governments face an additional pressure, namely, electoral proximity. Are governments more
likely to emphasise those issues they are competent on or those issues that are more salient to the
public when elections are approaching? While extensive research documents that political parties
emphasise their core issues (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996; Walgrave, Lefevere, and Tresch
2012) and this can be a winning card for governments that aim at being reelected, there is not much
comparative evidence (see, however, Jennings and Wlezien 2015b; Bischof 2015) outside the Amer-
ican context (e.g., Kuklinski 1978; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004) that governments respond to the
public when elections are coming, which makes it worth testing empirically the competing electoral
proximity hypotheses:
H4.3a. The Electoral Proximity Hypothesis. Governments are more likely to emphasise, in their
policy agendas, those issues the public is more concerned with when elections are approaching.
H4.3b. The Electoral Proximity Hypothesis. Governments are more likely to emphasise, in their
2Note that, asWalgrave, Lefevere, andTresch (2012) stress, competence is not the only dimensionof issue ownership.
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policy agendas, those issues they have a good reputation on when elections are approaching.
4.3 Data, Measurement, andModel Specification
This chapter tests the hypotheses aforementioned in four advanced democracies: Germany (1987-
2004), Spain (1982-2007), the United Kingdom (1970-2010), and the United States (1970-2012). The
reason of the case selection is twofold. On one hand, time-series data on the dependent variable need
to be matched with data on the independent variables, and this limits the sample size considerably.
On the other hand, the chosen cases are good to assess agenda responsiveness because they all display
high clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Hobolt, Tilley,
andBanducci 2013) and high electoral identifiability (Strøm 1990; Shugart andCarey 1992), given that
the features of the electoral system, though differing to some extent, help produce clear and identi-
fiable governments. Indeed, the UK and the US are both single member district (SMD) countries,
Spain is a proportional representation (PR) systemwith low district magnitude and overrepresenta-
tion of large parties (Hopkin 2005) and Germany a mixed-member system (Scarrow 2001) allowing
the formation of pre-electoral coalitions and producing a bipolar pattern conducive to high levels of
cabinet durability (Saalfeld 2005).
Rhetorical responsiveness on the government side is measured using data on executive speeches
as collected by theComparativeAgendas Project (CAP) following the codebook created by the Policy
Agendas Project. The policy content of these speeches is divided into quasi-sentences, with each
quasi-sentence assigned a single unique topic code The dependent variable is then the number of
quasi-sentences assigned to each macro topic in a set of policy domains.3 Table 4.1 shows the CAP
major topics used in the analysis for each country. While the most prominent topic in all countries is
given by defence and international affairs, there is significant variation across policy agendas (Green-
Pedersen andWalgrave 2014). For instance, whereas law, crime and education are extremely import-
3Note that the dependent variable is in raw numbers and not in percentage. This is due to data availability con-
straints. In fact, the German data on the CAP speeches are not publicly available yet and I am using the data in this
chapter with kind permission of theGermanCAP team. The drawback is, however, that I can access only a subsample of
all policy domains, which makes it impossible to compute the percentage based on the total number of quasi-sentences
in a speech. For this reason, I have also testedmy hypotheses by estimating a countmodel. These analyses, which support
my findings in the chapter, are available upon request.
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ant in Spain, the German policy agenda devotes more space to social welfare and the environment.4
Public issue salience is measured using themost important problem/issue (MIP/MII) question,
which gives citizens the opportunity to state their priorities. Data on citizens’ priorities have been
recoded in line with the Policy Agendas Project codebook tomake themmore comparable. Electoral
vulnerability represents the most relevant incentive of electoral competition for responsiveness. I
recall that governments’ electoral vulnerability is computed by subtracting the vote intentions for
the relevant opposition parties from the vote intentions for the government parties. Government’s
relative advantage on issues represents the other main electoral incentive that this chapter considers.
The measure is constructed by averaging competence on a given issue (issues have been recoded in
line with the major topics used for the dependent variable) by decade. Given that opinion polls may
contain some measurement error, the party leading the government is considered as competent if
the difference with the main opposition party is higher than 3 percent. A dummy variable for issue
competence is then constructed to capture whether the government has an advantage on the issue
compared to its main opponent. For details about data andmeasures of the dependent and themain
independent variables, please refer to Chapter 3.
Table 4.1: CAPMajor Topic codes used in the analysis, raw means
Major Topic Germany Spain UK US
(1987-2004) (1982-2007) (1970-2010) (1970-2012)
3. Health 5.6 5.0 2.0 16.4
6. Education 11.6 15.3 3.2 14.8
7. Environment 13.3 2.1 1.6 4.7
12. Law and Crime 10.8 36.7 6.1 13.8
13. Social Welfare 18.2 5.3 2.4 13.7
14. Housing 3.7 3.3 2.0 3.2
16/19. Defence/International Affairs 96.3 51.9 23.1 72.1
Note: The cells contain the mean value of each policy domain for the period considered in each country.
Source: Comparative Agendas Project.
4Note that I decided to exclude theMacroeconomicsmajor topic from the analysis because parties are not perceived
as competent or not competent over the whole macroeconomic topic, but they are rated differently on issues such as
unemployment, inflation, economic situation, and taxation, and this is highly problematic for themeasure of issue com-
petence adopted in this chapter.
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The data suggest that there is synchronic and diachronic variation in issue competence (see Ap-
pendixA). In theUK, for instance, some issues thatwere closer to theConservative Party in the 1970s
- such as health, education or housing - tend to be associatedwith the Labour Party in the subsequent
decades. However, there are also changeable issues such as crime and environment or stable issues
such as defence, which has always been associated with the Conservative Party. Issue stability seems
to be more evident in the US, where some issues are quite stable over time and are never stolen. For
instance, education, health, environment and welfare have always been associated with the Demo-
cratic Party and the same can be said for the Republican Party on issues such as defence and crime.
According to the data at my disposal, Spain registers high issue instability over the decades as well as
Germany, where only a few issues are closely associated with one of the two major parties over time.
To test whether responsiveness to citizens’ priorities increases during the election year, I created
two dummy variables, one including the executive speeches made up to 6months before the general
elections and another one including those speeches made up to 12 months before the elections. This
variable accounts for the fact that the election year differs from country to country and from one
election to another. In fact, a dummy variable for the election year would not work well since some
speeches are made right after the elections.
Finally, I add standard controls for unemployment rate and inflation, since government’s re-
sponsiveness can be driven by economic conditions rather than public opinion; for the proportion-
ality of the electoral system (by using Gallagher’s LSq index) to control for the fact that respons-
iveness can differ across electoral institutions (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Wlezien and Soroka
2012), and for the possibility that presidents in their second termmay not be responsive because they
cannot be reelected.
The Model
This chapter uses time-series cross-sectional data from four countries in seven policy domains. In-
stead of estimating issue-specific models, as done in other research on responsiveness and dynamic
representation, to test my hypotheses I reshape the data and stack them in terms of issues as well.
In this sense, the unit of analysis is no longer the combination of a panel variable (country) and a
CHAPTER 4. RHETORICAL RESPONSIVENESS 65
time variable (year× parliamentary term), but it becomes the combination of policy × country ×
(year × parliamentary term). Figure 4.1 provides a graphical example with two countries and two
policy domains of how the data matrix changes after being stacked. The advantages of changing the
structure of the data in this way are that thismight lead tomore robust results increasing the number
of cases and the variance in salience (not just over time, but across issues).
Country Year Speech_defence Speech_health 
Spain 1987 1 5 
Spain 1988 2 6 
UK 1987 3 7 
UK 1988 4 8 
Policy Country Year Speech 
Defence Spain 1987 1 
Defence Spain 1988 2 
Health Spain 1987 5 
Health Spain 1988 6 
Defence UK 1987 3 
Defence UK 1988 4 
Health UK 1987 7 
Health UK 1988 8 
Original Data Matrix 
Stacked Data Matrix 
Figure 4.1: Structure of stacked data matrix
Source: Author’s own adapted from Figure 2 in van der Eijk et al. (2006: 441)
To estimateTSCSmodels, pureOLS can be problematic (Beck andKatz 1995) because it assumes
errors to have the same variance (homoskedasticity) and errors to be independent of each other over
time (no serial correlation) and across unit (no spatial correlation).5 The pooled models are estim-
ated with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) (Beck and Katz 1995), which controls for panel
heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlations of the errors and fitted with the Prais-Winsten
5Unit-root tests based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests reveal that data are stationary and in all instances reject
the presence of unit root at the 95 per cent confidence level. However, the Wooldridge (2002) test for serial correlation
for TSCS data confirms the presence of serial correlation in the data. Finally, Breusch-Pagan and White tests report
heteroskedasticity in the data. For these reasons, the model needs to account for these issues.
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method to test for serial correlation (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005: 342). The assumption
is that, within panels, there is first-order autocorrelation (AR1) and that, as a robustness check, the
coefficient of theAR(1) process is specific to each panel. TSCSdata are seldom independent along the
time dimension within units and the Prais-Winsten estimator is one way to deal with serial correla-
tion in the data and is suggested for small samples (Fortin-Rittberger 2014). This choice is preferable
to lagged dependent variable (LDV) models as “the elimination of serial correlation by inclusion
of the lagged residuals gives more appropriate coefficients than the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable” (Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005: 342-3), which would also absorb more time-series
dynamics leaving less variance for the substantive explanatory variables (see also Achen 2000). Given
this discussion, in the chapter I estimate my models with PCSE and Prais-Winsten estimator with
country dummies.6
I begin by estimating a basicmodel where government electoral vulnerability is not included and
government issue emphasis is only a function of public issue salience and government issue compet-
ence:
Speech(it) = α + β1[Salience(it−1)]
+β2[Competence(it−1)] + β3[Controls(it)] + 
(4.1)
To test the Issue SalienceHypothesis (H1a) and the IssueOwnershipHypothesis (H1b) –namely
whether governments devote more attention to the issues the public is concerned about or to the
issues they have an advantage on, depending on the level of their vulnerability – I propose a model
that includes an interaction term between public issue salience and vulnerability, [Salience(t −
1)×V ulnerability(t−1)], and an interaction term between issue competence and vulnerability,
[Competence(t− 1)× V ulnerability(t− 1)]. The model is presented in equation 4.2, where
α and  represent the intercept and the error term:
6Note that models have also been reestimated including the LDV and country dummies and results are reported in
Appendix B. This specification does not alter the substantive validity of the results.
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Speech(it) = α + β1[Salience(it−1)] + β2[V ulnerability(it−1)]
+β3[Competence(it−1)] + β4[Salience(it−1) × V ulnerability(it−1)]
+β5[Salience(it−1) × Competence(it−1)] + β6[Controls(it)] + 
(4.2)
In the analysis I reversed the signof electoral vulnerability –namely, positive values denote higher
levels of vulnerability, whereas negative values denote higher levels of safety – to ease the interpreta-
tion of the coefficients. A positive coefficient β4 on the interaction between salience and vulnerabil-
ity would denote that an increase in public priorities on a given issue in the current year – compared
to the previous year – is associated with an increase in issue emphasis in government speeches con-
ditional on government vulnerability, i.e., that the government responds to public priorities in the
previous year when vulnerable. Similarly, a positive coefficient β5 on the interaction between com-
petence and vulnerability would denote that being competent on a given issue in the previous year
is associated with an increase in issue emphasis in government speeches conditional on government
issue competence, i.e., that the government responds to its own issues in the previous year when
vulnerable.
To estimate the Enhancing Vulnerability Hypothesis (H2), a model is required such as dealing
with the possibility that vulnerability matters differently for issues on which the government is not
associated (that is, where the competence is low). Therefore, a model theorising the relationship
between competitive incentives should require the following adjustment:
SalienceC = Salience if Competence = 1
SalienceNC = Salience if Competence = 0
(4.3)
whereSalienceC denotes those issues forwhich the government is viewed as competentwhereas
SalienceNC denotes those issues for which the government is not viewed as especially competent.
So, I split the sample into two groups and estimate two different models in the following way:
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Speech(it) = α + β1[Salience
C
(it−1)] + β2[V ulnerability(it−1)]
+β3[Salience
C
(it−1) × V ulnerability(it−1)] + β4[Controls(it)] + 
(4.4)
Speech(it) = α + β1[Salience
NC
(it−1)] + β2[V ulnerability(it−1)]
+β3[Salience
NC
(it−1) × V ulnerability(it−1)] + β4[Controls(it)] + 
(4.5)
To evaluate the EnhancingVulnerabilityHypothesis, the key coefficients are those on the interac-
tionbetween [SalienceC(t−1)×V ulnerability(t−1)] variables andbetween [SalienceNC(t−
1)×V ulnerability(t−1)] variables. A positive coefficientβ3 on the interaction between salience
and vulnerability (equation 4.4) would denote that an increase in public priorities on a given issue in
the current year – compared to the previous year – is associated with an increase in issue emphasis in
government speeches conditional on government vulnerability when the government is competent
on the issue. Similarly, a positive coefficient β3 on the interaction between salience and vulnerability
(equation 4.5) would denote that an increase in public priorities on a given issue in the current year
– compared to the previous year – is associated with an increase in issue emphasis in government
speeches conditional on government vulnerability when the government is not competent on the
issue.
To evaluate the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis, the key coefficients are those on the interaction
between [Salience(t − 1) × Proximity(t)] variables and between [Competence(t − 1) ×
Proximity(t)] variables.
Speech(it) = α + β1[Salience(it−1)] + β2[Competence(it−1)]
+β3[Proximity(it)] + β4[Salience(it−1) × Proximity(it)]
+β5[Competence(it−1) × Proximity(it)] + β6[Controls(it)] + 
(4.6)
A positive coefficient β4 on the interaction between salience and electoral proximity would de-
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note that an increase in public priorities on a given issue in the previous year is associated with an
increase in issue emphasis in government speeches conditional on electoral proximity, i.e., that the
government responds to public priorities in the previous year when elections are closer. Similarly, a
positive coefficientβ5 on the interaction between competence and electoral proximity would denote
that being competent on a given issue in the previous year is associated with an increase in issue em-
phasis in government speeches conditional on electoral proximity, i.e., that the government responds
to its own issues in the previous year when elections are closer.
Note that, in order to avoid endogeneity issues, public issue salience and the competitive incent-
ives are averaged not by calendar year but by speech date.7 However, since governments might need
more time to account for public issue priorities and that its effect on policy can be delayed, in line
with other studies on governmental responsiveness (e.g.,Hobolt andKlemmensen 2008; Soroka and
Wlezien 2010), we estimate ourmodels with public priorities, issue competence and electoral vulner-
ability at time (t− 1).
Finally, in the empirical analyses years when a new government emergedwhose ideology differed
from the previous government, such as Schroeder I in 1998 in Germany and Cameron I in 2010 in
the UK, are omitted. This is because in these years the lagged levels of government electoral vul-
nerability and government issue competence pertain to different governments. However, successive
governments with the same PrimeMinister are considered as the same.
4.4 Empirical Results
I evaluate my competing hypotheses (H1a and H1b) in a three-step fashion. Table 4.2 reports the
parameter estimates for the models given by equations 1 and 2 above. I first present the model
without including electoral vulnerability (Model 1). Then I add electoral vulnerability (Model 2)
and estimate the interactions between public issue salience and vulnerability, [Salience(t− 1)×
V ulnerability(t−1)], and between issue competence and vulnerability, [Competence(t−1)×
7This is also because the presidency literature (for an overview, see Cohen 1997: 165-6) finds support for the reverse
causal link, that is, presidential responsiveness to public opinion may boost presidential popularity. The only exception
is Germany, for which information about the date of the speeches is not available for data are not public yet, therefore
the calendar year is used to calculate yearly mean values.
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V ulnerability(t− 1)].
Model 1 shows that, independently of their own electoral vulnerability, governments emphasise
in their policy agendas those issues that are salient to the public and those issues they have a good
reputation on. Although both variables are positive and statistically significant, the size of the effect
differs considerably and is much larger for those issues the government is perceived as competent
on compared to those issues the public is more concerned about, where the magnitude of the effect
is 9 quasi-sentences at 2. This pattern holds when electoral vulnerability is included in the analysis
(Model 2) and interacted with issue salience and issue competence (Model 3). The estimates on both
variables are near zero and statistically insignificant. These estimates disconfirm both our Issue Sali-
ence and IssueOwnership hypotheses that, when vulnerable, governments either rely on those issues
that are salient to the public or on those issues they are competent.
So far, my analysis shows that governments seem to alter their agendas as communicated via ex-
ecutive speeches in response to issue salience and issue competence but not in response to the degree
to which both of these are conditioned by their electoral vulnerability. Table 4.3 reports the analysis
for an enhancing effect of electoral vulnerability on agenda responsiveness. Hypothesis 2, in fact,
tests the possibility that vulnerability matters differently for issues the government is not associated
with. It is reasonable to expect issues to receive more attention when the government does well on
those issues and the public cares about them, as some literature on issue ownership suggests. What I
argue is that electoral vulnerability would influence agenda responsiveness to public priorities when
the government is not competent on the issue – SalienceNC – rather than when the government
is competent – SalienceC .
Columns 2 reports the model for those cases where the issue is salient and the government is
competent. In such cases electoral vulnerability seems not to have an enhancing effect: when the
issue is salient to the public and the government is competent on the issue, electoral vulnerability
does not have any interactive effect on government issue emphasis. The coefficient of the interaction
term is, indeed, not significant. This seems to be in linewithmy expectations. More interesting is the
case in which the issue is salient to the public but the government is not competent (column 3). In
such a situation, the interactive effect of vulnerability is negative and significant at conventional levels
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Table 4.2: The Issue Salience Hypothesis vs The Issue Ownership Hypothesis
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable: Issue Emphasis in Executive Speeches
Salience (t-1) 1.821∗∗∗ 1.857∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗
(0.365) (0.360) (0.378)
Competence (t-1) 8.955∗∗∗ 8.800∗∗∗ 9.196∗∗∗
(2.877) (2.874) (3.062)
Vulnerability (t-1) 0.104 -0.046
(0.106) (0.117)
Salience (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.015
(0.013)
Competence (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.010
(0.139)
Unemployment (t) 0.651 0.513 0.632
(0.571) (0.550) (0.586)
Inflation (t) -0.119 -0.294 -0.180
(0.422) (0.414) (0.454)
LSq (t) -0.352 -0.262 -0.382
(0.770) (0.784) (0.806)
US 2nd Term (t) -1.316 -2.106 -1.667
(6.351) (6.433) (6.478)
Constant 3.022 3.736 2.920
(6.510) (6.272) (6.717)
N 575 575 575
R2 0.18 0.18 0.19
Models with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Germany reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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(p<0.01). Governments tend to emphasise those issues important to the public when they are vul-
nerable and not competent.8 To better understand this effect, I follow Brambor et al’s advice (2006)
and plot the marginal effects of the interaction. Figure 4.2 shows that the more the government be-
comes vulnerable, the more it tends to respond to the public when it is not competent on the issue.
This suggests that there is room for my Enhancing Vulnerability Hypothesis.
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Figure 4.2: Effect of electoral vulnerability on agenda responsiveness
Note: Marginal effect of public priorities on government emphasis at different levels of government electoral
vulnerability when the issue is salient to the public and the government is not competent on the issue (based on Table
4.3, Model 5). Dashed lines are 95 percent confidence interval.
Table 4.4 presents the results for the electoral proximity hypothesis. To test this hypothesis, I
recall, I have created two variables that disentangle the executive speeches made under electoral cam-
paign from the onesmadewhen the electoral campaign has not yet started. One variable captures the
speeches delivered up to six months before the general election takes place, while the other also in-
cludes those delivered up to twelvemonths before the election. The analysis shows that governments
seemnot to increase rhetorical responsiveness by emphasising issues the public is concernedwith nor
to rely on their own issues when elections are not very close and parties have not entered the elect-
oral campaign yet (Model 7). What the analysis suggests is that governments tend to be slightly less
8Appendix B reports the same analysis estimated by using a three-way interaction among salience, competence and
vulnerability instead of subsetting by issue competence. The interaction is, indeed, statistically significant and confirms
the difference between competence and not competence.
CHAPTER 4. RHETORICAL RESPONSIVENESS 73
Table 4.3: The Enhancing Vulnerability Hypothesis
Model 4 Model 5
Dependent Variable: Issue Emphasis in Executive Speeches
Salience C (t-1) 2.274∗∗∗
(0.455)
Vulnerability (t-1) 0.179 -0.076
(0.156) (0.111)
Salience C (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.010
(0.014)
Salience NC (t-1) 1.987∗∗∗
(0.397)
Salience NC (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.037∗∗∗
(0.011)
Unemployment (t) 0.264 0.387
(0.597) (0.969)
Inflation (t) 0.147 -0.555
(0.579) (0.516)
LSq (t) 0.155 -0.084
(0.903) (1.060)
US 2nd Term (t) 2.684 -4.390
(7.214) (7.964)
Constant 22.89∗ 0.081
(11.79) (8.508)
N 296 279
R2 0.35 0.14
Models with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Germany reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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responsive to public priorities when elections are approaching and also to emphasise less the issues
on which they are competent (Model 6), though the slope of the interaction terms is still positive.9
The interactions are plotted in Figure 4.3, which shows the effect of public priorities on government
emphasis at different levels of electoral proximity (left-hand graph) and the effect of issue compet-
ence on government emphasis at different levels of electoral proximity (right-hand graph). The slope
of the coefficients of the electoral proximity dummy is positive in both cases but slightly lower for
electoral proximity equals 1, namely, when elections are much closer.
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Figure 4.3: Effect of electoral proximity on agenda responsiveness
Note: Effect of public priorities on government emphasis at different levels of electoral proximity (left-hand graph) and
effect of issue competence on government emphasis at different levels of electoral proximity (right-hand graph) (based
on Table 4.4, Model 6). Dashed lines are 95 percent confidence interval.
9Note that the analysis omits Germany because data on the speech date are not available.
CHAPTER 4. RHETORICAL RESPONSIVENESS 75
Table 4.4: The Electoral Proximity Hypothesis
Model 6 Model 7
Dependent Variable: Issue Emphasis in Executive Speeches
Salience (t-1) 1.323∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗
(0.303) (0.320)
Competence (t-1) 5.963∗∗ 5.314∗
(2.585) (2.791)
Electoral Proximity (6-month) 3.533∗∗
(1.679)
Salience (t-1)× Electoral Proximity (6-month) -0.415∗∗
(0.161)
Competence (t-1)× Electoral Proximity (6-month) -3.443∗
(1.856)
Electoral Proximity (12-month) -5.182∗
(2.876)
Salience (t-1)× Electoral Proximity (12-month) 0.268
(0.433)
Competence (t-1)× Electoral Proximity (12-month) 0.930
(2.631)
Unemployment (t) 0.641 0.491
(0.525) (0.571)
Inflation (t) -0.216 -0.326
(0.379) (0.407)
LSq (t) -0.698 -0.662
(0.742) (0.777)
US 2nd Term (t) -1.552 -2.415
(6.577) (6.556)
Constant 4.780 10.98
(9.902) (10.97)
N 485 485
R2 0.13 0.14
Models with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Spain reference category)
Germany omitted from this analysis due to data unavailability of the speech date
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.5 Conclusion and Discussion
This chapter has studied the linkages between government’s policy agenda, public opinion, and in-
centives from party competition. The puzzle at the very heart of the chapter stems from the fol-
lowing question: what do governments do between elections when they are electorally vulnerable?
Do they tend to respond to those issues the public is concerned about or do they tend to emphas-
ise those issues they have a good reputation on? The question is addressed using pooled time-series
cross-sectional data from four advanced democracies that showhigh electoral identifiability and high
clarity of responsibility, which would make it easier for governments to respond given the majorit-
arian incentives of the electoral system and the lack of constraints for being in coalition with a large
number of partners.
From an empirical standpoint, this chapter contributes to the existing literature on dynamic
agenda representation and government’s rhetorical responsiveness (John, Bevan, and Jennings 2011;
Hobolt andKlemmensen 2008;Hakhverdian 2010; Spoon andKlüver 2014;Klüver andSpoon2014).
My findings present additional evidence for the influence of public priorities on the policy agenda of
governments and find interesting effects of competitive incentives on agenda responsiveness. This
chapter presents three main findings.
First, fromprevious research, we know that issue salience is a sufficient, if not necessary, incentive
for governments to react. However, given that parties hold a historical reputation on certain issues, as
issue ownership theories suggest, in the longer run one may expect that issue competence makes the
difference more than issue salience. Unlike this trade-off, I find that governments adjust their policy
agendas to the issues that are salient to the public as well as to the issues they are perceived as compet-
ent on, but tend to rely more heavily on the latter. These are not mutually exclusive scenarios but,
instead, governments rely on both strategies. My results make sense to the extent that governments,
unlike oppositions, can also play the card of competence, because of their own governing status.
Second, the chapter finds support for the hypothesis that vulnerability enhances responsiveness
on the issues that are salient to the public and where the government has not a good reputation on.
This somehow confirms previous findings that elevate issue salience and issue competence as import-
ant conditions for responsiveness. However, unlike previous research which shows that government
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responsiveness is conditional on electoral pressure, I find that electoral vulnerability is an incentive
for governments to respond in their policy agendas only when they are not competent on the issue.
The last result suggests that governments tend to rely on both issues that are salient to the public
and on which they are competent independently of the closeness of elections. When elections are
approaching, there is rather some evidence that agenda responsiveness to issue salience and issue
competence slightly decreases.
In the light of the results from this chapter, the theoretical expectation that political competi-
tion, defined as a set of dimensions, has a beneficial effect for democracy, in general, and respons-
iveness, in particular, and the empirical expectation that responsiveness would be more likely under
certain competitive incentives, end up standing. Governments do care about electoral expectations,
not only at election time, but also between elections and rely on incentives to ease their electoral
pressures. However, as also suggested by Cohen (1997), this kind of reaction could be very differ-
ent in other venues such as policy-making and policy implementation, where the relevance of other
factors different than electoral ones might play a major role in driving government responsiveness.
The next two chapters will, in fact, be devoted to assessing the impact of competitive incentives on
responsiveness in more substantive policy venues.
Chapter 5
Budgetary Responsiveness
5.1 Introduction
Unlike Chapter 4, this chapter moves the discussion towards more substantive policy venues and
builds on the negative findings of Bevan and Jennings (2014) and Jennings andWlezien (2015a) that
public issue priorities do not have any influence on government expenditures. What they conclude
is that, unlike executive speeches and legislation, ‘spending is not responsive to public concern about
the “most important problem” in contrast to relative preferences’ (Bevan and Jennings 2014: 52; but
see Wlezien 2005). The reason why public priorities would not have an impact on spending is that,
since budgets have directional implications, changes in the most important problem/issue question
are not directional, that is, the public cannot signal whether it wantsmore or less spending on a given
policy domain (Jennings and Wlezien 2015a). According to these scholars, there is a clear problem
of measurement and they argue that priorities are not a good measure of dynamic representation.
Yet this is rather different from the conclusion that Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) reached using
the same opinion indicator. Indeed, they actually find that, in several domains, the more an issue be-
comes salient to the public, themore the government spends on that issue and this is also conditional
on other factors such as electoral pressure and institutional differences.1
Building on the theoretical insights from political competition as a multidimensional concept
1Though policy issue and policy category/domain do not mean the same thing, they are used interchangeably in
this chapter.
78
CHAPTER 5. BUDGETARY RESPONSIVENESS 79
(Bartolini 1999, 2000; Strøm 1989, 1992) as well as from the spatial model of elections (Downs 1957;
Adams 2001) and the saliency theory of party competition (Budge and Farlie 1983), this chapter aims
to contribute to the literature on dynamic representation and assess whether competitive incentives
have an effect on governmental policy responsiveness between elections. More precisely, the ana-
lysis focuses on three main competitive incentives that can be conceived as necessary conditions for
responsiveness: government electoral vulnerability, the political offer differentiation, and electoral
proximity.
This chapter tests this framework using pooled time-series cross-section analysis on both public
issue priorities and preferences in spending and concludes that public spending is not responsive to
the most important problem/issue (Jennings andWlezien 2015a) and that no clear evidence is found
for a beneficial effect of electoral incentives for policy responsiveness. Such findings have, thus, seri-
ous implications for our conclusions about responsiveness of governments to citizens’ concerns and
demands, as well as for the application to policy responsiveness of theories driven by party competi-
tion.
5.2 Theoretical Expectations
The empirical research on dynamic representation is currently facing amethodological debate, prob-
ably started by the influencial article On the salience of political issues: The problem with ‘most im-
portant problem’ byWlezien (2005) andmore recently developed in Jennings andWlezien (2011) and
Jennings andWlezien (2015a). At the core of this debate there is the question of whether the saliency
approach is appropriate to measure dynamic representation and, especially, policy responsiveness.
According to this approach, citizens’ preferences can be captured by the ‘most important problem’
(MIP) or ‘most important issue’ (MII) question. Some scholars think that these questions are prob-
lematic and inappropriate to measure the public opinion side of the responsiveness relationship. I
summarise the arguments here based on the main points discussed in this literature (Wlezien 2005;
Jennings andWlezien 2011, 2015a).
The first problem arising in the discussion is the unclear definition in the most important prob-
lem question, in fact, an issue may not be a problem, in the sense that if an issue is not problematic
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then it cannot be turned into a problem. An issue is a problem if we are not getting the policy we
want. Therefore, issues and problems might be fundamentally different things. Moreover, the MIP
and MII questions add an attribute to problems/issues, which is their importance and importance
is often conflated with salience. However, a problem/issue may be important, but not salient if it
is not reflected in the media. So, variation in problem status can or cannot be correlated with im-
portance over time, hence MIP responses simply ‘tell us little, if anything, about the importance of
issues’ (Wlezien 2005: 575).
A second problematic aspect is whetherMIP andMIImean the same for respondents. Jennings’
andWlezien’s findings in this regard are reassuring. In fact they find thatMIP andMII series ‘capture
many of the same things, both at particular points in time and over time’. What they cannot rule
out is the connection between problem status and importance, however both may indicate public
‘attention’ (Jennings andWlezien 2011: 554-5).
A more serious limitation of the MIP/MII question is the lack of directionality. Respondents
are asked only to tell which is the most relevant issue for them regardless of whether they want more
or less of a policy. This is probably the main reason that brought scholars to conclude that the most
important problem is not well suited tomeasure policy responsiveness (Jennings andWlezien 2015a)
and this statement finds empirical support in a recent article suggesting that public priorities do not
have an impact on spending (Bevan and Jennings 2014).
In the light of this debate, this chapter analyses budgetary responsiveness by presenting a com-
parisonbetweenpublic priorities andpublic preferences. More interestingly, this chapter provides an
empirical test for the theoretical framework of electoral competition discussed in Chapter 2 and fo-
cuses on three main incentives or dimensions of competition that can be conceived as necessary con-
ditions for governmental responsiveness to public opinion: (1) electoral vulnerability, which refers
to the electoral uncertainty the government faces in between elections; (2) electoral decidability, that
is, how clear and differentiated the political offer is within the party system; (3) electoral proximity,
which refers to the pressure the government faces when elections are approaching.
Please refer to Chapter 2 for the discussion of the theoretical expectations concerning these com-
petitive incentives. Here I only recall in amore formalway the three empirical hypotheses thatwill be
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tested in the chapter. Incumbent vulnerability is at the core of the connection between responsive-
ness and competition. The hypothesis that electoral pressure increases government responsiveness to
citizens’ preferences and priorities finds confirmation in both case studies and comparative research
(Hakhverdian 2010;Hobolt andKlemmensen 2008; Pickup andHobolt 2015), though the effect var-
ies from policy area to policy area. Therefore:
H5.1 (The Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis). The more vulnerable the government, the more
likely it will be responsive to public opinion.
The second hypothesis relates to the differentiation of the political offer. In the eyes of voters, it
is sufficient for the political offer on a given issue to be decidable between government and oppos-
ition and not across the whole party system, for what matters is that voters are able to understand
what the main competitors are offering. Note that, although electoral competition should lead to
constant and smooth adaptation of parties’ preferences to voters’ demands (Downs 1957), parties
actually change their positions slowly (Budge 1994; Walgrave and Nuytemans 2009), so one should
not expect governments to quickly adapt their positions to changes in public opinion. Following this
argument, the assumption is that party preferences are quite stable during the electoral cycle but can
change from one election to the next. In order for decidability to influence the opinion-policy link,
an interactive effect between public opinion and decidability is hypothesised. In other words, the
facilitating effect of decidability, for the reasons aforementioned, is more likely to occur if the policy
difference between government and opposition on the issue increases when the issue becomes more
salient to the public or the public wants the government to spend more on the issue. A hypothesis
concerning decidability would then be the following:
H5.2 (The Electoral Decidability Hypothesis). The greater the policy difference between govern-
ment and opposition on a given issue, the higher the likelihood of policy responsiveness to public
opinion.
Electoral proximity is the third electoral incentive considered in this chapter. On the one hand,
the political economy literature suggests that fiscal policy tends to be systematically manipulated
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before elections (for a review, see Persson and Tabellini 2000, 2002). While taxes are cut before elec-
tions, painful fiscal adjustments (such as cuts in spending and deficits) are postponed until after the
elections and this, in turn, depends on institutional differences (Persson and Tabellini 2002: 4). On
the other hand, though between-country variationmay exist due to institutional friction, budgetary
policy is highly incremental and occasionally punctuated by large changes (Jones et al. 2009). Chan-
ging budgets (and observing the effects of this change) simply takes time (Tsebelis 1995; Garrett and
Mitchell 2001). More than that, when setting budgets, policymakers are constrained by veto play-
ers (Tsebelis 1995) as well as social, economic and international realities that are largely beyond their
control (Epp, Lovett, and Baumgartner 2014). This means that also governmental responsiveness to
public opinion would be subject to the ‘empirical law of public budgets’ (Jones et al. 2009). Given
such contrasting results and expectations, it is worth retesting a hypothesis linking policy respons-
iveness and electoral proximity:
H5.3 (The Electoral Proximity Hypothesis). Policy responsiveness ismore likely to be higherwhen
elections are approaching.
5.3 Data, Measurement, andModel Specification
This chapter focuses on the impact of certain dimensions of competition on responsiveness of gov-
ernments to public opinion and tests its framework through a pooledTSCS analysis in five advanced
democracies: Canada, Germany, Spain, the UK, and the US in a time span between 1980 and 2009.
The reason of the case selection is a compromise between data availability and comparability. On the
one hand, since this chapter is interested in policy responsiveness between elections, it is not possible
to collect long-time series data on public opinion and the competitive incentives for several countries
allowing a thorough test of dynamic representation. On the other hand, all the cases selected display
high clarity of responsibility (Powell and Whitten 1993; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; Hobolt, Tilley,
and Banducci 2013) and high electoral identifiability (Strøm 1990; Shugart and Carey 1992), given
that the features of the electoral system, though differing to some extent, help produce clear and
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identifiable governments. In fact, Canada, the UK and the US are all single member district (SMD)
countries, Spain is a proportional representation (PR) system but with low district magnitude and
overrepresentation of large parties (Hopkin 2005) andGermany is amixed-member system (Scarrow
2001) allowing the formation of pre-electoral coalitions and producing a bipolar pattern conducive
to high levels of cabinet durability (Saalfeld 2005).
Measuring the Independent Variables
Public opinion is measured in two ways: priorities and preferences. Public issue priorities are meas-
ured using the most important problem/issue (MIP/MII) question (see Chapter 3 for details). In
the light of recent findings suggesting thatMIPs/MIIs are not good indicators of public opinion for
budgetary responsiveness, because they do not allow to measure directionality but only attention
(Jennings andWlezien 2015a), public opinion is alsomeasured by using relative preferences in spend-
ing (Soroka andWlezien 2010). While throughMIPs/MIIs it is possible to argue that, especially for
valence issues such as crime, environment, but also health, higher public concern does imply more
spending (Jennings and Wlezien 2015a: 19), spending preferences allows to better address the direc-
tionality issue, as the public can say whether it wants more or less spending on a given issue. Data on
preferences in spending are taken from the Soroka-Wlezien dataset used for Degrees of Democracy
(Soroka andWlezien 2010), but they are available only for a subset of countries (Canada, theUK and
the US).
Government’s electoral vulnerability is defined as the electoral uncertainty the government faces
in between elections. Governments’ electoral vulnerability is computed by subtracting for each year
the vote intentions for the relevant opposition parties from the vote intentions for the government
parties (for the US, presidential approvals are used by subtracting disapproval from approval).
Though the concept of electoral decidability is potentially broader, the chapter focuses on the
key aspect which refers to the dispersion of the political offer on a given issue in a given party system.
For this reason, data from theComparativeManifestos Project (CMP),which analyses partymanifes-
tos for 56 countries throughout the post-war period (Volkens et al. 2014), are used.2 I apply Ezrow’s
2Note that although party positions can change between elections due, for instance, to external shocks, it is not
unreasonable to assume that in normal situations they are quite stable during legislative periods. Thus keeping the same
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(2007) version of party system dispersion not to the left-right ideological position – as he does – but
to specific policy categories and test three measures of party system dispersion: an unweightedmeas-
ure (UPSD), a measure weighted by vote share (VWPSD), and a measure weighted by the salience
of the issue in the party system (SWPSD) (see Chapter 3 for details). Since what matters for voters
is whether the political offer on the issue is decidable between the main competitors, in the text are
reported results only for VWPSD and SWPSD.
To test whether governments are more responsive during the election year a dummy variable
is created (1 for election year, zero otherwise). Following previous research, standard economic in-
dicators for unemployment rate and inflation are included as controls given that responsiveness on
certain issues can be a function of the state of the economy. Government ideology is also included
(as a dummy variable with value of 1 for left-wing governments, zero otherwise) for two reasons.
One is that there might be an issue ownership effect meaning that, for instance, left-wing govern-
ments spend more on left-wing issues and vice versa. Second is that government partisanship cap-
tures representation through election results. Therefore, responsiveness may also depend on gov-
ernment ideology, although a recent study (Epp, Lovett, and Baumgartner 2014) clearly shows that
the latter has no significant impact whatsoever on spending. Given that electoral rules shape policy
(Persson and Tabellini 2000, 2002), a measure of disproportionality of electoral system is included,
precisely Gallagher’s (1991) Least squares index. Moreover, since an already reelected US president
cannot be reelected for a third time, a dummy variable is also included, as in their second terms pres-
idents might care less about responsiveness (although this possibilitymight bemoderated by the fact
that their party can still win the presidency). Finally, some issue-specific controls are also included
for some policy domains: a dummy variable accounting for the presence ofmajor wars in the defence
model and a variable accounting for elderly population in the health model, given that spending in
these two policy domains can also be a function of these factors.
value for the measure of decidability for the whole electoral cycle is theoretically reasonable.
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Dependent Variable and Model
The dependent variable is the level of government expenditure by policy function as a percentage of
GDP. Although Wlezien and Soroka (2003: 273-4) note that expenditures are not policy per se and
using appropriations would be better than outlays, they also acknowledge the former are not easily
available comparatively. The reason of using effective expenditure (outlays) as a percentage of GDP
instead of spending in national currency is that some countries may spend more than others just
because of their size, as also suggested by Garrett and Mitchell (2001). The policy domains selected
are the ones for which comparative data are available for all the five countries: defence, education,
health, housing, unemployment and welfare.3
There is a vital methodological debate among political scientists and political economists about
the use of expenditure as a dependent variable and its relatedmodeling issues (see Plümper, Troeger,
andManow 2005). To check whether errors can display temporal dependence, that is, errors are not
independent fromone time period to the next, autocorrelation andpartial autocorrelation functions
are examined graphically. These tests reveal that first-order autocorrelation is present. Given such
problemsof autocorrelation in time-series data, somemethodologists suggest to include the lag of the
dependent variable in the model (Beck and Katz 1995). Lagging dependent variables is motivated by
methodological reasons,meaning autocorrelation in thedata, for observation at time t candependon
observation at time t− 1. In other words, there is no time independence and this is a common issue
with all time-series data. This seems to be especially true for expenditure data considered as highly
path dependent (Garrett and Mitchell 2001; Jones et al. 2009). However, alternative solutions exist
for, according to other methodologists (Achen 2000; Plümper, Troeger, and Manow 2005), using a
lagged dependent variable would depress the explanatory power of the main independent variables
and absorb part of the trend in the dependent variable. Moreover, some heteroskedasticity in the
data is detected.4 For these reasons, in the chapter I present models with panel-corrected standard
3Data on defence are from the SIPRIMilitary Expenditure Database; data on health, housing, unemployment and
welfare are from the OECD Social Expenditure Database; data on education are combined fromWorld Bank Develop-
ment Indicators and Eurostat.
4The Breusch-Pagan and White tests for heteroskedasticity reject the null hypothesis that the variance of the error
term is constant in some policy domains but not in others.
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errors and country dummies.5
Since significant unit-root tests (Fisher-type test based on ADF test) reveal that the data on ex-
penditures are not stationary and not accounting for this issue will lead to flawed hypothesis tests
and results can be spurious (see e.g., Fortin-Rittberger 2014), in Appendix C I report sensitivity ana-
lysis (discussed in the chapter at the end of the empirical analysis) with a large variety ofmodels while
differencing the dependent variable.
The basic issue-specific model that will be estimated is the following:
EXP(t) = α + β1[PO(t−1)] + β2[COMP(t−1)]
+β3[PO(t−1) × COMP(t−1)] + β4[LEFT(t−1)]
+β5[LSQ(t)] + β6[TERM(t)] + β7[ECON(t)] + 
(5.1)
where:
EXP(t) = the level in public spending on a given policy domain in year t.
PO(t−1) = public priorities and preferences on a given policy domain in the previous year.
COMP(t−1) =competitive incentives: electoral vulnerability at time t−1; electoral decidability
at the time of the previous election; electoral proximity at time t.
LEFT(t−1) = government ideology in the previous year (1 for left-wing governments, zero oth-
erwise).
LSQ(t) =disproportionality of electoral systemusingGallagher’s Least squares index at the time
of the previous election.
TERM(t) = second US presidential term in the current year (1 for second presidential term,
zero otherwise).
ECON(t) = each economic indicator (unemployment and inflation) in the current year.
5This choice is also motivated by the argument that clustering standard errors by country is a practice strongly
discouraged when the sample is very small (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008) and robust standard errors may lead
to biased estimators (King and Roberts 2015). However, given that in instances autocorrelation remains, in additional
analyses the lagged dependent variable is also included in the models and this does not undermine the validity of the
results.
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α and  represent the intercept and the error term. The effect of the competitive incentives on
policy responsiveness is given by the interaction term between public opinion and the competitive
incentive [PO(t−1)×COMP(t−1)]. Lagging public opinion is important to establish the time or-
der. Since expenditures are quite sticky and itmay take time to translate citizens’ priorities into policy,
it is common sense to use the lagged variable for public opinion as the citizens’ side of the responsive-
ness relationship (Page and Shapiro 1983; Soroka andWlezien 2010;Hobolt andKlemmensen 2008).
Note that, in the analysis I reverse the sign of electoral vulnerability – namely, positive values denote
higher levels of vulnerability, whereas negative values denote higher levels of safety – to ease the in-
terpretation of the coefficients. If the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis is supported by the data, I
should expect a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction term, meaning the more vul-
nerable the government, the more likely it would be responsive. If electoral decidability produces
the expected effect, the coefficient for the interaction term would be positive, that is, the more dif-
ferentiated the emphasis on the issue in the party system, the more likely the government would
be responsive, as the Electoral Decidability Hypothesis would predict. Finally, if the government is
more responsive in the election year, the coefficient for the interaction term should also be positive
and significant.
Whereas it is accepted, for the arguments outlined above, that the lagged variable of public opin-
ion is required, it is less clear whether we should consider the current or the past value of government
ideology as well as the competitive incentives. For example, Soroka and Wlezien (2010) use the lag
of government ideology and vote margins while Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) set both govern-
ment ideology and electoral uncertainty at time t. Theremight be two competing arguments that are
worth considering here. On the one hand, we could expect that what matters for the government is
its current potential vulnerability and not as much if the government was vulnerable before. In this
case, the solution adopted byHobolt andKlemmensen (2008)would be theoretically preferable. On
the other hand, however, there might be a causality issue with this solution, that is, are governments
responsive because they are vulnerable or are they vulnerable because they are responsive? In other
words, is a change in spending mediated by government vulnerability or do governments become
more vulnerable due to a change in spending? This concern is less relevant to the other competitive
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incentives, electoral decidability and electoral proximity. In fact, given that CMP data are used to
capture the former, electoral decidability takes repeated values for the whole electoral cycle and there
would be no reasonable causal expectation saying that the political offer on a given issue becomes
more decidable due to a change in spending. The same would apply to electoral proximity. For these
reasons, the model for electoral vulnerability is tested with vulnerability at time t − 1 whereas the
models for electoral decidability and electoral proximity are testedwith both the former and the latter
at time t.
5.4 Empirical Results
Responsiveness to Public Priorities
This section presents the findings with public priorities. Before moving to the results for my hy-
potheses, it is worth noting that the analysis only for the constitutive terms (models are reported
in Appendix C) confirms previous findings that spending does not respond to the most important
problem/issue. In fact, all coefficients for public priorities are negative and three also statistically
significant (education, unemployment and welfare).
Results for the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis are reported in Table 5.1. Two main findings
seem to be clear. Firstly, looking at the constitutive term for public opinion, when electoral vulner-
ability is zero (I recall that vulnerability equaling zero does not mean absence of vulnerability but
maximum uncertainty about results of the next election) the coefficient for public issue priorities
is negative (and sometimes significant) in all policy domains considered. This would suggest that,
when electoral vulnerability is zero, the more the issue becomes salient to the public, the less the
government spends on the issue.
Secondly, when it comes to spending, government’s electoral vulnerability seems not to have any
beneficial effect whatsoever for governmental responsiveness to public priorities. The coefficient of
the interaction is mostly negative, meaning that the safer the government, the more responsive it is
to public priorities, and only positive and significant in one policy domain (housing).6 To interpret
6Note that N differs across models due to the lack of observations of the most important problem/issue for some
years.
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Table 5.1: Electoral vulnerability and policy responsiveness to public priorities
Defence Education Health Housing Unemployment Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP
Public Priorities (t-1) -0.002 -0.064∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.016∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.024) (0.013) (0.009) (0.003) (0.023)
Gov’t Vulnerability (t-1) -0.003 -0.002 0.003 -0.000 0.005∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006)
Priorities (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗ -0.000∗∗ -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Left (t-1) -0.921∗∗∗ 0.260∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.040 0.180∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.134) (0.107) (0.043) (0.083) (0.178)
LSq (t) 0.061∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.011) (0.021) (0.037)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.173 -0.398∗∗∗ -1.276∗∗∗ 0.051∗ 0.012 -0.538∗∗
(0.249) (0.153) (0.232) (0.031) (0.085) (0.232)
Inflation (t) 0.043∗ -0.073∗∗ -0.005 -0.013 0.033 -0.158∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.029) (0.039) (0.011) (0.025) (0.045)
Unemployment (t) 0.044∗∗ 0.009 0.022∗ -0.000 0.113∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗
(0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.005) (0.013) (0.025)
War (t) 0.006
(0.052)
Elderly (t) 0.078
(0.084)
Constant 0.931∗∗ 6.679∗∗∗ 7.199∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 1.614∗∗∗ 11.02∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.370) (1.186) (0.132) (0.279) (0.437)
N 86 57 75 59 80 85
R2 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.94 0.97 0.99
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Canada reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 5.1: Electoral vulnerability and responsiveness to public priorities
Note: Predicted values of government’s electoral vulnerability on responsiveness to public priorities in housing and
unemployment with 95 percent confidence intervals (based on Table 5.1).
these findings more intuitively, I follow the advice by Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) and plot
the predicted values (Figure 5.1). It is easier to see that when the government is extremely vulnerable
(dashed line), as concern about housing increases, spending in housing increases, and the oppos-
ite happens for unemployment; conversely, when the government is extremely safe (solid line), as
concern about housing increases, spending in housing decreases, and the opposite happens for un-
employment.
Table 5.2 shows the results for the Electoral Decidability Hypothesis. Since CMP data use two
single categories for social domains (welfare state expansion and welfare state limitations), health,
housing and social welfare have been aggregated into one policy category calledWelfare State.7 Table
5.2 presents results for the two measures of electoral decidability, that is, vote weighted party system
dispersion (VWPSD) and salience weighted party system dispersion (SWPSD), whereas results for
the unweighted party system dispersion (UPSD) measure are reported in Appendix C. Electoral de-
cidability seems not to have any conditional effect on policy responsiveness to public priorities for the
selected domains as all coefficients of the interaction term are not statically significant at conventional
levels.
7Given that CMP data do not have a specific category for unemployment, this policy issue has not been included in
this analysis.
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Table 5.2: Electoral decidability and policy responsiveness to public priorities
Defence Defence Education Education Welfare Welfare
(a) (b) (a) (b) State (a) State (b)
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP
Public Priorities (t-1) -0.009 0.002 -0.067∗∗ -0.042 0.036 -0.004
(0.010) (0.009) (0.027) (0.035) (0.039) (0.030)
VWPSD (t) 0.214∗∗∗ -0.008 0.138
(0.068) (0.048) (0.105)
Priorities (t-1)×VWPSD (t) 0.003 0.005 -0.019
(0.004) (0.006) (0.012)
SWPSD (t) 0.177∗ -0.058 0.071
(0.104) (0.090) (0.134)
Priorities (t-1)× SWPSD (t) -0.002 0.002 -0.009
(0.005) (0.024) (0.014)
Left (t-1) -0.457∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗ 0.155∗ 0.127 0.418∗∗ 0.392∗∗
(0.091) (0.092) (0.091) (0.085) (0.191) (0.191)
LSq (t) 0.041∗∗ 0.037∗ -0.061∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.301∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.021) (0.050) (0.050)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.158 0.166 -0.418∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗ -1.333∗∗∗ -1.404∗∗∗
(0.220) (0.230) (0.177) (0.153) (0.280) (0.281)
Inflation (t) 0.053∗∗ 0.051∗∗ -0.076∗∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.031) (0.027) (0.059) (0.059)
Unemployment (t) 0.052∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.007 0.014 0.064∗ 0.065
(0.019) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.039) (0.040)
War (t) -0.042 -0.008
(0.072) (0.069)
Constant 0.487 0.737∗∗ 6.704∗∗∗ 6.843∗∗∗ 19.22∗∗∗ 19.39∗∗∗
(0.329) (0.374) (0.431) (0.369) (0.811) (0.728)
N 95 95 61 61 94 94
R2 0.90 0.86 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Canada reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Results for the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis are reported in Table 5.3. In all policy domains
but one, the interaction term between public priorities and election year is not statistically signi-
ficant. Only for housing, electoral proximity seems to decrease the likelihood of responsiveness to
public priorities. The effect is plotted in Figure 5.2, which shows the predicted values of electoral
proximity on responsiveness to public priorities in housing. Given that electoral proximity is opera-
tionalised with a dummy variable, the dashed line reports the effect of public priorities on spending
in housing in the election year, while the solid line reports the effect of public priorities on spending
in housing elsewhere. The graph shows that there is a very modest difference between the two cases,
as confidence intervals almost overlap.
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Figure 5.2: Electoral proximity and responsiveness to public priorities
Note: Predicted values of election year on responsiveness to public priorities in housing with 95 percent confidence
intervals (based on Table 5.3) while omitting country dummies.
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Table 5.3: Electoral proximity and policy responsiveness to public priorities
Defence Education Health Housing Unemployment Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP
Public Priorities (t-1) -0.000 -0.036∗ -0.002 -0.010 -0.007∗∗ -0.061∗∗
(0.004) (0.019) (0.012) (0.007) (0.003) (0.025)
Election Year (t) 0.030 0.085 -0.010 0.028 -0.059 -0.128
(0.069) (0.060) (0.109) (0.025) (0.048) (0.129)
Priorities (t-1)× Election Year (t) 0.000 -0.014 -0.002 -0.010∗ -0.001 0.025
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.022)
Left (t-1) -0.432∗∗∗ 0.119 0.037 0.005 -0.046 0.160
(0.089) (0.091) (0.126) (0.032) (0.069) (0.120)
LSq (t) 0.040∗ -0.064∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.019) (0.029) (0.012) (0.020) (0.034)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.148 -0.456∗∗∗ -0.626∗∗ 0.080 -0.204
(0.220) (0.147) (0.275) (0.061) (0.154)
Inflation (t) 0.054∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.101∗∗∗ -0.002 0.017 -0.128∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.027) (0.035) (0.011) (0.017) (0.038)
Unemployment (t) 0.050∗∗∗ 0.011 0.037∗∗ 0.004 0.125∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.003) (0.018) (0.025)
War (t) 0.017
(0.066)
Elderly (t) 0.167∗
(0.086)
Constant 0.729∗∗ 6.708∗∗∗ 5.871∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 11.06∗∗∗
(0.311) (0.412) (1.205) (0.128) (0.317) (0.470)
N 95 61 82 64 87 93
R2 0.85 0.98 0.97 0.90 0.90 0.99
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Canada reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Responsiveness to Public Preferences
The previous section showed that spending is not responsive to the most important problem/issue
and that competitive incentives have a marginal impact on policy responsiveness. The analysis is
replicated for a subset of countries (Canada, the UK, and the US) and a subset of issues (defence,
education, health, and welfare) by using spending preferences. Results are reported in Tables 5.4
to 5.6. As for priorities, before moving to comment on the impact of competitive incentives on re-
sponsiveness to public preferences, I consider the basic responsiveness model (reported in Appendix
C) with only public opinion and a set of controls. As for priorities, these analyses show that levels
of spending in the current period do not respond to levels of public preferences in spending in the
previous period. This finding is interested and will be readdressed in the sensitivity analysis.
Results for the Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis (Table 5.4) partly resemble the story told for
public priorities. Except for welfare, safe governments are no more likely than vulnerable govern-
ments to respond to public preferences. In fact, the interaction between preferences and vulnerabil-
ity is negative in all models, but significant only in health, while positive and statistically significant
at conventional levels (p<0.01) only inwelfare. As for priorities, these effects are plotted in Figure 5.3,
where the dashed line refers to maximum vulnerability and the solid line to maximum safety. The
graph shows that when the government is extremely vulnerable, an increase in spending preferences
in welfare results in an increase in government spending on the issue, and the opposite happens to
health; conversely, when the government is extremely safe, an increase in spending preferences inwel-
fare results in a decrease in government spending on the issue, and the opposite happens to health.
Results for the Electoral Decidability Hypothesis are reported in Table 5.5 and, compared to
the models for public priorities, do not report substantive differences. The exception is given by the
educationmodel, where the interaction between public preferences and party systemdispersion goes
in the opposite direction: the coefficient is, in fact, negative and significant for both the vote and the
salience weighted measures. The effect of the latter is plotted in Figure 5.4, which shows that when
the issue is very undecidable (solid line), as public preferences for spending in education increase,
spending in education increases; conversely, when the issue is very decidable (dashed line), as public
preferences for spending in education increase, spending in education decreases.
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Table 5.4: Electoral vulnerability and policy responsiveness to public preferences
Defence Education Health Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP
Public Preferences (t-1) -0.002 -0.018∗∗ -0.010 -0.003
(0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006)
Gov’t Vulnerability (t-1) -0.003 0.005 0.052∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.004) (0.014) (0.012) (0.002)
Preferences (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Left (t-1) -0.888∗∗∗ 0.159 0.356 0.437∗∗∗
(0.275) (0.119) (0.288) (0.149)
LSq (t) 0.140∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.036) (0.023) (0.041) (0.023)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.481∗∗ -0.602∗∗∗ -0.624∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗
(0.236) (0.106) (0.232) (0.094)
Inflation (t) 0.104∗∗ 0.079∗∗ -0.067 -0.089∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.039) (0.052) (0.029)
Unemployment (t) 0.223∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ -0.062 0.309∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.043) (0.073) (0.032)
War (t) 0.109
(0.127)
Elderly (t) 0.481
(0.371)
Constant -1.731∗∗ 7.324∗∗∗ 4.003 6.987∗∗∗
(0.805) (0.627) (4.114) (0.392)
N 43 31 43 43
R2 0.96 0.98 0.89 0.99
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Canada reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 5.3: Electoral vulnerability and responsiveness to public preferences
Note: Predicted values of government’s electoral vulnerability on responsiveness to public preferences in health and
welfare with 95 percent confidence intervals (based on Table 5.4).
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Table 5.5: Electoral decidability and policy responsiveness to public preferences
Defence Defence Education Education Welfare Welfare
(a) (b) (a) (b) State (a) State (b)
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP
Public Preferences (t-1) -0.004 -0.007 0.029∗ 0.010 -0.015 -0.016
(0.006) (0.005) (0.016) (0.012) (0.020) (0.018)
VWPSD (t) 0.387∗∗∗ 1.162∗∗∗ 0.161
(0.056) (0.325) (0.160)
Preferences (t-1)×VWPSD (t) 0.000 -0.016∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
SWPSD (t) 0.603∗∗∗ 2.284∗ 0.056
(0.121) (1.320) (0.218)
Preferences (t-1)× SWPSD (t) 0.004 -0.036∗ 0.001
(0.005) (0.020) (0.004)
Left (t-1) -0.713∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -0.129 0.021 0.021 0.108
(0.156) (0.168) (0.099) (0.118) (0.299) (0.282)
LSq (t) 0.046 0.100∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.029) (0.022) (0.024) (0.065) (0.065)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.293∗ 0.344∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.552∗∗∗ -0.581∗ -0.625∗∗
(0.168) (0.180) (0.111) (0.101) (0.311) (0.318)
Inflation (t) 0.090∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.042 0.037 -0.202∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.039) (0.042) (0.040) (0.060) (0.060)
Unemployment (t) 0.171∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 0.240∗∗
(0.054) (0.058) (0.028) (0.035) (0.113) (0.115)
War (t) 0.020 0.044
(0.104) (0.107)
Constant -0.775 -1.203∗ 3.528∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗ 16.00∗∗∗ 17.13∗∗∗
(0.632) (0.695) (1.196) (0.979) (1.634) (1.410)
N 48 48 33 33 48 48
R2 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Canada reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.6: Electoral proximity and policy responsiveness to public preferences
Defence Education Health Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP
Public Preferences (t-1) -0.002 -0.012∗ -0.005 -0.009
(0.003) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
Election Year (t) 0.145 3.372∗∗∗ -0.140 0.019
(0.101) (0.625) (0.451) (0.066)
Preferences (t-1)× Election Year (t) 0.005 -0.047∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.002)
Left (t-1) -0.446∗∗∗ 0.176∗ -0.278 0.337∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.104) (0.187) (0.127)
LSq (t) 0.121∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.153∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.021) (0.044) (0.020)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.400∗ -0.917∗∗∗ -0.455∗∗ -0.206∗∗
(0.221) (0.124) (0.219) (0.098)
Inflation (t) 0.132∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ -0.060 -0.077∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.033) (0.048) (0.022)
Unemployment (t) 0.219∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ -0.060 0.322∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.033) (0.072) (0.039)
War (t) 0.100
(0.115)
Elderly (t) 0.893∗∗∗
(0.333)
Constant -1.942∗∗∗ 7.334∗∗∗ -1.304 7.009∗∗∗
(0.720) (0.456) (3.945) (0.435)
N 48 33 48 48
R2 0.94 0.99 0.68 0.89
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Canada reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 5.4: Electoral decidability and responsiveness to public preferences
Note: Predicted values of salience weighted party system dispersion (SWPSD) on responsiveness to public preferences
in education with 95 percent confidence intervals (based on Table 5.5).
Finally, results for the Electoral Proximity Hypothesis are reported in Table 5.6. The hypothesis
does not find confirmation and, in one case (education), the interaction between public preferences
and election year is significant but in the opposite direction. The effect for the education model is
shown in Figure 5.5, where predicted values are plotted. The slope is negative for both the dashed
line (election year) and the solid line (other years), but lower for the election year, suggesting that
spending in this domain decreases a bit more when public preferences increase and elections are ap-
proaching.
Sensitivity Analysis
The analysis reported above documented little if no influence of electoral incentives on budgetary
responsiveness to public opinion (both priorities and preferences). The dependent variable has been
estimated in levels and the responsiveness models (Tables C3 and C5) suggest that levels of spending
in the current period do not respond to levels of priorities/preferences in the previous period. The
opposite seems, instead,more likely from the policy domains analysed: that is, the higher the increase
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Figure 5.5: Electoral proximity and responsiveness to public preferences
Note: Predicted values of election year on responsiveness to public preferences in education with 95 percent confidence
intervals (based on Table 5.6).
in priorities/preferences in the previous period, the lower the government spending in the current
period.
However, theoretical reasons from the responsiveness literature (Hobolt andKlemmensen 2008;
Soroka and Wlezien 2010) along with methodological caveats discussed above – namely, data on
spending are not stationary – suggest that spending should be estimated in changes rather than levels.
Therefore, in Appendix C, I report an extensive number of analyses where the dependent variable is
measured in changes in instead of levels of spending. I summarise the main results below.
Firstly, the responsiveness analysis of changes in spending on past levels of priorities/preferences
without interactions (TablesC4andC6) reports amuch clearer story. Changes in governmentbudget-
ary policy respond to preferences but not to priorities and this effect is statistically significant in three
out of four policy domains. This result confirms previous findings by Jennings andWlezien (2015a)
according to which, unlike spending preferences, the most important problem/issue does not have
any effect on spending.
Secondly, several additional analyseswith changes in spending have beenundertaken to assess the
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validity of the results presented in the chapter. First, all models in the chapter have been reestimated
with the dependent variable in changes (Tables C7-C12). Second, the analysis with public priorit-
ies has been reestimated for the same countries used for the analysis with public preferences (Tables
C13-C15). Third, the Electoral Decidability Hypothesis has been retested by using two alternative
measures: an unweighted measure of party system dispersion (Tables C16-C17) and a measure based
on the policy difference on a given issue between the government and the biggest opposition party
(Tables C18-C19). Fourth, all models have been reestimated while including a lagged dependent vari-
able (Tables C20-C25). None of these analyses subvert the conclusions that competitive incentives
have a limited effect on policy responsiveness when it comes to budget.
5.5 Conclusion and Discussion
This chapter started with certain expectations that incentives coming from electoral competition
(Sartori 1977; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Bartolini 1999, 2000; Manin, Przeworski, and
Stokes 1999) might have beneficial effects for policy responsiveness of governments to public opin-
ion. The empirical analysis undertaken suggests that, when it comes to budgetary policy, all these
expectations should be rethought.
As often happens, this chapter’s attention has been captured by a puzzling result from the lit-
erature: on the one hand, Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) and Pickup and Hobolt (2015) show
strong findings in support of governmental responsiveness to public priorities and the importance
of electoral pressures as a clear incentive for governments to respond; on the other hand, Bevan and
Jennings (2014) and Jennings and Wlezien (2015a) find no governmental responsiveness whatsoever
to public priorities. The reason why public priorities would not have an impact on spending is that,
since budgets have directional implications, changes in the most important problem/issue question
would not allow us to capture well the preferences the public is signalling, meaning whether the
public wants more or less spending on a given policy domain (Jennings andWlezien 2012).
Given these premises, I developed an empirical framework of competitive incentives for respons-
iveness to both public preferences and priorities, inspired by the prolific conceptual and theoretical
literature on party competition (e.g., Downs 1957; Budge and Farlie 1983; Strøm 1992; Bartolini 1999),
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and applied it to government spending as an indicator of policy responsiveness. Threemajor compet-
itive incentives have been selected: electoral vulnerability of governments, decidability of the political
offer, and electoral proximity.
The analysis produces three major findings. First, changes in (but not levels of) governments’
budgetary policy respond to public preferences but not to public priorities. This finding contributes
to the long-lasting debate in political science around whether governments respond to preferences
or priorities and confirms results from previous studies in favour of the use of preferences instead of
priorities to measure signals from the public when spending is involved.
Second, no support is found for a beneficial effect of governments’ electoral vulnerability on re-
sponsiveness. Rather, the fact that the interaction between public opinion and vulnerability is, apart
for few examples coming from sensitivity analyses with changes in spending, mostly not significant
confirms and extends previous studies on presidential popularity arguing that being unpopular does
not increase (or decrease) the likelihood of responsiveness (e.g., Cohen 1995; Canes-Wrone 2004) or
that more popular presidents feel less pressure to promote policies in line with the public (Manza
and Cook 2002, but see also Hakhverdian 2012).
Third, the chapter did not find clear support for higher responsiveness to priorities close to the
elections, but there is some evidence that changes in spending are more responsive to spending pref-
erences when elections are approaching. Interestingly, this finding is strictly connected to another
incidental finding of this chapter, that is, government ideology seems to matter only when the de-
pendent variable is measured in levels rather than changes. The latter seems to be in line with the
recent comparative finding of Epp, Lovett, and Baumgartner (2014), according to which no evidence
is found that governments spend more in line with their ideology, and, as they claim, this is relevant
since it challenges the usefulness of issue ownership theories in explaining budgetary policy.
The Electoral Decidability Hypothesis represents the biggest non-result of the chapter as incon-
sistent results are found with both preferences and priorities. A possible explanation would be that
since governments are overloaded by citizens’ requests and demands (Jones and Baumgartner 2005),
it is plausible to argue that disagreement on the issue might reduce responsiveness rather than en-
hance it. In fact, electoral decidability, conceived as position taking by emphasising the importance
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of certain issues compared to others, may be interpreted not only as a degree of polarisation of the
political offer, but also as the amount of difficulty governments are facing inmaking a policy change.
However, also another explanation can be proposed. If it is true that ‘when polarisation is high, the
meaning of the vote choice can be reduced to nothing more than an expression of partisan loyalty’
(Vegetti 2014: 240), then the expected beneficial effect of decidability in facilitating responsiveness
might simply translate into party attachment when the issue is too polarised. In this sense, toomuch
polarisation would not be good for responsiveness either; hence these results for decidability should
not be seen so strongly in opposition of the Electoral Decidability Hypothesis. Perhaps in polarised
contexts, public preferences and priorities are also polarised, meaning that different partisan groups
might want more or less budget spent on different policy areas, and governments might just be in-
clined to respond to their own voters and not to the priorities/preferences of the general public.
Unfortunately, I do not have data to check the preferences and priorities of different voter groups
and to see whether governments are more likely to respond to their own supporters, rather than to
the whole public, as polarisation increases. This would be very interesting, though, for future devel-
opments of this chapter.
Chapter 6
Legislative Responsiveness
6.1 Introduction
This chapter studies whether the proportion of adopted laws responds to an increase in public at-
tention and, then, whether this is mediated by electoral incentives. This question is relevant for we
already know considerably about rhetorical responsiveness (Cohen 1997; Hobolt and Klemmensen
2008; Hakhverdian 2010) as well as dynamic agenda representation (John, Bevan, and Jennings 2011;
Mortensen et al. 2011; Bevan and Jennings 2014; Green-Pedersen and Walgrave 2014), and whether
parties respond to voters’ preferences (Adams et al. 2004; Ezrow et al. 2010; Adams, Ezrow, and
Somer-Topcu 2011; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013) and priorities (Spoon andKlüver 2014;Wag-
ner and Meyer 2014; Klüver and Spoon 2014) in their manifestos. Yet we know much less about
legislative responsiveness and its determinants.
Governmental policy responsiveness can be driven by several factors. For instance, responsive-
ness may depend on public issue salience (Miller and Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983; Burstein
2003; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010), different institutional arrange-
ments (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Wlezien and Soroka 2012), electoral pressure (Hobolt and
Klemmensen 2008), electoral proximity (Canes-Wrone 2004; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004), in-
terest group pressure (Lax and Phillips 2009), and the size and intensity of protest (Morales et al.
2014). However, this chapter addresses the issue of underwhich circumstances governments respond
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to the public, looking specifically at a set of incentives governing parties face when their mind is pro-
jected to the next elections. Although reelection is not the only goal politicians aim to achieve (e.g.,
see Strøm 1990), they nevertheless have in mind the “shadows of future elections” when they enter
government (Lupia and Strom 1995) and are worried about voters’ reactions (Downs 1957; Friedrich
1963; Sartori 1977; Bartolini 1999) during the electoral cycle.1
If studies on governmental policy responsiveness in comparative perspective exist, they mainly
look at policy in terms of public spending (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien
2010;Wlezien and Soroka 2012). While the comparative literature on policy agenda’s priorities is still
underdeveloped (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Green-Pedersen andWalgrave 2014), comparative studies
using legislation as an indicator of policy responsiveness are even rarer (e.g., Bevan and Jennings 2014),
if compared to single country studies (see, for instance, the chapters included in the recent volume
edited by Green-Pedersen andWalgrave 2014).
This chapter uses time-series cross-sectional data on legislative priorities from the Comparative
Agendas Project for Spain, the UK, and the US in several policy domains. In line with previous
research, the chapter confirms that public priorities have an impact on legislative priorities of gov-
ernments (e.g., Bevan and Jennings 2014). However, the effect of incentives coming from compet-
ition is mixed. First, government electoral vulnerability seems not to have a conditional effect on
legislative responsiveness, supporting and extending the finding from presidential research (Canes-
Wrone 2004) that unpopular presidents are not more likely than popular ones to support policies
endorsed by themajority of the public. Second, despite lawproductivity decreaseswhen elections are
approaching, legislative responsiveness seems to actually be higher in the election year compared to
other years, meaning that policymakers arewilling to play the salience card to increase their chance of
reelection. Third, the chapter finds mixed results in relation to the expectation that public priorities
would have a greater effect on legislative priorities when the government is associated with the issue
and the issue is salient to the public.
1Yet policy portfolio risk and returnmust matter to citizens hence theymust affect government’s electoral prospects
(Bertelli and John 2012).
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6.2 Subverting the Public
Amajor reason for enacting legislation is to translate the people’s will into policy output. Yet there is
a solid and diversified literature showing how legislation is the product of a combination of factors
that are at odds, if not detrimental, to responsiveness to citizens’ preferences and demands.
A first insight comes from the literature on presidential powers (e.g., Shugart and Carey 1992;
Cheibub 2006; Doyle and Elgie 2014). Presidents can exercise a set of legislative powers over legisla-
tion and budgetary policy, as well as non-legislative powers over cabinet formation, cabinet dismissal
and dissolution of assembly (see Shugart and Carey 1992: Ch. 8). More than that, presidents can ex-
ercise not only formal powers as prescribed in the constitution, but also a set of informal powers that
are more difficult to measure empirically. In this sense, presidents can act as an arbiter, that is, they
follow different priorities than the ones of their own party and take different positions than the ones
their ownparty officially stands for (e.g., Finland in the 1980s aswell as theUS). Such a divergence can
have serious consequences for policy-making and electoral expectations, but also for responsiveness
to public opinion.
For instance, policy switches (Stokes 2001; Samuels and Shugart 2010: Ch. 8) can also be a de-
viation from the citizens. In her study on mandate responsiveness in Latin America, Stokes (2001)
addresses that theoretical issue regarding responsiveness and responsibility from an empirical per-
spective and finds that in some cases to be responsible/manipulative pays off better than to be re-
sponsive if it can help face minor risks, even though it implies violating the mandate. From an insti-
tutional standpoint, Samuels and Shugart (2010: Ch. 8) find that policy switches are more likely in
presidential and semi-presidential systems, when elections are closer, than in parliamentary systems,
probably due to the fact that they are more accustomed to the responsible party model. Incentives
for the next election come also into play: presidents would try to bring their party on their own side
if this justifies the ultimate end of winning elections, even though it would mean changing policy
against their own party.
A second insight comes from the literature on government and coalition formation. While a
first wave of research previously suggested that ministers are policy dictators in their ministry (Laver
and Shepsle 1990, but see also Carroll and Cox 2007), recent research shows that the autonomy of
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ministers is diminished by the activity of juniorministers as well as parliamentary committees (Indri-
dason and Kristinsson 2013) and that coalition partners monitor and delegate to each other (Thies
2001; Indridason and Kam 2008). Also, opposition influence matters: the public will can be dis-
torted by committee preferences, the opposition, or veto players (Shugart and Carey 1992; Tsebelis
1995; Cameron 2000; Cox and McCubbins 2005), which can have the final word on a bill. This is
even more relevant in systems allowing the constitution of divided governments (Shugart 1995; Cox
andMcCubbins 2005), for if the executive party controls a majority of the seats, its capacity to push
forward legislation should increase.
Finally, presidential literature suggests that presidents can also raise the salience of a bill by “going
public” andmake it electorally costly to theHouse to block certain bills (Kernell 1986; Canes-Wrone
and de Marchi 2002; Canes-Wrone 2004; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Calvo 2007). Moreover, some
scholars argue that amendments bring the bill closer to the party’s position (Martin and Vanberg
2004), but that intra-party factors can also matter as well as change in public opinion.
6.3 Electoral Competition as Incentive for Legislative Responsive-
ness
Despite the literature suggesting how often governments deviate from the public in the law-making
and policy-making stages, this chapter argues that, if certain electoral incentives are present, they
might have a beneficial effect and increase the likelihood of responsiveness to public opinion. The
vast conceptual and theoretical literature on political competition suggests which electoral incent-
ives can improve the chances of governments for responding to the public. Nevertheless, I remind
the reader that the focus is on legislative responsiveness and not on other types of responsiveness,
meaning that a given electoral incentive can have different effects according to how responsiveness is
measured.
The proposed theoretical framework builds on the so-called Friedrich’s (1963) “mechanism of
anticipated reactions” and argues that, if governments aim to be reelected, they will be more likely
to reach this goal if they respond sympathetically to citizens’ preferences and demands (see Downs
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1957; Bartolini 1999). Given this fundamental premise, the first competitive incentive is what Barto-
lini (2000) calls incumbent vulnerability, for governments are theoretically more likely to respond to
the publicwhen they feel electorally vulnerable between elections. Therefore, vulnerability is defined
as the electoral uncertainty governments perceive during the electoral cycle. The literature on elect-
oral vulnerability and government popularity does not give a definitive answer to the question of
whether such an incentive matters for responsiveness. While some studies find that electoral pres-
sure increases government responsiveness to citizens’ preferences and priorities (Hakhverdian 2010;
Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008) and that unpopular presidents will tend to endorse popular posi-
tions in order to boost personal approval ratings (e.g., Manza and Cook 2002), other studies report
noparticular impact of presidential popularity on responsiveness topublic concern (Cohen 1995) and
that “unpopular presidents are not more likely than popular ones to support positions endorsed by
majority opinion” (Canes-Wrone 2004: 487).
However, alternative arguments exist and come from the presidential literature. Since govern-
ments are attentive to changes in public opinion and fear electoral consequences (Manin, Przeworski,
and Stokes 1999), it can also be the case that “going public” and raising the salience of a bill constitutes
an effective strategy for increasing its legislative success (Kernell 1986; Canes-Wrone and de Marchi
2002; Cox andMcCubbins 2005; Calvo 2007). For instance, Canes-Wrone anddeMarchi (2002: 504)
in theUS find that “only for legislation that is both complex and salient will popularity translate into
policy influence”, while Calvo (2007: 275) finds that, in Argentina, “a very high positive image in-
creases legislative success to about 60 per cent when legislation starts in the House and about 80 per
cent for the Senate”.2 Therefore, an opposite argument suggests that “the likelihood of approving
a bill [is] a function of the increasing popularity of the executive” (Calvo 2007: 275). According to
this argument, legislative productivity increases when the government is more popular rather than
more vulnerable.
If electoral vulnerability behaves in the way theorised above, we should expect governments to
produce more legislation in line with public priorities when governments are vulnerable. In this
2Yet elsewhere Canes-Wrone (2004: 487) finds that both popular and unpopular presidents “obtain significant
legislative influence from appealing to the public” (about domestic initiatives) and that “unpopular presidents are not
more likely than popular ones to support positions endorsed by majority opinion”.
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sense, my first hypothesis will be the following:
H6.1 (The Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis). The more vulnerable the government, the more
likely it will be responsive to public priorities.
Another crucial competitive incentive for responsiveness is given by electoral proximity. In fact,
if elections are instruments of democracy (Mayhew 1974; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Pow-
ell 2000), governments who seek reelection are theoretically more likely to respond when elections
are approaching . However, the literature provides inconsistent conclusions. For instance, the hy-
pothesis finds confirmation in the American context where reelection-seeking presidents are more
likely to endorse popular policies in the second half of the term (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004).
Moreover, studying nuclear energy policy in thirteen countries after the Fukushima disaster, Mor-
ales et al. (2014) find that proximity to elections was indeed a powerful incentive, in association with
other factors, in all of the three cases – Germany, Italy and Switzerland – that undertook substantial
policy responsiveness. On the other side, evidence from Spain reveals that policymakers are more
responsive to public priorities immediately after elections and when the executive governs without a
majority (Chaqués Bonafont and Palau 2011).3
Theorising on the electoral proximity hypothesis in relation to legislative responsiveness is tricky.
Should we really expect governments to legislate more on issues the public is concerned about right
before elections? On the one hand, the answermight be yes, for law-making in favour of public prior-
ities may boost government’s chances of reelection. On the other hand, either governments are likely
to produce legislation closer to public priorities right after elections – perhaps due to the ongoing
“honeymoon effect” (Stimson 1976; Sigelman andKathleen 1983; Green and Jennings 2014) – or gov-
ernments would tend not to put forward a bill they might run against during the campaign (Martin
and Vanberg 2004), decreasing the likelihood of introducing legislation in the final part of the elec-
tion cycle. In otherwords, the “natural” cycle of legislationproduction suggests that politicians know
that there will be no “procedural” time to go through a complex piece of legislation towards the end.
3Thismight suggest that the relationship between responsiveness and the electoral cycle is not linear but curvilinear,
with responsiveness higher in the first year after elections, probably in line with the so-called honeymoon effect, but
decreasing during the legislative term and increasing again in the election year.
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The crucial distinction here is between putting forward legislation because the government is
linked to a mandate that it has to carry forward and putting forward legislation as a reaction to a
change in public priorities. It might be less likely and more risky for governments to introduce a bill
before elections, in general terms, but it might also be the case that the chances of introducing a bill
in line with public opinionmight have beneficial effects for the government. So, my argument is not
that legislation production increases when elections are approaching. What I argue is, instead, that if
a law in linewithwith public concerns andpriorities is implementedwhen elections are approaching,
it can still help governments to increase their chance of reelection because the public is concerned
about the issue.
H6.2 (The Electoral Proximity Hypothesis). Legislative responsiveness to public opinion is likely
to occur when elections are approaching.
Unlike electoral vulnerability and electoral proximity, which can be conceived as beneficial in-
centives for responsiveness, there is an additional competitive incentive that might, instead, have an
ill-fated effect on responsiveness. This incentive relies on the issue ownership theory of party compet-
ition (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996), and, especially, on its associative dimension (Walgrave,
Lefevere, and Tresch 2012). In this sense, responsiveness is mediated by whether the government is
more associatedwith certain issues rather than others. In fact, a left-wing governmentmight bemore
willing to legislate more on social left-wing issues and, conversely, a right-wing governmentmight be
expected to legislate on right-wing issues such as defence or public order. If governments behaved as
issue ownership theories would expect, they would devote their legislative attention on issues they
have a good reputation on or issues they are associated with, in order to avoid electoral defeat (Green
and Hobolt 2008; van der Brug 2004).
However, there is also a tendency for issues to receive more attention from a party when that
party does well on that issue and when the public cares about it (e.g., Walgrave and De Swert 2007;
Walgrave and Lefevere 2013). This would suggest that public issue salience and issue ownership are
not purely additive effects but that there is an interactive effect between the two.
Hence, we should expect government partisanship to mediate the relationship between public
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opinion and public policy in the following way. The likelihood of responsiveness can be higher on
those issues the government ismore associatedwith. However, it can also be the case that public issue
priorities diverge from the issues the government is closer to, therefore responsiveness may be lower
in these cases.
Reviewing the studies on governmental responsiveness in dynamic representation, the effect of
government ideology has been mostly tested using executive speeches and public spending, as in-
dicators of policy, leading to inconsistent results. For instance, Hakhverdian (2010) finds that, al-
though government partisanship affects policy independently of public preferences in the UK, the
latter still have an impact on the budget speeches. Using both executive speeches andpublic spending
inDenmark, theUK and theUS,Hobolt andKlemmensen (2008) find that the effect of government
ideology and public priorities is less consistent across policy areas, while Soroka and Wlezien (2010,
2004b, 2005) find support for the effect of government ideology on government spending in the US
but not in Canada and the UK. In a large N study on responsiveness and inequality in twenty-five
European countries, Peters and Ensink (2014) find that more right-wing governments tend to have
lower levels of social spending. However, although not interested in responsiveness, a recent study
by Epp, Lovett, and Baumgartner (2014) does not find that the ideology of the prime ministerial
party predicts the level of spending, which suggests that the application of expectations based on is-
sue ownership theories should be seriously rethoughtwhen looking at budgets. Finally, the literature
from the Comparative Agendas Project has recently started to look at the responsiveness of govern-
ment agendas to public priorities using different venues, but only a few studies look at laws, mainly
in theUK, and find that government ideology does not reallymatter (John, Bevan, and Jennings 2011;
Bevan and Jennings 2014).
Such a rich diversification in the results outlined corroborates the necessity of testing the effect
of legislative responsiveness to public priorities conditional to government partisanship.
H6.3 (The Ideological Proximity Hypothesis). Government responsiveness is higher on those is-
sues the public cares about and that are closer to the government.
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6.4 Data, Measurement, andModel Specification
The Dependent Variable
Unlike other studies on government responsiveness to public opinion, which essentially use party
manifestos (Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013; Klüver and Spoon 2014), executive speeches (Cohen
1997; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Hakhverdian 2010) and public spending (Hobolt and Klem-
mensen 2008; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien and Soroka 2012), this chapter uses legislative pri-
orities as indicator of policy. This novelty is clearly driven by the fact that comparative data on policy
indicators across time and space have only recently started to become available. Data for the depend-
ent variable are taken from the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) for Spain, the UK and the US
(Bevan, John, and Jennings 2011; Chaqués Bonafont, Palau, and Muñoz 2014; Jones and Whyman
2014).
The reason for the case selection is twofold. On the one hand, the advantage of using data from
the CAP is clear. Given that this chapter is about responsiveness between elections, data ideally cov-
ering the whole electoral cycle are the gold standard for studying dynamic representation. However,
CAP data have also drawbacks. The contingent disadvantage is that a unified CAP dataset is not
ready as yet and data on some countries are not publicly available. A second issue is related to the
fact that CAP time-series must be matched with time-series for public priorities as well as govern-
ment’s electoral vulnerability. These caveats end up reducing considerably the number of countries
at my disposal.
On the other hand, the countries selected would allow me to assess the likelihood of legislative
responsiveness, conditional on a set of electoral incentives, in cases in which electoral identifiability
(Strøm 1990; Shugart andCarey 1992) and clarity of responsibility (Powell andWhitten 1993;Hellwig
and Samuels 2007) are high. The argument is that, if voters have a reasonably clear understanding of
themain differences between government andopposition, then thiswould be a facilitating condition
for governments to respond (Bartolini 2000). In this sense, if it is hard for voters to punish govern-
ments in future elections because of low electoral identifiability and low clarity of responsibility, as
happens in multi-party coalition governments, then governments would be less worried to respond
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to the public. Following this argument, it would be easier for single-party governments to respond
to opinion change since the policy output would not be the by-product of a coalition agreement
(Soroka and Wlezien 2010: 48). Moreover, the cases selected share other institutional similarities
and differences. For instance, the fact that Spain experiences the formation ofminority governments
makes it similar to the US, where the president can also be regarded as a minority in periods of di-
vided governments. This is also the main difference with the UK, where governments usually have a
majority. Moreover, similarly to the US President, Spain’s constructive vote of no-confidence makes
the remove of the prime minister quite difficult.4
The dependent variable is the proportion of laws by CAPMajor Topic enacted every year. Note
that, while the British legislative process does not allow a distinction between laws initiated by the
parliament and laws initiated by the government because, in practice, all laws expect for privatemem-
bers’ bills, are proposed by the government (John et al. 2013), such a distinction does exist in the
Spanish case. However, most laws are in practice initiated by the governing party.5 Given that some
legislation in Spain and the UK implements European directives into the national context, this le-
gislation would simply be a response to European Union requests rather than a response to public
opinion. For this reason, legislation explicitly stating in the CAP title that implements a directive
from the EU is omitted. For the US, a subpopulation of all public laws is taken. Although all laws
in the US must be signed by the president, only those initiated by a Congressman whose party co-
incides with the party of the president are considered here. Commemorative laws in the US are also
excluded. Since I am interested in parceling out government responsiveness, this cautiousness aims
at reducing some of the noise in the data. Table 6.1 shows the number of laws enacted in each country
in the policy domains used in the analysis. Government’s legislative attention in Spain is mainly de-
voted to macroeconomic issues and crime. The UK shows a similar pattern with the exception that
law and crime issues are the first legislative priority of British governments, closely followed by mac-
roeconomic issues. In the US there is a dominant law production in defence and legislative activity
4The lack of counter examples will leave to future research the task of testing on empirical grounds whether single-
party governments are more responsive than multi-party coalition governments, a hypothesis that is clearly influenced
by electoral institutions (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000).
5Laws coded by the Spanish Policy Agendas Project and published in theBoletin Oﬁcial del Estado include ordinary
laws, organic laws, decree laws and legislative decrees.
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decreases considerably in all other policy domains.
Table 6.1: CAPMajor Topic codes used in the analysis
Major Topic Spain (1982-2008) UK (1960-2007) US (1948-2011)
N % N % N %
1. Macroeconomics 253 16.5 374 13.0 208 2.5
3. Health 40 2.6 124 4.3 240 2.9
6. Education 63 4.1 86 3.0 193 2.3
7. Environment 39 2.5 87 3.0 232 2.8
12. Law and Crime 170 11.1 429 15.0 374 4.5
13. Social Welfare 21 1.4 91 3.2 115 1.4
14. Housing 19 1.2 157 5.5 119 1.4
16. Defence 62 4.0 58 2.0 1004 12.0
Note: The cells contain frequencies and proportion of laws enacted in each policy domain in each country.
Source: Comparative Agendas Project.
Independent Variables and Controls
The main independent variable is public issue priorities measured using the “most important prob-
lem/issue” (MIP/MII) question. While theMIP/MII questionmight bemore problematicwhen as-
sociated with indicators of government activity that contain policy directionality (for instance, more
or less spending on a given issue), it matches quite well with government priorities and is frequently
used in studies on dynamic agenda representation (Jones and Baumgartner 2004; John, Bevan, and
Jennings 2011; Bevan and Jennings 2014). Data on citizens’ priorities have been recoded by the author
in line with the Policy Agendas Project codebook to make themmore comparable.
Electoral vulnerability represents the most relevant incentive of electoral competition for re-
sponsiveness. Governments’ electoral vulnerability is computed by subtracting for each year the vote
intentions for the relevant opposition parties from the vote intentions for the governing parties (for
Spain and the UK) while US presidential disapprovals are subtracted from approvals (see Chapter 3
and Appendix A for details).6
Electoral proximity is measured using a dummy variable, 1 for the election year, zero otherwise.
6Note that, the measure does not explicitly take into account any institutional difference mainly because it focuses
on capturing potential vulnerability over time. However, even though such indicators were included, given the own
countries’ nature there would be not enough variance as vulnerability is mostly electoral rather than institutional.
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Government ideology ismeasuredwith a dummyvariable, taking value 1 if the government is defined
as left-wing along the traditional left-right economic scale (e.g., Benoit and Laver 2006), zero other-
wise. Including government partisanship in the equation allows me to test the mechanism through
which public opinion translates into policy (see Hakhverdian 2010: 849-850). If the public has an
impact on policy after controlling for government ideology, then it means that the government is
truly responding to the public. If public priorities have no impact on policy after controlling for
government ideology, then it means the government is not dynamically reacting to the public but it
is only responding to its mandate (only if government ideology is also significant).
Given the importance of institutional factors and veto players in the law-making phase and given
that such constraints can help policy change deviate from the public, I use an index of political con-
straint developed by Heinsz (2002). POLCONIII “identifies the number of independent branches
of government with veto power over policy change”, assuming that the preferences of each of these
branches and the status quo policy are independently and identically drawn from a uniform, unidi-
mensional policy space (Heinsz 2002: 363). The measure of political constraint “incorporates data
on the number of independent political institutions with veto power in a given polity and data on
the alignment and heterogeneity of the political actors that inhabit those institutions” (Heinsz 2002:
384). The index, thus, takes into account “the extent of alignment across branches of government
using data on theparty compositionof the executive and legislative branches” and “the extent of pref-
erence heterogeneity within each legislative branch” (Heinsz 2002: 363). The index varies from zero
to 1: as the number of actors with independent veto power increases, the level of political constraints
increases.7
Another political control is included, namely, a dummy variable accounting for the possibility
that US presidents who cannot run for reelection might be less willing to respond to the public,
because the electoral incentive simply disappears (though not fully because their party still runs for
reelection). I also include unemployment rate and inflation as economic indicators, since legislation
can be driven by the state of the economy and not necessarily by an increase in public concern on the
7In practical terms, the measure of political constraint derives from the fractionalisation of the legislature based on
Rae’s and Taylor’s (1970) index of fractionalisation. For details on how the political constraint index is calculated I refer
to the appendix in Heinsz (2002: 380-389).
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issue.
The Model
This chapter uses time-series cross-sectional data from three countries in eight policy domains. In-
stead of estimating issue-specific models, as done in other research on responsiveness and dynamic
representation, to test my hypotheses I reshape the data and I stack the data matrix in terms of issues
as well (see Chapter 4 for details).
To estimateTSCSmodels, pureOLS can be problematic (Beck andKatz 1995) because it assumes
errors to have the same variance (homoskedasticity) and errors to be independent of each other over
time (no serial correlation) and across unit (no spatial correlation). Unit-root tests for stationarity
reveal that data on the dependent variable are stationary and thus there is no need of differencing
the data.8 TheWooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelation in TSCS data suggests that only in one in-
stance (housing) is there evidence of autocorrelation. However, by running country-specific models,
predicting the residuals of the dependent variable and plotting the autocorrelation and partial auto-
correlation functions, some residuals seem to be autocorrelated. For this reason, I prefer to proceed
cautiously and control for possible serial correlation in themodel. Finally, tests for homoskedasticity
reveal that some models require an adjustment to control for heteroskedasticity.9
The pooled models are estimated with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995),
which controls for panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlations of the errors and fit-
tedwith thePrais-Winstenmethod to test for serial correlation (Plümper, Troeger, andManow2005:
342). The assumption is that, within panels, there is first-order autocorrelation (AR1). TSCS data are
seldom independent along the time dimension within units and the Prais-Winsten estimator is one
way to deal with serial correlation in the data and is suggested for small samples (Fortin-Rittberger
2014). This choice is preferable to LDVmodels as “the elimination of serial correlation by inclusion
of the lagged residuals gives more appropriate coefficients than the inclusion of a lagged dependent
variable” (Plümper, Troeger, andManow2005: 342-3), whichwould also absorbmore time-series dy-
8Unit-root tests based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are used.
9Breusch-Pagan andWhite tests are used.
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namics leaving less variance for the substantive explanatory variables (see also Achen 2000).10 Since
it is unlikely that errors are independent across panels, they are assumed to be panel-level heteroske-
dastic.
LAW (t) = α + β1[PO(t−1)] + β2[COMP(t−1)]
+β3[PO(t−1) × COMP(t−1)] + β4[LEFT(t−1)] + β5[LSQ(t)]
+β6[POLCONIII(t)] + β7[TERM(t)] + β8[ECON(t)] + 
(6.1)
where:
LAW (t) = the percentage of enacted laws devoted to a given policy domain in year t.
PO(t−1) = public priorities on a given policy domain at time t-1.
COMP(t−1) = competitive incentives: electoral vulnerability at time t-1; electoral proximity at
time t.
LEFT(t−1) = government ideology in the previous year (1 for left-wing governments, zero oth-
erwise).
LSQ(t) = Gallagher’s least squares index at the time of the previous election.
POLCONIII(t) =Heinsz’s index of political constraint in the current year.
TERM(t) = secondUS presidential term in the current year (1 for second term, zero otherwise).
ECON(t) = each economic indicator (unemployment, inflation) in the current year.
α and  represent the intercept and the error term. The effect of the competitive incentives on
policy responsiveness is given by the interaction term between public opinion and the competitive
incentive [POt−1 × COMP(t−1)]. In the analysis I reversed the sign of electoral vulnerability –
namely, positive values denote higher levels of vulnerability, whereas negative values denote higher
levels of safety – to ease the interpretation of the coefficients. If the Electoral Vulnerability Hypo-
thesis is supported by the data, I should expect a positive and significant coefficient for the interaction
10Note that models are also reestimated including a LDV and results are reported in Appendix D. The inclusion of
the LDV does not alter the results for the Electoral Vulnerability and Electoral Proximity models.
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term, meaning the more vulnerable the government, the more likely it will be responsive. Finally, if
the government ismore responsive in the election year, the coefficient for the interaction term should
also be positive and significant.11
To test the expectation relating the Ideological Proximity Hypothesis, issues are divided into
two macro categories, according to a traditional left-right distinction. Left-wing issues include edu-
cation, environment, health, housing, welfare. Right-wing issues include defence, foreign affairs,
law and crime. Macroeconomics is excluded given that it is not straightforward to assign suchmacro
topic either to right- or left-wing governments. The model that will be tested is the one outlined in
Equation 1 but without the interaction term and the government ideology control.
Given that CAP data on enacted laws provide information on when the law has been approved
but not when it has been introduced, it is hard to say when the public actually influenced govern-
ment’s decision to introduce a law on the issue. I follow the standard suggestion in the studies of
responsiveness (Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Soroka andWlezien 2010) of taking one year lag for
public priorities.
6.5 Empirical Results
Table 6.2 reports the results with panel-corrected standard errors and country dummies for Hypo-
thesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 1 tests the mediating effect of government’s electoral vul-
nerability against the mediating effect of government popularity on legislative responsiveness. On
the one hand, electoral pressure is said to be beneficial for making governments responsive. On the
other hand, presidential research suggests that more popular governments have higher probabilities
of passing a bill on a salient issue.
The Electoral Vulnerability model results in a coefficient of the interaction between public pri-
orities and vulnerability that is positive but not statistically significant. A closer look at the main
terms suggests that public issue salience does have an effect on legislative productivity as well as gov-
ernment’s vulnerability. When vulnerability is zero, public issue salience has an effect of 0.1 percent
on law production. The negative sign for the coefficient of electoral vulnerability indicates that law
11The models without interaction terms are not reported in the text but they are available in Appendix D.
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productivity increases when the government is vulnerable, but this effect seems not to be mediated
by an increase in public concern on issues.
The finding that government’s electoral vulnerability seems not to have an effect on legislative
responsiveness is, however, in line with some presidential research. In fact, by confirming that un-
popular governments are notmore likely than popular ones to support positions endorsed bymajor-
ity opinion (Canes-Wrone 2004), my finding drifts from the American-based conventional wisdom
that unpopular presidents would tend to endorse popular positions in order to boost their own pop-
ularity. Though this chapter does not deal with position taking but with public issue salience, it is
interesting that such a non-result can be extended comparatively outside the US boundaries.
Results from the Electoral Proximity model seem to be in line with the Electoral Proximity Hy-
pothesis, that is, legislative responsiveness would be higher during the election year. Although the
main term for the election year dummy is, as expected, negative – meaning that law production de-
creases when elections are approaching (if public issue salience was zero) – but not statistically sig-
nificant, the interaction between public priorities and the election year dummy is positive and signi-
ficant. Thus, apparently, when elections are imminent, governments seem to be willing to play the
issue salience card, by introducing legislation on issues about which the public is concerned in order
to increase their chances of reelection.
To better understand this effect, I follow Brambor and colleagues’ recommendation (2006) and
plot the marginal effects of the interaction. Figure 6.1 shows that the slope of the coefficient when
the election year dummy equals one (black dashed line) is higher than the slope of the coefficient for
all other years (grey straight line), meaning that the likelihood of legislative responsiveness is slightly
higher when elections are proximate.
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Table 6.2: Electoral Pressure and Legislative Responsiveness
Electoral Vulnerability Model Electoral ConnectionModel
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Legislation
MIP (t-1) 0.100∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.015
(0.011)
MIP (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.000
(0.001)
Election Year (t) -0.113
(0.356)
MIP (t-1)× Election Year (t) 0.075∗∗∗
(0.029)
Left (t-1) -0.076 0.007
(0.366) (0.357)
LSq (t) 0.100∗ 0.106∗
(0.058) (0.056)
Political Constraint (t) 4.076 3.297
(5.877) (5.402)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.464 -0.372
(0.471) (0.469)
Unemployment (t) 0.002 0.000
(0.059) (0.057)
Inflation (t) 0.019 -0.002
(0.039) (0.038)
Constant 2.524 2.871
(2.674) (2.433)
N 706 706
R2 0.10 0.11
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Spain reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 6.1: Effect of electoral proximity on legislative responsiveness
Note: Effect of public priorities on government emphasis at different levels of electoral proximity (based on Electoral
ConnectionModel, Table 6.2). Dashed lines are 95 percent confidence interval.
Some interesting insights come from the control variables. Whereas the economic indicators and
the political constraint index are not statistically significant, the controls for the disproportionality
of the electoral system and for the US second presidential term are. Specifically, US presidents are
less likely to pass legislation when they cannot be reelected and the positive coefficient for the least
squares index suggests that legislative productivity is higher in contexts where the electoral system is
less proportional. Finally, government ideology seems not to have any effect, but this finding will be
better explored in the next table.
Table 6.3 breaks down the sample into right-wing and left-wing issues and tests Hypothesis 3
trying to reply to the question: do governments devote more attention in legislation production as
a response to public priorities in those issues the government is more associated with? The Ideolo-
gical Proximity Hypothesis argues in favour of an issue ownership effect. In this sense, right-/left-
wing governments should increase their attention on their own issues when salience for the public
increases on those issues. Table 6.3 seems to support this expectation, but only for left-wing govern-
ments (last column). In fact, the coefficient for public priorities is positive and significant, meaning
that left-wing governments are more likely to respond to the priorities of the public on those issues
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they have a long term reputation for.
Table 6.3: Ideological Proximity and Legislative Responsiveness
Right-wing Issues Right-wing Issues Left-wing Issues Left-wing Issues
Right-wing Govts Left-wing Govts Right-wing Govts Left-wing Govts
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Legislation
MIP (t-1) 0.068 0.077 0.115 0.108∗
(0.064) (0.062) (0.070) (0.056)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.026 0.010 -0.008 -0.006
(0.025) (0.031) (0.012) (0.011)
Election Year (t) 1.322∗ -0.091 -0.013 -0.444
(0.785) (0.592) (0.344) (0.281)
LSq (t) -0.064 0.654∗∗∗ -0.043 -0.002
(0.239) (0.219) (0.083) (0.065)
Political Constraint (t) -27.36 -29.33 21.36 6.318
(43.45) (20.13) (14.16) (7.163)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.408 -2.986 0.542 -1.015∗
(1.203) (1.851) (0.692) (0.580)
Unemployment (t) 0.536∗ 0.324 0.098 -0.112
(0.310) (0.281) (0.082) (0.086)
Inflation (t) -0.139 0.007 -0.012 0.155∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.134) (0.068) (0.041)
Constant 13.53 7.591 -9.028 0.570
(22.38) (4.807) (7.186) (1.785)
N 116 86 229 172
R2 0.09 0.18 0.04 0.15
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Spain reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Right-wing issues: defence, foreign affairs, law and crime
Left-wing issues: education, environment, health, housing, welfare
The results presented in this chapter are robust to a set of additional analyses reported in Ap-
pendix D. In particular, the analysis has been reestimated under different model specifications: in-
cluding a trendvariable, policy dummies, and the laggeddependent variable (TablesD3-D8). Moreover,
since the duration of policy-making can change across countries and policy domains and a one year
lag for public opinionmight not be sufficient, models have been reestimated by using themean value
of public priorities for the previous three years (Tables D9 and D10). Finally, given that law-making
in the US might differ from law-making in Western European democracies, the analysis has been
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presented at the country level, too (Tables D11-D13). The Electoral Vulnerability Hypothesis finds
support only in the UK, whereas the interaction between public priorities and government elect-
oral vulnerability is negative and significant in the US. The Electoral Connection Hypothesis finds
support only in the UK, while the interaction between public priorities and government ideology is
never statistically significant in any of the countries analysed.
6.6 Conclusion and Discussion
Law-making is a keymomentof thedemocratic process. Yet, despite very fewexceptions,most quant-
itative time-series analyses on governmental responsiveness to public opinion focus on other stages
of policy-making, in particular agenda-setting and budgetary policy. The reason is essentially due to
the difficulty of collecting comparative data on public laws. This chapter aims at filling this gap and
contributes to the research on the opinion-policy link by using recent data from the Comparative
Agendas Project on enacted laws.
Although the autonomy of both elected officials and bureaucrats from public opinion, along
with the complexity of policy-making, allowing for low responsive or non-responsive behaviours of
policy makers (e.g., seeManza and Cook 2002), this chapter tried to answer the question of whether
citizens’ priorities are still translated into legislation and argued that this relationship can be facilit-
ated by some electoral incentives, for governments aim at reelection.
Evidence from a pooled time-series cross-section analysis including Spain, the UK and the US
suggests that public issue salience has an influence on legislative production. However, results on
whether competitive incentives have a beneficial effect on legislative responsiveness are mixed. The
analysis does not support the hypothesis that electoral vulnerability increases the likelihood of re-
sponsiveness nor the opposite expectation, borrowed from the presidential literature, that popular
governments have higher probabilities of passing a bill on an issuewhich is salient to the public. This
chapter, instead, supports previous findings by Canes-Wrone (2004), according to which unpopular
presidents are notmore likely than popular ones to support positions endorsed bymajority opinion,
and extends them to parliamentary systems. Althoughmy chapter deals with attention and not with
position, this finding is important for reflecting on the idea that the effect of electoral pressure on
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responsiveness might differ depending on the venue of interest.
Mixed results are found in relation to the issue ownership dimension of party competition.
There is the tendency, in fact, for issues to receive more attention from a party when that party does
well on that issue and when the public cares about it. Therefore, unlike purely issue ownership in-
centives, governmentswouldbemore responsive, by approving legislation salient to thepublic, when
the public is concerned about it and the government is closely associated with the issue in question.
The analysis suggests that public priorities have an impact on legislation only over traditional left-
wing issues (i.e., education, environment, health, housing, and welfare) when the government is
left-wing.
Finally, there is evidence that closeness to elections makes the likelihood of legislative respons-
iveness higher. Although it is well known, also from the literature on executive-legislative relations
(e.g., seeMartin andVanberg 2004), that legislative production decreases in the election year because
policy makers are afraid of putting forward, right before the elections, a bill that can be used against
them in the campaign, there is not much research on whether enacting laws supported by the public
concern is, instead, beneficial for governments. My argument was, in fact, that producing legislation
on issues that the public cares about might boost government’s chances of reelection. The analysis
seems to support this view.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Degrees of Democracy concludes that representative democracy is not perfect but it works (Soroka
andWlezien 2010: 182). My dissertation shares this optimistic thought and confirms the major find-
ings from previous research on dynamic representation: public issue salience matters for govern-
mental responsiveness and the latter differs across policy domains and institutions. However, given
thatmost ofwhatwe know in terms of determinants of responsiveness is about the impact of institu-
tional arrangements (i.e., form of government, division of power, electoral system) on government
responsiveness, this dissertation only indirectly touched upon these explanatory factors. My analysis,
instead, focused on whether governments respond to public priorities and whether this relationship
is mediated by a set of dimensions from electoral competition. Conventional wisdom claims, in fact,
that elections and their consequent incentives are one of the most powerful drivers of governmental
responsiveness to public opinion. At least for what relates to public priorities, the reflection of this
dissertation seems to suggest differently. Let me explain why.
This dissertation tests empirically the theoretical claim that electoral competition is beneficial
for democracy and, in particular, for responsiveness. If we think of electoral competition as a multi-
dimensional concept (Strøm 1989, 1992; Bartolini 1999, 2000) and if we think that some dimensions
of competition are important for responsiveness, then we can argue that such dimensions of com-
petition can be studied as incentives useful to explain when governments are more likely to respond
to public opinion and, more specifically, to public issue priorities. My goal was not to find the
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golden rule or the universal law of responsiveness that holds across time and space. My ambition,
in Durkheim’s understanding of science, was nonetheless to look for explanations as functional pro-
positions about patterns of relations among variables (della Porta 2008: 203). In this sense, my re-
search design was clearly variable-oriented. This is so because my aim was to move the discussion
on responsiveness beyond the exploratory country-specific analysis, which was helpful to answer the
question of under what institutions responsiveness is maximised. My research question is rather
different and the focus of my analysis moves from a case-based to a variable-based comparison.
More precisely, my original expectations pointed at a beneficial effect of electoral incentives on
government responsiveness topublic priorities by following the classical hypothetical fashion“more...
more”. Along these lines, if governments care about reelection, my key expectations can be outlined
as follows: (i) electorally vulnerable governments are more likely than safe governments to respond
to public priorities. Similarly, (ii) responsiveness is higher when elections are approaching compared
to other moments of the electoral cycle. Moreover, (iii) responsiveness is higher on those issues the
government is more associated with. Finally, (iv) a higher decidability of the political offer between
the main competitors on a given issue has a facilitating effect on responsiveness compared to a lower
decidability.
Summarising the main contributions to the existing research, my dissertation produces twoma-
jor findings: (1) governmental responsiveness to public priorities decreases when we move from a
more symbolic policy venue (agenda priorities) to more substantive policy venues (budgetary and
legislative priorities) and (2) the impact of competitive incentives changes depending on the policy
venue. While the implications of the first point will be considered below, the second point will be
discussed in detail in the next section.
In relation to the first point, my work extends findings from previous research in the US (e.g.,
Cohen 1997) which argues that presidential responsiveness to public opinion is higher in symbolic
presidential policy activities and then declines as decisions becomemore substantive. This is the com-
mon thread that links together the empirical chapters of this dissertation. While there is substantial
evidence that public issue priorities are translated into government’s agenda priorities through ex-
ecutive speeches, when responsiveness is analysed by looking at budgetary allocations and attention
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devoted to given issues in enacted legislation, the picture is not as reassuring as it was for govern-
ment speeches. Although my pooled analysis suggests that public priorities do have an impact on
legislative priorities, a closer look at single policy domains reveals that only in a few areas the prior-
ities of the public are actually translated into legislation. The picture is even worse when budgetary
policy is considered. In this policy venue, in fact, unlike spending preferences, public priorities have
no impact whatsoever on spending. This finding confirms results from previous studies according
to which the budget is not responsive to the most important problem/issue but rather to spending
preferences (Bevan and Jennings 2014; Jennings andWlezien 2015a).
The finding that the impact of citizens’ priorities on governments’ priorities is higher in more
symbolic policy venues is not surprising, though. Reelection-oriented governments would, indeed,
find it easier and less risky to incorporate public priorities in their policy announcements than in their
actual policies. If we think of responsiveness and accountability as both crucial values of democracy,
then attribution of responsibility is the other side of the coin. Whether voters weigh more heav-
ily rhetorical and symbolic representation or more substantive policy representation and reward or
punish governments accordingly has serious implications for representation. Although it is reason-
able to expect that voters might more easily agree on the policy goals and more easily disagree on the
policy means, it is an empirical question of whether voters reward governments as long as they make
promises and punish them as soon as they implement what has been promised. My findings that
governmental responsiveness to public priorities is higher in the agenda-setting stage and lower in
the policy-making stage clearly connect to the emerging debate about voters’ reactions to what gov-
erning parties say compared to what governing parties actually do. New research on social welfare
issues seems, in fact, to suggest that government support between elections tends to be influenced
by what governments emphasise in their budgetary allocations but not in their executive speeches.
Specifically, governments seem not to benefit when they emphasise social welfare issues in their ex-
ecutive speeches but punished when they increase spending on these issues (Bernardi and Adams
2015). This can be the case because people’s lives are not touched by policy decisions as long as such
decisions still consist of words and promises, and citizens’ dissatisfaction relentlessly increases when
words are turned into acts. If this is true, it is not that surprising to find greater responsiveness in
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more symbolic policy venues. Which role then do electoral incentives play in responsiveness?
7.1 The Impact of Competitive Incentives on Responsiveness
Competitive incentives matter for governmental responsiveness to public priorities differently from
policy venue to policy venue. As a general point, similarly to the impact of public priorities on gov-
ernment’s policy, the effects of such incentives are more evident in more symbolic than in more sub-
stantive policy venues. However, this is not thewhole story. Amore accurate picture is given inTable
7.1, which reports the effect of each competitive incentive for each level of responsiveness compared
to the original expectations.
Governments’ electoral vulnerability is an incentive to respond to citizens’ priorities only in the
rhetorical responsiveness stage and only when the government does not have a long-term advant-
age on the issue. Instead, when the issue is salient to the public and the government is perceived as
competent on the issue, electoral vulnerability does not have any enhancing effect on responsiveness.
Vulnerability matters to the extent that the government is not historically associated with the issue.
Moreover governments tend to respond to both the public and emphasise those issues in which they
are perceived as competent on, but the effect is much bigger for issue competence than issue salience.
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Table 7.1: Effects of competitive incentives on responsiveness
Rhetorical Budgetary Legislative
Ch. 4 Ch. 5 Ch. 6
Dependent Variable Speeches Expenditures Laws
Expectation Finding Expectation Finding Expectation Finding
Electoral Vulnerability positive mixed positive mixed positive no impact
Electoral Decidability n.a. n.a. positive mixed n.a. n.a.
Issue Competence/Ideological Proximity negative negative n.a. n.a. positive mixed
Electoral Proximity positive negative positive mixed positive positive
Source: Author’s own.
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When we move to more substantive policy venues such as budgetary and legislative policy, gov-
ernments’ electoral vulnerability either does not have an impact at all on responsiveness or its ef-
fect goes in the opposite direction and rarely in the expected direction. Similar findings had already
been discovered in theAmerican presidential context, wheremore popular presidents would feel less
pressure to promote policies in line with the public (e.g., Manza and Cook 2002; but also, see Canes-
Wrone and Shotts 2004). This is the case for some policy issues in the budgetary responsiveness
chapter but also in the legislative responsiveness chapter. Although the latter shows that by pooling
all issues together no particular impact of electoral vulnerability is found, when looking at issue-
specific models a few issues seem to confirm the hypothesis already outlined in previous presidential
research (Canes-Wrone and deMarchi 2002; Calvo 2007) that a president’s higher positive image in-
creases the likelihood of legislative success. However, inmany other issues considered, in both policy
responsiveness chapters, safe governments are not more likely than vulnerable governments to take
public issue priorities into account in their own budgetary and legislative priorities. This finding is,
indeed, in linewith other research on presidential popularity, which suggests that popular presidents
are not more likely than unpopular ones to support policies endorsed by the majority of the public
(Canes-Wrone 2004; Cohen 1995). It is important to note that these findings do not differ – in the
budgetary responsiveness chapter – when preferences in spending are used instead of priorities as a
measure of public opinion. So, at least for what relates to the policy domains included in the ana-
lysis, whereas howwemeasure public opinion (and government output) matters for responsiveness,
the impact of electoral vulnerability on government responsiveness does not change much when we
measure public opinion in different ways.
A possibility that requires further exploration relates to the nature of the relationship between
vulnerability and responsiveness. In the dissertation I assumed a linear relationship, meaning the
more vulnerable the government, the higher the responsiveness. However, an alternative hypothesis
may imply a curvilinear relationship between these two variables. More specifically, one can assume
that when governments have no hope of winning next election they will not bother and neither will
they when they are sure of winning. In this sense, one can expect governments to respond when
the difference in support between government and opposition is minimal, that is around the area of
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total uncertainty. I have started exploring this possibility in additional analyses not reported in the
dissertation, but I have not so far found confirmation for this hypothesis when pooled models are
estimated. It can be the case that support for this relationship can be found in country-by-country
analyses and this is something that I want to consider more carefully in future research.
Beyond the results of these chapters, a broader consideration deserves to be raised, for it has
serious implications for representation. The reason why electoral vulnerability does not show the
expected effect when more substantive policy responsiveness is considered might have something to
do with the notable debate around public ignorance. Given that people have an incentive not to
invest in information (Lupia and McCubbins 1998) and that their preferences can be uninformed
(Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), as well as unstable and inconsistent (Bartels 2003), we might think
that perhaps governments do not expect to be punished in such technical subjects such as budgetary
policy and legislation. Put it differently, maybe governments think that in spite of the power of
aggregation (Page and Shapiro 1992; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002) and notwithstanding
the fact that change in preferences may bemoremeaningful than levels of preferences, as Soroka and
Wlezien might argue, the average citizen is essentially uninformed about how much governments
spend on an issue or about the details underneath a law, therefore governments might weigh out
other factors more than electoral pressure and respond for other reasons. In this sense, it would be
interesting to test in future research the expectation that governments are more likely to respond
when their vote intentions decrease among those voters who are more competent and informed.
If elections are drivers of responsiveness, electoral proximity does notwork the sameway for each
level of responsiveness either. While in the rhetorical responsiveness chapter no evidence is found
that closeness to elections increases the likelihood that citizens’ priorities are implemented into gov-
ernment’s priorities in its speeches – there is instead evidence for the opposite scenario that respons-
iveness is slightly higher in other moments of the electoral cycle (Chaqués Bonafont and Palau 2011)
– electoral proximity seems to matter more for preferences than for priorities in budgetary policy.
More interesting are, however, the findings for legislative responsiveness. Despite the fact that law
productivity decreases when elections are approaching, legislative responsiveness seems to actually
be higher in the election year compared to other years, meaning that policymakers are willing to play
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the saliency card to increase their chance of reelection.
Issue ownership matters for responsiveness more in symbolic policy venues than in substantive
ones. Thoughmeasured in two different ways – long-term issue competence on the issue and ideolo-
gical proximity – issue ownership matters for rhetorical but less for legislative responsiveness, where
its effect is only significant for left-wing governments but not for right-wing governments. Govern-
ments tend, in fact, to emphasise, in their agendas, both issues that are salient to the public and issues
on which they are competent, independently of whether they are vulnerable at the polls. The fact
that government’s issue reputation (measured as government ideology) has a limited mediating ef-
fect on responsiveness in legislative venues (see also Epp, Lovett, and Baumgartner 2014) raises the
question of the validity of issue ownership theories for policy responsiveness. However, it is worth
noting that government ideology has in impact on spending when the latter is measured in levels
and not changes. Perhaps, it is also true that, in the legislative process, factors other than government
ideology or issue reputation are more relevant for explaining how governments respond to public
opinion in decision-making and policy implementation phases.
Finally, this dissertation argued in favour of a beneficial effect of party policy differentiation on
responsiveness. Due to research design limitations, the effect of electoral decidability on responsive-
ness could be tested only for budgetary responsiveness and results were mixed. Again, the fact that
electoral decidability in the way it is measured has a limited impact on responsiveness goes hand in
handwith the issue ownership story depicted above and reinforces the conclusion that partiesmatter
for responsiveness not asmuch in the policy-making stage –where, perhaps, other actors such as veto
players or bureaucrats are more important – but in the earlier stage of agenda-setting.
As an addendum, although I have not tested a specific hypothesis concerning electoral contest-
ability and responsiveness, it is worth noting that the disproportionality of the electoral system –
used as an indicator of contestability – has different effects on government emphasis. In fact, higher
disproportionality is more associated with higher levels of spending and higher emphasis in govern-
ment legislation in traditional right-wing issues (e.g., defence), whereas higher disproportionality is
more associated with lower levels of spending and lower emphasis in government legislation in tra-
ditional left-wing issues (e.g., education, health and welfare).
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7.2 Limitations and Future Agenda
As anyother honorablework, this dissertation comeswith some caveats. Oneof these is certainly data
availability. Probably the greatest effort of this dissertation was to collect time-series cross-sectional
data for responsiveness and the electoral competition variables. The ambition to go back in time as
much as possible and the need to collect data points for different policy domains as well as different
indicators of competition came at the expense of the number of countries included in the analysis.
More than that, this dissertation employs the mainstream approach used in the studies of re-
sponsiveness, that is, it analyses the opinion-policy link dynamically over time and across countries.
If the world works as described in this dissertation, then electoral incentives have a limited impact on
government responsiveness to public priorities, stronger in some policy venues and weaker in oth-
ers. However, due to data availability constraints, macro temporal units (year or parliamentary term)
have been used to study the dynamics of government’s reaction. Yet it would still be interesting to
see whether electoral incentives matter differently when a more micro temporal unit is employed in
order to unveil causal mechanisms that, perhaps, would be covered by aggregating data by a higher
temporal unit.1 This is, essentially, one of the motivations behind different approaches on the study
of responsiveness such as the ResponsiveGov Project that use, for instance, an event history analysis
approach, a strategy which could lead to a better understanding of the timing of responsiveness.2
Projects such as ResponsiveGovwould allow the researcher to studywhether, at least in the policy is-
sues included, governments change their policy positions in line with the public when, for instance,
elections are approaching or the policy positions of the main competitors are more differentiated.
In this latter case, one can expect responsiveness if the main opponent has positions similar to the
majority of the people and is perceived as sufficiently credible in the eyes of voters (see Gerber and
1Note that a similar concern can be raised in relation to an analysis of responsiveness by disaggregating broader
policy domains into more specific policy issues to reduce noise in the data. Although this can be a fascinating solution,
it is not easily applicable because of the nature of public issue priorities. When respondents are asked to name the most
important problem/issue in their country, they tend to name broader policy areas such as environment, health, economy
or education instead of specific policy issues within these domains. For this reason, it would be inadvisable to decom-
pose major topics of governments’ policy agendas into minor topics, as it would create a mismatch between public and
government priorities. For more details please refer to Jennings andWlezien (2011) and Bevan and Jennings (2014).
2The EuropeanResearch Council Starting Grant ResponsiveGov Project studies government responsiveness to the
preferences of different sections of public opinion in twenty-three advanced democracies plus the European Union. For
details see: http://www.responsivegov.eu/.
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Lupia 1995).
Another caveat, which is not a disadvantage per se but a limitation of this work, is given by
the fact that, with the exception of Germany and the 2010 British coalition, all the cases included
experienced single-party (minority) governments. This can be an advantage, for such cases register
high levels of clarity of responsibility and electoral identifiability, which makes it easier for voters to
pin down unresponsive policy makers and makes it easier for governments to respond to the public
without compromising with coalition partners. However, the forced exclusion of cases of multi-
party coalition governments cannot give a complete picture of the impact of electoral incentives on
responsiveness to public priorities and this is an evident limitation of this work.
My research can be – andwill be – extended in the future oncemore data on public priorities and
government agendas will be publicly available. Data on the most important issue are available for all
European countries from Eurobarometer but only since 2003. As this is not a very long time span,
other sources will have to be taken into account. For instance, the Comparative Agendas Project
(CAP) is also involved in the data collection of public issue priorities and such data for additional
countries will hopefully be soon at the disposal of the scientific community. Similarly, CAP is also
finalising the assemblage of a joint website where data collected by single CAP units on different
policy venues will be publicly available in the following months. The other good news for future
developments of this work is that survey data on vote intentions have just been released for a large
number of countries over the last decades (Jennings andWlezien 2015b). This would allowme to test
the impact of governments’ electoral vulnerability on responsiveness for a larger sample than the one
I could rely on for my dissertation.
A final thought is devoted to the extension of my current work on the effect of electoral decid-
ability on responsiveness to public priorities. As done by, for instance, Bertelli and John (2012), the
idea would be to reaggregate the policy categories included in the ComparativeManifestos Project in
line with the CAP coding schemes. This would give me the opportunity to increase the number of
policy issues and extend the analysis to additional policy venues such as executive speeches. It can be
the case that there would be a clearer effect of decidability on responsiveness inmore symbolic policy
venues, as my results for issue competence suggest.
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As students of comparative politics, we tend to assign a great deal of importance to elections
and party politics. We put our trust on the expectation that party competition is a very powerful
engine that moves the machinery of our democracies and motivates politicians to respond to public
opinion. The ultimate message that my dissertation is sending points to the fact that we should not
dismiss the relevance of party competition as an explanatory variable for responsiveness, but that, at
least in the realm of public priorities, we should rather reconsider its role for a better understanding
of how our democracies work.
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Table A.1: Electoral vulnerability in Canada
Year Government Opposition
1978 LP PCP +NDP
1979 PCP LP +NDP
1980 LP PCP +NDP
1981 LP PCP +NDP
1982 LP PCP +NDP
1983 LP PCP +NDP
1984a LP PCP +NDP
1984b PCP LP +NDP
1985 PCP LP +NDP
1986 PCP LP +NDP
1987 PCP LP +NDP
1988 PCP LP +NDP
1989 PCP LP +NDP + RPC
1990 PCP LP +NDP + RPC + BQ
1991 PCP LP +NDP + RPC + BQ
1992 PCP LP +NDP + RPC + BQ
1993a PCP LP +NDP + RPC + BQ
1993b LP PCP +NDP + RPC + BQ
1994 LP PCP +NDP + RPC + BQ
1995 LP PCP +NDP + RPC + BQ
1996 LP PCP +NDP + RPC + BQ
1997 LP PCP +NDP + RPC + BQ
1998 LP PCP +NDP + RPC + BQ
1999 LP PCP +NDP + RPC + BQ
2000 LP PCP +NDP + CA + BQ
2001 LP PCP +NDP + CA + BQ
2002 LP PCP +NDP + CA + BQ
2003 LP PCP +NDP + CA + BQ
2004 LP CPC +NDP + BQ
2005 LP CPC +NDP + BQ
2006 CPC LP +NDP + BQ
2007 CPC LP +NDP + BQ
2008 CPC LP +NDP + BQ
2009 CPC LP +NDP + BQ
2010 CPC LP +NDP + BQ
Note: Liberal Party (LP), Progressive Conservative/Conservative Party (PCP/CPC), Bloc Québécois (BQ),
NewDemocratic Party (NDP), and Reform Party/Canadian Alliance (RPC/CA). Election years in italics.
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Table A.2: Electoral vulnerability in Germany
Year Government Opposition
1977 SPD + FDP CDU/CSU +GREENS
1978 SPD + FDP CDU/CSU +GREENS
1979 SPD + FDP CDU/CSU +GREENS
1980 SPD + FDP CDU/CSU +GREENS
1981 SPD + FDP CDU/CSU +GREENS
1982 SPD + FDP CDU/CSU +GREENS
1983 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS
1984 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS
1985 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS
1986 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS
1987 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS
1988 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS
1989 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS
1990 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS + PDS/LINKE
1991 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS + PDS/LINKE
1992 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS + PDS/LINKE
1993 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS + PDS/LINKE
1994 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS + PDS/LINKE
1995 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS + PDS/LINKE
1996 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS + PDS/LINKE
1997 CDU/CSU + FDP SPD +GREENS + PDS/LINKE
1998 SPD +GREENS CDU/CSU + FDP + PDS/LINKE
1999 SPD +GREENS CDU/CSU + FDP + PDS/LINKE
2000 SPD +GREENS CDU/CSU + FDP + PDS/LINKE
2001 SPD +GREENS CDU/CSU + FDP + PDS/LINKE
2002 SPD +GREENS CDU/CSU + FDP + PDS/LINKE
2003 SPD +GREENS CDU/CSU + FDP + PDS/LINKE
2004 SPD +GREENS CDU/CSU + FDP + PDS/LINKE
2005 CDU/CSU + SPD FDP + GREENS + PDS/LINKE
2006 CDU/CSU + SPD FDP + GREENS + PDS/LINKE
2007 CDU/CSU + SPD FDP + GREENS + PDS/LINKE
Note: Social Democratic Party (SPD), Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU), Liberal Party (FDP),
Greens, and The Left (PDS/Die Linke). Election years in italics.
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Table A.3: Electoral vulnerability in Spain
Year Government Opposition
1978 UCD PSOE + AP + PCE + CiU
1979 UCD PSOE + AP + PCE + CiU
1980 UCD PSOE + AP + PCE + CiU
1981 UCD PSOE + AP + PCE + CiU
1982 PSOE UCD +AP + PCE + CiU
1983 PSOE UCD +AP + PCE + CiU
1984 PSOE UCD +AP + PCE + CiU
1985 PSOE UCD +AP + PCE + CiU
1986 PSOE AP + IU + CiU
1987 PSOE AP + IU + CiU
1988 PSOE AP + IU + CiU
1989 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
1990 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
1991 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
1992 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
1993 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
1994 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
1995 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
1996 PP PSOE + IU + CiU
1997 PP PSOE + IU + CiU
1998 PP PSOE + IU + CiU
1999 PP PSOE + IU + CiU
2000 PP PSOE + IU + CiU
2001 PP PSOE + IU + CiU
2002 PP PSOE + IU + CiU
2003 PP PSOE + IU + CiU
2004 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
2005 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
2006 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
2007 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
2008 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
2009 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
2010 PSOE PP + IU + CiU
2011 PP PSOE + IU + CiU
2012 PP PSOE + IU + CiU
2013 PP PSOE + IU + CiU
Note: Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD), People’s Alliance/People’s Party (AP/PP), Communist Party
of Spain (PCE), United Left (UI), Convergence and Union (CiU), and Socialist Party (PSOE). Election years
in italics.
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Table A.4: Electoral vulnerability in the UK
Year Government Opposition
1970 CON LAB + LIB
1971 CON LAB + LIB
1972 CON LAB + LIB
1973 CON LAB + LIB
1974a LAB CON + LIB
1974b LAB CON + LIB
1975 LAB CON + LIB
1976 LAB CON + LIB
1977 LAB CON + LIB
1978 LAB CON + LIB
1979 CON LAB + LIB
1980 CON LAB + LIB
1981 CON LAB + SDP/LIB Alliance
1982 CON LAB + SDP/LIB Alliance
1983 CON LAB + SDP/LIB Alliance
1984 CON LAB + SDP/LIB Alliance
1985 CON LAB + SDP/LIB Alliance
1986 CON LAB + SDP/LIB Alliance
1987 CON LAB + SDP/LIB Alliance
1988 CON LAB + SDP/LIB Alliance
1989 CON LAB + LD
1990 CON LAB + LD
1991 CON LAB + LD
1992 CON LAB + LD
1993 CON LAB + LD
1994 CON LAB + LD
1995 CON LAB + LD
1996 CON LAB + LD
1997 LAB CON + LD
1998 LAB CON + LD
1999 LAB CON + LD
2000 LAB CON + LD
2001 LAB CON + LD
2002 LAB CON + LD
2003 LAB CON + LD
2004 LAB CON + LD
2005 LAB CON + LD
2006 LAB CON + LD
2007 LAB CON + LD
2008 LAB CON + LD
2009 LAB CON + LD
2010 CON + LD LAB
2011 CON + LD LAB
2012 CON + LD LAB
2013 CON + LD LAB
Note: Conservative Party (CON), Labour Party (LAB), Liberal Party/Social Democratic and Liberal
Alliance/Liberal Democratic Party (LIB/SDP/LIB Alliance/LD). Election years in italics.
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Table A.5: Electoral vulnerability in the US
Year Government Opposition
1945 DEM REP
1946 DEM REP
1947 DEM REP
1948 DEM REP
1949 DEM REP
1950 DEM REP
1951 DEM REP
1952 REP DEM
1953 REP DEM
1954 REP DEM
1955 REP DEM
1956 REP DEM
1957 REP DEM
1958 REP DEM
1959 REP DEM
1960 DEM REP
1961 DEM REP
1962 DEM REP
1963 DEM REP
1964 DEM REP
1965 DEM REP
1966 DEM REP
1967 DEM REP
1968 REP DEM
1969 REP DEM
1970 REP DEM
1971 REP DEM
1972 REP DEM
1973 REP DEM
1974 REP DEM
1975 REP DEM
1976 DEM REP
1977 DEM REP
1978 DEM REP
1979 DEM REP
1980 REP DEM
1981 REP DEM
1982 REP DEM
1983 REP DEM
1984 REP DEM
1985 REP DEM
1986 REP DEM
1987 REP DEM
1988 REP DEM
1989 REP DEM
1990 REP DEM
1991 REP DEM
1992 DEM REP
1993 DEM REP
1994 DEM REP
1995 DEM REP
1996 DEM REP
1997 DEM REP
1998 DEM REP
1999 DEM REP
2000 REP DEM
2001 REP DEM
2002 REP DEM
2003 REP DEM
2004 REP DEM
2005 REP DEM
2006 REP DEM
2007 REP DEM
2008 DEM REP
2009 DEM REP
2010 DEM REP
2011 DEM REP
2012 DEM REP
2013 DEM REP
Note: Democratic Party (DEM) and Republican Party (REP). Election years in italics.
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Figure A.1: Popularity and vulnerability: A comparison, 1980-2010 (percentage values)
Source: Environics Focus (Canada), Politbarometer (Germany), Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Spain), Ipsos
MORI (UK), Gallup (US).
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Table A.6: CMP categories for party system dispersion
Policy Domain CMP Category
Defence Military Positive (104) - Military Negative (105)
Education Education Expansion (506) - Education Limitation (507)
Welfare Welfare State Expansion (504) - Welfare State Limitation (505)
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Table A.7: Issue competence in Germany
Year Govt Defence/Foreign Education Environment Health Housing Law and Crime Welfare
1987 CDU/CSU FDP 1 0 0 0
1988 CDU/CSU FDP 1 0 0 0
1989 CDU/CSU FDP 1 0 0 0
1990 CDU/CSU FDP 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1991 CDU/CSU FDP 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1992 CDU/CSU FDP 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1993 CDU/CSU FDP 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1994 CDU/CSU FDP 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1995 CDU/CSU FDP 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1996 CDU/CSU FDP 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1997 CDU/CSU FDP 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1998 SPDGRUE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1999 SPDGRUE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
2000 SPDGRUE 1 0 1 0 0 0
2001 SPDGRUE 1 0 1 0 0 0
2002 SPDGRUE 1 0 1 0 0 0
2003 SPDGRUE 1 0 1 0 0 0
2004 SPDGRUE 1 0 1 0 0 0
Source: Politbarometer (various years); Politbarometer Election Study (1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002); European Election Studies (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004).
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Table A.8: Issue competence in Spain
Year Govt Defence/Foreign Education Environment Health Housing Law and Crime Welfare
1982 PSOE 1 1 1
1983 PSOE 1 1 1
1984 PSOE 1 1 1
1985 PSOE 1 1 1
1986 PSOE 1 1 1
1987 PSOE 1 1 1
1988 PSOE 1 1 1
1989 PSOE 1 1 1
1990 PSOE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1991 PSOE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1992 PSOE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1993 PSOE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1994 PSOE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1995 PSOE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1996 PP 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1997 PP 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1998 PP 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1999 PP 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
2000 PP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2001 PP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2002 PP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2003 PP 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2004 PSOE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2005 PSOE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2006 PSOE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2007 PSOE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Source: CIS Barometer (various years); European Election Studies (1989, 1994, 1999, 2004).
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Table A.9: Issue competence in the UK
Year Govt Defence/Foreign Education Environment Health Housing Law and Crime Welfare
1970 CON 1 1 1
1971 CON 1 1 1
1972 CON 1 1 1
1973 CON 1 1 1
1974 LAB 0 0 0
1975 LAB 0 0 0
1976 LAB 0 0 0
1977 LAB 0 0 0
1978 LAB 0 0 0
1979 CON 1 0 1
1980 CON 1 0 0 0 0
1981 CON 1 0 0 0 0
1982 CON 1 0 0 0 0
1983 CON 1 0 0 0 0
1984 CON 1 0 0 0 0
1985 CON 1 0 0 0 0
1986 CON 1 0 0 0 0
1987 CON 1 0 0 0 0
1988 CON 1 0 0 0 0
1989 CON 1 0 0 0 0
1990 CON 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1991 CON 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1992 CON 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1993 CON 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1994 CON 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1995 CON 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1996 CON 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1997 LAB 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1998 LAB 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1999 LAB 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
2000 LAB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
2001 LAB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
2002 LAB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
2003 LAB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
2004 LAB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
2005 LAB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
2006 LAB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
2007 LAB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
2008 LAB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
2009 LAB 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
2010 CON LD 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Source: Ipsos-MORI (various years); European Election Studies (1989, 1994, 1999).
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Table A.10: Issue competence in the US
Year Govt Defence Education Environment Health Housing Law and Crime Welfare
1970 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1971 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1972 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1973 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1974 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1975 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1976 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1977 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1978 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1979 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1980 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1981 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1982 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1983 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1984 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1985 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1986 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1987 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1988 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1989 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1990 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1991 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1992 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1993 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1994 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1995 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1996 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1997 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1998 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1999 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
2000 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
2001 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
2002 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
2003 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
2004 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
2005 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
2006 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
2007 REP 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
2008 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
2009 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
2010 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
2011 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
2012 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
2013 DEM 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
Source: American National Election Studies (1972-2004); Egan (2013); Pope andWoon (2009); Sides (2006).
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Data Sources
Executive Speeches
Comparative Agendas Project
Most Important Problem/Issue
Germany: Politbarometer
Spain: CIS Barometer
United Kingdom: Gallup; Ipsos-MORI (UK Policy Agendas Project)
United States: Gallup (Roper Center)
Vote Intentions/Presidential Approvals
Germany: Politbarometer
Spain: CIS Barometer
United Kingdom: WJFFP dataset (see Wlezien et al. 2013; Green and Jennings 2012b)
United States: Gallup (Roper Center)
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Issue Competence
Germany: Politbarometer (1978-2004); Gesis Election Study (1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002); EES
(combined EES file 1989-2004: van der Eijk, Oppenhuis, and Schmitt (1993); Schmitt et al. (1997);
van der Eijk et al. (1999); Schmitt et al. (2009))
Spain: CIS Barometer (2006-2007); EES (combined EES file 1989-2004: van der Eijk, Oppenhuis,
and Schmitt (1993); Schmitt et al. (1997); van der Eijk et al. (1999); Schmitt et al. (2009))
United Kingdom: Ipsos-MORI (1977-2010); EES (combined EES file 1989-2004: van der Eijk,
Oppenhuis, and Schmitt (1993); Schmitt et al. (1997); van der Eijk et al. (1999); Schmitt et al. (2009))
United States: ANES (1972-2002), Sides (2006); Pope andWoon (2009); Egan (2013)
Economic Indicators
Unemployment rate as percentage of civilian labour force (OECD)
Inflation as consumer prices as percentage change on the same period of the previous year (OECD)
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Table B.1: Correlation table for speeches and priorities
Variables speech_def speech_edu speech_env speech_hea speech_hou speech_law speech_wel mip_def mip_edu mip_env mip_hea mip_hou mip_law mip_wel
speech_def 1.000
speech_edu 0.220 1.000
speech_env 0.586 0.257 1.000
speech_hea 0.400 0.420 0.228 1.000
speech_hou 0.550 0.302 0.400 0.365 1.000
speech_law 0.163 0.339 0.223 0.323 0.178 1.000
speech_wel 0.530 0.402 0.451 0.450 0.385 0.197 1.000
mip_def 0.240 -0.029 0.180 -0.010 0.038 0.143 0.020 1.000
mip_edu -0.118 0.261 -0.030 0.180 -0.107 0.104 0.065 0.211 1.000
mip_env 0.223 -0.161 0.565 -0.078 0.030 -0.073 0.065 0.164 -0.130 1.000
mip_hea -0.134 0.043 -0.085 0.208 -0.092 0.038 -0.047 0.035 0.562 -0.121 1.000
mip_hou -0.104 0.224 0.016 -0.065 0.177 0.301 -0.060 0.137 0.037 0.209 0.038 1.000
mip_law -0.118 0.341 -0.077 0.376 -0.030 0.550 0.089 0.081 0.470 -0.262 0.199 0.040 1.000
mip_wel 0.143 0.263 0.164 0.287 -0.064 0.201 0.342 0.002 0.258 0.169 0.316 0.064 0.318 1.000
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Table B.2: Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 with LDV
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Dependent Variable: Issue Emphasis in Executive Speeches
Speech (t-1) 0.539∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.118) (0.217)
Salience (t-1) 1.092∗∗∗
(0.300)
Competence (t-1) 3.602∗
(1.842)
Vulnerability (t-1) 0.144 0.107 0.136
(0.094) (0.124) (0.117)
Salience (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.007
(0.011)
Competence (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.103
(0.089)
Salience C (t-1) 1.208∗∗∗
(0.360)
Salience C (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.005
(0.011)
Salience NC (t-1) 1.226∗∗∗
(0.392)
Salience NC (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.021∗∗
(0.009)
Unemployment (t) 0.467 0.401 1.586∗
(0.369) (0.456) (0.817)
Inflation (t) 0.532∗ 0.090 1.356∗∗∗
(0.310) (0.493) (0.518)
LSq (t) -0.251 -0.043 -0.685
(0.590) (0.544) (0.894)
US 2nd Term (t) -3.374 3.359 -7.749
(6.690) (6.241) (8.248)
Spain -4.595 -10.09 -7.395
(6.181) (8.377) (9.578)
UK -5.385 -13.30 -0.355
(8.657) (10.21) (11.63)
US 7.205 -2.026 15.52∗
(6.301) (8.843) (8.021)
Constant -4.026 7.120 -20.19∗∗
(5.423) (7.270) (10.18)
N 575 296 279
R2 0.45 0.54 0.36
Models with lagged dependent variable
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Germany reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.3: Hypothesis 3 with LDV
Model 6 Model 7
Dependent Variable: Issue Emphasis in Executive Speeches
Speech (t-1) 0.827∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.115)
Salience (t-1) 0.523∗ 0.508∗
(0.278) (0.283)
Competence (t-1) 0.912 1.753
(1.605) (1.751)
Electoral Proximity (6-month) 1.095
(2.377)
Salience (t-1)× Electoral Proximity (6-month) -0.344
(0.253)
Competence (t-1)× Electoral Proximity (6-month) 1.646
(2.643)
Electoral Proximity (12-month) 0.869
(3.384)
Salience (t-1)× Electoral Proximity (12-month) -0.107
(0.522)
Competence (t-1)× Electoral Proximity (12-month) -2.507
(2.933)
Unemployment (t) 0.621∗ 0.596∗
(0.339) (0.347)
Inflation (t) 0.531 0.514
(0.324) (0.318)
LSq (t) -0.355 -0.351
(0.599) (0.598)
US 2nd Term (t) -2.957 -3.162
(6.827) (6.830)
UK 6.195 6.151
(6.724) (6.846)
US 9.906∗∗ 9.821∗
(5.019) (5.061)
Constant -10.13 -9.956
(7.146) (7.471)
N 485 485
R2 0.48 0.48
Models with lagged dependent variable
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Spain reference category)
Germany omitted from this analysis due to data unavailability of the speech date
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.4: Hypothesis 2 with three-way interaction
Alternative Model H2
Dependent Variable: Issue Emphasis in Executive Speeches
Salience (t-1) 1.840∗∗∗
(0.317)
Competence (t-1) 6.861∗
(4.023)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.090
(0.105)
Salience (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.035∗∗∗
(0.010)
Salience (t-1)× Competence (t-1) 0.238
(0.567)
Competence (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.302
(0.220)
Salience (t-1)× Competence (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.046∗
(0.027)
Unemployment (t) 0.502
(0.541)
Inflation (t) -0.311
(0.447)
LSq (t) 0.021
(0.779)
US 2nd Term (t) -1.904
(6.442)
Spain -7.682
(7.421)
UK -13.91
(10.17)
US -0.758
(5.860)
Constant 3.111
(6.492)
N 575
R2 0.20
Models with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Germany reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table B.5: Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, German data omitted
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Dependent Variable: Issue Emphasis in Executive Speeches
Salience (t-1) 1.372∗∗∗
(0.300)
Competence (t-1) 5.814∗∗
(2.898)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.008 0.224∗ -0.099
(0.128) (0.134) (0.123)
Salience (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.012
(0.013)
Competence (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.011
(0.132)
Salience C (t-1) 1.423∗∗∗
(0.278)
Salience C (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.012
(0.013)
Salience NC (t-1) 2.321∗∗∗
(0.499)
Salience NC (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.045∗∗∗
(0.013)
Unemployment (t) 0.538 0.893∗ -0.321
(0.589) (0.522) (1.072)
Inflation (t) -0.315 -0.081 -0.423
(0.436) (0.477) (0.537)
LSq (t) -0.760 -0.184 -0.492
(0.834) (0.681) (1.146)
US 2nd Term (t) -2.305 4.457 -5.621
(6.705) (7.049) (7.993)
UK -2.947 -5.269 -11.48
(11.03) (9.205) (16.85)
US 0.268 11.39∗∗ -5.414
(6.824) (5.335) (12.28)
Constant 8.069 0.164 16.02
(10.91) (5.922) (18.43)
N 485 253 232
R2 0.14 0.30 0.15
Models with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Spain reference category)
German data omitted
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
APPENDIX B. APPENDIX CHAPTER 4 155
Table B.6: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Speech Defence/Int. Affairs 128 55.7 57.5 0 458
Speech Education 128 10.7 13.5 0 64
Speech Environment 128 4.4 8.3 0 48
Speech Health 128 8.0 13.7 0 106
Speech Housing 128 2.9 5.0 0 47
Speech Law& Crime 128 15.6 18.7 0 85
Speech Social Welfare 128 9.0 12.4 0 67
MIP Defence 118 12.2 10.3 0.4 56.1
MIP Education 103 2.7 2.5 0 11.7
MIP Environment 96 2.2 3.1 0 16.9
MIP Health 101 5.8 6.7 0.1 34.7
MIP Housing 75 2.1 2.3 0.1 11.9
MIP Law& Crime 117 8.4 7.5 0.2 32.7
MIP Social Welfare 117 3.7 2.6 0.1 14.1
Competence Defence 117 0 1
Competence Education 117 0 1
Competence Environment 117 0 1
Competence Health 120 0 1
Competence Housing 112 0 1
Competence Law& Crime 96 0 1
Competence Social Welfare 107 0 1
Gov’t Vulnerability 128 0.2 20.0 -43.6 53.7
Election Year (6 months) 110 0 1
Election Year (12 months) 110 0 1
Unemployment 128 8.8 5.0 2 24.2
Inflation 128 4.9 4.2 -0.4 24.2
Least Squares Index 128 8.0 5.2 0.8 17.8
US 2nd Term 128 0 1
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Data Sources
Most Important Problem/Issue
Canada: Environics Focus
Germany: Politbarometer
Spain: CIS Barometer
United Kingdom: Gallup, Ipsos-MORI (UK Policy Agendas Project)
United States: Gallup (Roper Center)
Preferences in Spending from Soroka andWlezien (2010) Dataset
Canada: int_all_def , int_all_educ, int_all_heal, int_all_wel
United Kingdom: int_all_def , int_all_educ, int_all_heal, int_all_pen
United States: int_all_def , int_all_educ, int_all_heal, int_all_wel
Vote Intentions/Presidential Approval
Canada: Environics Focus
Germany: Politbarometer
Spain: CIS Barometer
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United Kingdom: WJFFP dataset (see Wlezien et al. 2013; Green and Jennings 2012b)
United States: Gallup (Policy Agendas Project)
Party System Dispersion
Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens et al. 2014)
Government Expenditures
Defence: SIPRIMilitary Expenditure Database
Education: World Bank Development Indicators, Eurostat
Health, Housing, Labour/Unemployment, Social Welfare: OECD Social Expenditure Database
Economic Indicators
Unemployment rate as percentage of civilian labour force (OECD)
Inflation as consumer prices as percentage change on the same period of the previous year (OECD)
Additional Controls
Population over 65 as percentage of population (OECD)
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Table C.1: Correlation table for spending and priorities
Variables exp_def exp_edu exp_hea exp_hou exp_une exp_wel mip_def mip_edu mip_hea mip_hou mip_une mip_wel
exp_def 1.000
exp_edu 0.108 1.000
exp_hea -0.526 0.268 1.000
exp_hou 0.055 0.278 0.009 1.000
exp_une -0.600 -0.398 0.182 -0.412 1.000
exp_wel -0.524 -0.396 0.608 -0.043 0.548 1.000
mip_def 0.018 -0.257 -0.129 -0.305 0.095 0.133 1.000
mip_edu 0.154 0.066 -0.177 0.782 -0.493 -0.190 -0.183 1.000
mip_hea 0.277 0.021 -0.348 0.513 -0.569 -0.429 -0.301 0.477 1.000
mip_hou -0.066 -0.199 -0.193 0.062 0.019 -0.033 0.261 0.152 0.102 1.000
mip_une -0.534 -0.297 0.418 -0.263 0.703 0.670 -0.203 -0.476 -0.463 -0.353 1.000
mip_wel 0.371 -0.182 -0.079 -0.118 -0.313 -0.102 -0.173 0.084 0.212 -0.047 -0.023 1.000
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Table C.2: Correlation table for spending and preferences
Variables exp_def exp_edu exp_hea exp_wel pref_def pref_educ pref_heal pref_welf
exp_def 1.000
exp_edu -0.516 1.000
exp_hea -0.785 0.753 1.000
exp_wel -0.316 -0.095 0.091 1.000
pref_def -0.303 0.137 0.206 -0.225 1.000
pref_educ -0.110 -0.786 0.065 0.230 -0.116 1.000
pref_heal 0.016 -0.837 -0.129 0.131 0.011 0.897 1.000
pref_welf -0.103 -0.549 -0.119 0.619 -0.322 0.696 0.664 1.000
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Table C.3: Policy responsiveness to public priorities (DV in levels)
Defence Education Health Housing Unemployment Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP
Public Priorities (t-1) -0.002 -0.054∗∗ -0.011 0.004 -0.007∗∗ -0.036∗
(0.004) (0.022) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019)
Left (t-1) -0.431∗∗∗ 0.129 -0.016 -0.042∗ 0.049 0.263∗∗
(0.082) (0.093) (0.123) (0.023) (0.073) (0.121)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.146 -0.382∗ -0.400 0.055 -0.293∗∗
(0.214) (0.221) (0.256) (0.055) (0.122)
Inflation (t) 0.054∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ 0.023 -0.124∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.030) (0.033) (0.007) (0.019) (0.036)
Unemployment (t) 0.042∗∗ -0.005 0.043∗ 0.005∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.015) (0.024) (0.003) (0.023) (0.038)
War (t) 0.022
(0.068)
Elderly (t) 0.208∗∗
(0.087)
Constant 1.279∗∗∗ 6.188∗∗∗ 4.050∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.181 8.359∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.373) (1.158) (0.031) (0.358) (0.469)
N 95 61 82 64 87 93
R2 0.82 0.98 0.97 0.91 0.79 0.98
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Canada reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.4: Policy responsiveness to public priorities (DV in changes)
Defence Education Health Housing Unemployment Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Priorities (t-1) -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.006 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.032∗
(0.003) (0.017) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.016)
Left (t-1) 0.051 0.166∗∗ -0.022 -0.002 -0.017 -0.014
(0.048) (0.065) (0.057) (0.026) (0.059) (0.077)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.004 -0.077 -0.216∗ 0.062 -0.022 -0.147
(0.103) (0.233) (0.109) (0.124) (0.139) (0.158)
Inflation (t) 0.018 0.013 0.024 0.010 -0.016 0.031
(0.014) (0.021) (0.018) (0.008) (0.019) (0.024)
Unemployment (t) 0.003 0.009 -0.023∗∗ 0.010∗∗ -0.010 0.007
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.014)
War (t) -0.095∗
(0.053)
Elderly (t) -0.039
(0.041)
Constant -0.124 -0.194 0.852 -0.121∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.109
(0.105) (0.162) (0.614) (0.059) (0.116) (0.179)
N 96 56 83 65 88 94
R2 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.22 0.11
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.5: Policy responsiveness to public preferences (DV in levels)
Defence Education Health Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP
Public Preferences (t-1) -0.004 -0.028∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.012∗∗
(0.003) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
Left (t-1) -0.468∗∗∗ -0.077 -0.141 0.299∗∗
(0.167) (0.193) (0.148) (0.125)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.124 -0.453∗ -0.189 -0.110
(0.188) (0.232) (0.169) (0.107)
Inflation (t) 0.091∗∗∗ 0.030 -0.050 -0.079∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.037) (0.032) (0.025)
Unemployment (t) 0.125∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.041 0.325∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.047) (0.056) (0.045)
War (t) 0.030
(0.081)
Elderly (t) 0.658∗∗
(0.265)
Constant 0.491 5.524∗∗∗ -1.360 6.314∗∗∗
(0.581) (0.781) (3.088) (0.430)
N 48 33 48 48
R2 0.92 0.98 0.87 0.95
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Canada reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX CHAPTER 5 163
Table C.6: Policy responsiveness to public preferences (DV in changes)
Defence Education Health Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Preferences (t-1) 0.008∗∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.006∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.012) (0.003) (0.007)
Left (t-1) -0.091 -0.369 -0.181∗∗∗ -0.166
(0.093) (0.232) (0.067) (0.165)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.138 0.684 -0.090 -0.025
(0.112) (0.411) (0.079) (0.154)
Inflation (t) 0.025 0.073 0.041∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.021) (0.050) (0.017) (0.029)
Unemployment (t) 0.031 0.137∗ -0.002 0.039
(0.029) (0.072) (0.025) (0.051)
War (t) -0.051
(0.079)
Elderly (t) 0.042
(0.112)
Constant -0.255 -2.783∗∗ -0.840 -0.364
(0.259) (1.229) (1.384) (0.447)
N 48 27 48 48
R2 0.39 0.40 0.45 0.23
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.7: Electoral vulnerability and policy responsiveness to public priorities
Defence Education Health Housing Unemployment Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Priorities (t-1) -0.003 0.005 -0.011 0.002 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗
(0.003) (0.019) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.016)
Gov’t Vulnerability (t-1) -0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Priorities (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Left (t-1) 0.010 0.164∗ -0.017 -0.013 0.015 0.100
(0.059) (0.084) (0.070) (0.043) (0.073) (0.091)
LSq (t) -0.011 -0.003 -0.017 -0.009 -0.070∗∗∗ -0.046∗
(0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018) (0.024)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.004 -0.069 -0.203∗ 0.065 -0.009 -0.269
(0.102) (0.267) (0.116) (0.136) (0.139) (0.162)
Inflation (t) 0.018 0.015 0.032 0.015 0.004 0.056∗
(0.018) (0.027) (0.024) (0.013) (0.024) (0.031)
Unemployment (t) 0.005 0.012 -0.021∗ 0.009∗ 0.008 0.006
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015)
War (t) -0.078
(0.054)
Elderly (t) -0.047
(0.045)
Constant -0.024 -0.245 1.164∗ -0.009 0.788∗∗∗ 0.417∗
(0.139) (0.212) (0.689) (0.132) (0.164) (0.224)
N 86 52 75 59 80 85
R2 0.18 0.14 0.26 0.16 0.38 0.27
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.8: Electoral decidability and policy responsiveness to public priorities
Defence Defence Education Education Welfare Welfare
(a) (b) (a) (b) State (a) State (b)
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Priorities (t-1) 0.006 0.018∗∗∗ 0.013 -0.024 -0.020 0.000
(0.007) (0.006) (0.021) (0.042) (0.037) (0.027)
VWPSD (t) 0.050 0.077 -0.049
(0.041) (0.052) (0.083)
Priorities (t-1)×VWPSD (t) -0.002 -0.005 0.002
(0.002) (0.006) (0.009)
SWPSD (t) 0.124∗∗ 0.112 0.111
(0.056) (0.111) (0.112)
Priorities (t-1)× SWPSD (t) -0.012∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.008
(0.003) (0.026) (0.011)
Left (t-1) 0.068 0.089∗ 0.140∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.027 0.025
(0.050) (0.048) (0.072) (0.074) (0.126) (0.125)
LSq (t) -0.023∗ -0.019 0.012 0.006 -0.066∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.014) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.035) (0.035)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.022 0.038 -0.054 0.014 -0.459∗ -0.438∗
(0.121) (0.103) (0.244) (0.265) (0.255) (0.252)
Inflation (t) 0.021 0.027∗ 0.013 0.016 0.099∗∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.025) (0.029) (0.040) (0.039)
Unemployment (t) 0.007 0.013 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.003
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.023)
War (t) -0.087 -0.051
(0.054) (0.052)
Constant -0.081 -0.261∗ -0.534∗ -0.305 0.763∗ 0.441
(0.161) (0.153) (0.267) (0.229) (0.452) (0.377)
N 95 95 55 55 94 94
R2 0.10 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.15
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.9: Electoral proximity and policy responsiveness to public priorities
Defence Education Health Housing Unemployment Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Priorities (t-1) -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.019) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.018)
Election Year (t) -0.011 0.116 -0.043 0.031 -0.143 -0.215
(0.071) (0.103) (0.087) (0.041) (0.091) (0.143)
Priorities (t-1)× Election Year (t) 0.006 -0.013 -0.000 -0.010 0.003 0.063∗∗
(0.006) (0.015) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003) (0.026)
Left (t-1) 0.073 0.175∗∗ -0.023 0.014 0.046 0.023
(0.050) (0.073) (0.059) (0.031) (0.060) (0.076)
LSq (t) -0.017 0.001 -0.012 -0.015 -0.058∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.016) (0.021)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.015 -0.051 -0.219∗ 0.130 -0.033 -0.185
(0.103) (0.256) (0.111) (0.135) (0.130) (0.151)
Inflation (t) 0.026∗ 0.007 0.023 0.019∗ 0.004 0.056∗∗
(0.015) (0.027) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019) (0.025)
Unemployment (t) 0.005 0.010 -0.025∗∗ 0.008 -0.006 0.012
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013)
War (t) -0.086
(0.054)
Elderly (t) -0.061
(0.046)
Constant -0.033 -0.211 1.274∗ 0.023 0.761∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗
(0.139) (0.201) (0.713) (0.122) (0.158) (0.221)
N 95 55 82 64 87 93
R2 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.35 0.23
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.10: Electoral vulnerability and policy responsiveness to public preferences
Defence Education Health Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Preferences (t-1) -0.001 0.020∗ 0.005 0.009
(0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010)
Gov’t Vulnerability (t-1) 0.009∗∗∗ -0.043∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.004
(0.002) (0.023) (0.005) (0.004)
Preferences (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Left (t-1) -0.137 0.250 -0.083 0.056
(0.100) (0.315) (0.092) (0.260)
LSq (t) -0.018 -0.053 -0.019 -0.054
(0.021) (0.052) (0.016) (0.038)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.170 0.000 -0.006 -0.090
(0.102) (0.440) (0.072) (0.173)
Inflation (t) 0.039 0.105∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.099∗
(0.030) (0.059) (0.023) (0.053)
Unemployment (t) 0.046 0.074 0.043 0.074
(0.028) (0.064) (0.026) (0.061)
War (t) -0.048
(0.070)
Elderly (t) 0.099
(0.129)
Constant -0.423 -1.736 -1.814 -0.282
(0.287) (1.098) (1.577) (0.585)
N 43 26 43 43
R2 0.62 0.53 0.64 0.31
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.11: Electoral decidability and policy responsiveness to public preferences
Defence Defence Education Education Welfare Welfare
(a) (b) (a) (b) State (a) State (b)
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Preferences (t-1) -0.007∗ -0.005 0.009 0.017 0.011 0.014
(0.004) (0.004) (0.027) (0.023) (0.016) (0.013)
VWPSD (t) 0.057 0.232 0.000
(0.040) (0.774) (0.127)
Preferences (t-1)×VWPSD (t) 0.005∗∗∗ -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.010) (0.002)
SWPSD (t) 0.199∗∗ -0.636 0.036
(0.074) (2.463) (0.173)
Preferences (t-1)× SWPSD (t) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010 0.000
(0.003) (0.034) (0.004)
Left (t-1) -0.358∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗∗ -0.465 -0.359 -0.316 -0.313
(0.105) (0.109) (0.341) (0.322) (0.247) (0.212)
LSq (t) 0.025 0.004 0.056 0.011 -0.062 -0.073∗
(0.025) (0.021) (0.075) (0.071) (0.051) (0.043)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.215∗ 0.176 0.862 0.711 -0.171 -0.182
(0.118) (0.115) (0.510) (0.529) (0.222) (0.221)
Inflation (t) -0.046 -0.044 0.125 0.082 0.131∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.081) (0.081) (0.045) (0.045)
Unemployment (t) -0.076∗∗ -0.080∗∗ 0.134 0.134 0.064 0.073
(0.037) (0.038) (0.077) (0.080) (0.083) (0.081)
War (t) -0.022 -0.041
(0.069) (0.069)
Constant 0.457 0.639∗ -3.094 -2.488 -0.477 -0.467
(0.317) (0.335) (2.160) (1.689) (1.044) (0.928)
N 48 48 27 27 48 48
R2 0.58 0.58 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.38
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.12: Electoral proximity and policy responsiveness to public preferences
Defence Education Health Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Preferences (t-1) 0.005∗ 0.025∗ 0.005 0.002
(0.002) (0.013) (0.004) (0.008)
Election Year (t) 0.143∗ 2.803∗ -0.442∗ 0.114
(0.082) (1.570) (0.236) (0.115)
Preferences (t-1)× Election Year (t) 0.008∗∗ -0.041∗ 0.006∗ 0.003
(0.003) (0.023) (0.004) (0.003)
Left (t-1) -0.052 -0.107 -0.195∗∗∗ -0.154
(0.091) (0.322) (0.066) (0.166)
LSq (t) -0.012 -0.046 -0.013 -0.043
(0.020) (0.062) (0.016) (0.029)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.150 0.414 -0.077 -0.072
(0.112) (0.491) (0.077) (0.154)
Inflation (t) 0.037 0.124 0.049∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(0.022) (0.074) (0.020) (0.031)
Unemployment (t) 0.034 0.125 0.009 0.039
(0.028) (0.073) (0.026) (0.052)
War (t) -0.039
(0.079)
Elderly (t) 0.098
(0.121)
Constant -0.295 -2.529∗ -1.451 -0.047
(0.299) (1.255) (1.504) (0.485)
N 48 27 48 48
R2 0.48 0.50 0.52 0.31
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.13: Electoral vulnerability and policy responsiveness to public priorities CA, UK, US
Defence Education Health Housing Unemployment Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Priorities (t-1) 0.008 0.006 -0.027∗∗∗ 0.033 -0.016∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.029) (0.009) (0.029) (0.004) (0.029)
Gov’t Vulnerability (t-1) -0.002 0.001 0.007∗∗ 0.000 0.001 0.025∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Priorities (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.000 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 -0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Left (t-1) 0.201 -0.019 -0.167 0.036 -0.038 0.256∗
(0.144) (0.239) (0.103) (0.121) (0.096) (0.135)
LSq (t) -0.012 0.030 0.027 0.006 -0.019 -0.020
(0.026) (0.046) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018) (0.026)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.021 0.040 -0.183∗ 0.105 0.063 -0.219
(0.130) (0.371) (0.095) (0.189) (0.090) (0.132)
Inflation (t) 0.061∗ -0.003 0.014 0.005 0.011 0.080∗∗
(0.032) (0.057) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.034)
Unemployment (t) 0.040 -0.019 -0.047∗ 0.036 0.033 -0.005
(0.031) (0.054) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.035)
War (t) -0.063
(0.087)
Elderly (t) 0.270∗
(0.142)
Constant -0.552 -0.279 -3.141∗ -0.450 0.124 0.628
(0.440) (0.871) (1.804) (0.579) (0.291) (0.449)
N 53 33 51 33 47 52
R2 0.26 0.11 0.42 0.24 0.42 0.59
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.14: Electoral decidability and policy responsiveness to public priorities: CA, UK, US
Defence Defence Education Education Welfare Welfare
(a) (b) (a) (b) State (a) State (b)
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Priorities (t-1) 0.022∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.051 -0.025 -0.025 -0.011
(0.012) (0.010) (0.034) (0.063) (0.043) (0.033)
VWPSD (t) 0.029 0.185∗∗ -0.082
(0.071) (0.087) (0.139)
Priorities (t-1)×VWPSD (t) -0.002 -0.013 0.007
(0.004) (0.009) (0.012)
SWPSD (t) 0.070 0.409∗ -0.007
(0.109) (0.223) (0.159)
Priorities (t-1)× SWPSD (t) -0.007 0.004 0.002
(0.008) (0.040) (0.014)
Left (t-1) 0.158 0.160 0.059 0.248 -0.081 -0.099
(0.100) (0.096) (0.183) (0.178) (0.212) (0.207)
LSq (t) -0.021 -0.018 0.061 0.027 -0.018 -0.008
(0.026) (0.022) (0.042) (0.038) (0.057) (0.048)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.016 -0.001 0.029 -0.036 -0.391 -0.365
(0.154) (0.155) (0.321) (0.329) (0.275) (0.274)
Inflation (t) 0.042∗ 0.040∗ 0.032 0.086 0.081 0.087∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.047) (0.054) (0.049) (0.048)
Unemployment (t) 0.026 0.028 0.004 -0.005 0.018 0.007
(0.032) (0.031) (0.050) (0.053) (0.072) (0.070)
War (t) -0.038 -0.026
(0.081) (0.085)
Constant -0.348 -0.384 -1.663 -1.005 0.468 0.157
(0.423) (0.407) (0.971) (0.961) (1.028) (0.873)
N 59 59 34 34 58 58
R2 0.23 0.24 0.34 0.38 0.17 0.16
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.15: Electoral proximity and policy responsiveness to public priorities: CA, UK, US
Defence Education Health Housing Unemployment Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Priorities (t-1) 0.017∗∗ -0.001 -0.008 0.026 -0.014∗∗∗ -0.096∗∗
(0.008) (0.029) (0.009) (0.023) (0.003) (0.039)
Election Year (t) 0.088 0.055 -0.081 0.071 -0.061 -0.345
(0.096) (0.231) (0.120) (0.084) (0.068) (0.221)
Priorities (t-1)× Election Year (t) -0.001 -0.007 0.003 -0.009 0.001 0.083∗∗
(0.010) (0.026) (0.009) (0.033) (0.004) (0.041)
Left (t-1) 0.187∗ 0.130 -0.097 0.112 0.002 -0.094
(0.095) (0.215) (0.084) (0.077) (0.063) (0.132)
LSq (t) -0.018 0.005 0.018 -0.002 -0.018 -0.017
(0.020) (0.042) (0.019) (0.024) (0.015) (0.029)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.057 -0.059 -0.219∗∗ 0.240 0.030 -0.118
(0.125) (0.374) (0.106) (0.195) (0.084) (0.163)
Inflation (t) 0.049∗∗ 0.023 0.029 0.019 0.014 0.045
(0.021) (0.055) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.031)
Unemployment (t) 0.028 -0.017 -0.045 0.041∗ 0.020 -0.008
(0.028) (0.058) (0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.044)
War (t) -0.028
(0.081)
Elderly (t) 0.067
(0.131)
Constant -0.402 -0.092 -0.568 -0.474 0.153 0.665
(0.359) (0.916) (1.708) (0.481) (0.239) (0.589)
N 59 34 56 36 51 57
R2 0.24 0.12 0.22 0.26 0.41 0.25
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.16: Electoral decidability and policy responsiveness to public priorities: UPSD
Defence Education Welfare State
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Priorities (t-1) 0.016∗∗ -0.018 -0.032
(0.007) (0.035) (0.034)
UPSD (t) 0.059∗∗ 0.081 -0.080
(0.028) (0.076) (0.096)
Priorities (t-1)×UPSD (t) -0.005∗∗∗ 0.003 0.006
(0.002) (0.015) (0.009)
Left (t-1) 0.080∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.032
(0.048) (0.069) (0.124)
LSq (t) -0.019 0.005 -0.062∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.034)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.066 -0.072 -0.478∗
(0.110) (0.235) (0.253)
Inflation (t) 0.023 0.015 0.097∗∗
(0.015) (0.027) (0.040)
Unemployment (t) 0.013 0.010 -0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.023)
War (t) -0.058
(0.053)
Constant -0.241 -0.397∗ 0.841∗
(0.157) (0.236) (0.473)
N 96 56 95
R2 0.17 0.23 0.15
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.17: Electoral decidability and policy responsiveness to public preferences: UPSD
Defence Education Welfare State
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Preferences (t-1) -0.007∗ -0.016 0.008
(0.004) (0.038) (0.015)
UPSD (t) 0.074∗∗ -0.988 -0.157
(0.032) (0.867) (0.106)
Preferences (t-1)×UPSD (t) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.014 0.003
(0.001) (0.012) (0.002)
Left (t-1) -0.382∗∗∗ -0.284 -0.175
(0.112) (0.315) (0.229)
LSq (t) 0.006 -0.011 -0.073∗
(0.021) (0.061) (0.042)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.183 0.716 -0.180
(0.117) (0.498) (0.215)
Inflation (t) -0.046 0.102 0.126∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.081) (0.043)
Unemployment (t) -0.081∗∗ 0.169∗ 0.086
(0.039) (0.082) (0.080)
War (t) -0.039
(0.069)
Constant 0.632∗ -0.292 -0.125
(0.339) (2.516) (0.942)
N 48 27 48
R2 0.57 0.45 0.41
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.18: Electoral decidability and policy responsiveness to public priorities: Alternative measure
Defence Education Welfare State
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Priorities (t-1) 0.006 -0.001 0.012
(0.006) (0.019) (0.036)
Distance Gov Opp (t) 0.015 0.063 0.012
(0.013) (0.041) (0.032)
Priorities (t-1)×Distance (t) -0.001 -0.003 -0.005
(0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
Left (t-1) 0.065 0.236∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.050) (0.076) (0.129)
LSq (t) -0.018 0.015 -0.077∗∗
(0.013) (0.018) (0.038)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.031 -0.109 -0.418
(0.120) (0.244) (0.258)
Inflation (t) 0.022 0.001 0.101∗∗
(0.016) (0.026) (0.041)
Unemployment (t) 0.007 0.015 0.005
(0.010) (0.012) (0.023)
War (t) -0.081
(0.055)
Constant -0.093 -0.551∗∗ 0.576
(0.156) (0.261) (0.424)
N 95 55 94
R2 0.10 0.22 0.15
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.19: Electoral decidability and policy responsiveness to public preferences: Alternative meas-
ure
Defence Education Welfare State
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Public Preferences (t-1) -0.004 0.025 0.011
(0.004) (0.027) (0.013)
Distance Gov Opp (t) 0.028∗ 0.020 -0.007
(0.015) (0.510) (0.046)
Preferences (t-1)×Distance (t) 0.002∗∗∗ -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001)
Left (t-1) -0.350∗∗∗ -0.361 -0.274
(0.110) (0.372) (0.205)
LSq (t) 0.003 -0.005 -0.050
(0.021) (0.074) (0.062)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.194 0.670 -0.158
(0.122) (0.565) (0.222)
Inflation (t) -0.033 0.074 0.138∗∗
(0.027) (0.077) (0.061)
Unemployment (t) -0.069∗ 0.138 0.063
(0.038) (0.088) (0.091)
War (t) -0.044
(0.070)
Constant 0.588∗ -2.827 -0.595
(0.343) (1.980) (0.862)
N 48 27 48
R2 0.56 0.40 0.38
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.20: Electoral vulnerability and policy responsiveness to public priorities: LDV
Defence Education Health Housing Unemployment Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Gov’t Spending (t-1) -0.112∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.379∗∗∗ -0.346∗∗∗ -0.142∗
(0.042) (0.062) (0.065) (0.119) (0.084) (0.076)
Public Priorities (t-1) -0.003 -0.032∗ -0.011 -0.003 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.016)
Gov’t Vulnerability (t-1) -0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.005 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004)
Priorities (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ 0.000 -0.000∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Left (t-1) -0.074 0.239∗∗∗ -0.012 -0.005 0.055 0.175∗
(0.065) (0.070) (0.087) (0.040) (0.066) (0.098)
LSq (t) 0.002 -0.013 -0.018 -0.016 -0.087∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.011) (0.017) (0.024)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.068 -0.078 -0.210 0.051 -0.007 -0.342∗∗
(0.102) (0.217) (0.142) (0.124) (0.125) (0.164)
Inflation (t) 0.027 -0.034 0.031 -0.001 0.039∗ 0.018
(0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.013) (0.023) (0.037)
Unemployment (t) 0.010 0.014 -0.021∗ 0.007 0.048∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015)
War (t) -0.094∗
(0.052)
Elderly (t) -0.047
(0.045)
Constant 0.132 1.516∗∗∗ 1.202 0.389∗∗ 1.026∗∗∗ 2.176∗∗
(0.145) (0.418) (0.819) (0.174) (0.158) (0.963)
N 86 52 75 59 80 85
R2 0.26 0.48 0.26 0.31 0.51 0.30
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.21: Electoral decidability and policy responsiveness to public priorities: LDV
Defence Defence Education Education Welfare Welfare
(a) (b) (a) (b) State (a) State (b)
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Gov’t Spending (t-1) -0.156∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗ -0.011 0.003
(0.047) (0.042) (0.060) (0.062) (0.074) (0.074)
Public Priorities (t-1) -0.001 0.014∗∗ -0.032 -0.043 -0.020 0.000
(0.007) (0.006) (0.020) (0.036) (0.037) (0.028)
VWPSD (t) 0.071∗ 0.042 -0.047
(0.039) (0.042) (0.083)
Priorities (t-1)×VWPSD (t) -0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.005) (0.009)
SWPSD (t) 0.169∗∗∗ 0.092 0.110
(0.055) (0.091) (0.113)
Priorities (t-1)× SWPSD (t) -0.009∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.008
(0.003) (0.022) (0.011)
Left (t-1) -0.041 -0.003 0.208∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.040 0.026
(0.057) (0.055) (0.060) (0.063) (0.143) (0.141)
LSq (t) -0.011 -0.009 0.004 -0.003 -0.068∗ -0.072∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.039) (0.038)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.034 0.084 -0.106 -0.051 -0.473∗ -0.434
(0.113) (0.099) (0.198) (0.222) (0.274) (0.274)
Inflation (t) 0.033∗∗ 0.034∗∗ -0.037 -0.034 0.094∗ 0.100∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.027) (0.050) (0.051)
Unemployment (t) 0.008 0.016∗ 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.023) (0.023)
War (t) -0.096∗ -0.061
(0.050) (0.049)
Constant 0.201 -0.037 1.271∗∗∗ 1.327∗∗∗ 0.964 0.369
(0.173) (0.164) (0.436) (0.427) (1.568) (1.601)
N 96 96 56 56 95 95
R2 0.21 0.29 0.48 0.43 0.14 0.15
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.22: Electoral proximity and policy responsiveness to public priorities: LDV
Defence Education Health Housing Unemployment Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Gov’t Spending (t-1) -0.121∗∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ 0.027 -0.347∗∗∗ -0.310∗∗∗ -0.104
(0.042) (0.062) (0.055) (0.098) (0.076) (0.068)
Public Priorities (t-1) -0.001 -0.039∗∗ 0.002 -0.002 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.019)
Election Year (t) -0.030 0.127 -0.023 0.055 -0.134 -0.230
(0.066) (0.081) (0.086) (0.035) (0.082) (0.141)
Priorities (t-1)× Election Year (t) 0.008 -0.011 -0.001 -0.014 0.002 0.062∗∗
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.026)
Left (t-1) -0.014 0.235∗∗∗ -0.030 0.011 0.028 0.061
(0.057) (0.061) (0.063) (0.028) (0.053) (0.080)
LSq (t) -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.024∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.015) (0.021)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.065 -0.055 -0.191 0.127 0.011 -0.235
(0.102) (0.209) (0.122) (0.123) (0.118) (0.153)
Inflation (t) 0.038∗∗ -0.044∗ 0.030 0.008 0.027 0.032
(0.015) (0.025) (0.021) (0.010) (0.018) (0.029)
Unemployment (t) 0.011 0.010 -0.023∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.015
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004) (0.014) (0.013)
War (t) -0.099∗
(0.052)
Elderly (t) -0.043
(0.043)
Constant 0.118 1.515∗∗∗ 0.770 0.387∗∗ 0.996∗∗∗ 1.792∗∗
(0.141) (0.409) (0.742) (0.151) (0.154) (0.872)
N 96 56 83 65 88 94
R2 0.19 0.43 0.17 0.34 0.47 0.25
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
APPENDIX C. APPENDIX CHAPTER 5 180
Table C.23: Electoral vulnerability and policy responsiveness to public preferences: LDV
Defence Education Health Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Gov’t Spending (t-1) -0.148∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ 0.032 -0.856∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.157) (0.062) (0.136)
Public Preferences (t-1) -0.001 -0.004 0.006 -0.001
(0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.007)
Gov’t Vulnerability (t-1) -0.008∗∗∗ 0.018 0.012∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.019) (0.006) (0.002)
Preferences (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Left (t-1) -0.254∗∗ 0.140 -0.097 0.372∗∗
(0.108) (0.243) (0.097) (0.182)
LSq (t) 0.015 -0.086∗ -0.012 -0.051∗
(0.025) (0.041) (0.021) (0.025)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.280∗∗ -0.196 0.022 -0.266∗∗
(0.109) (0.341) (0.090) (0.120)
Inflation (t) 0.047 0.077 0.069∗∗∗ -0.066
(0.028) (0.046) (0.025) (0.044)
Unemployment (t) 0.081∗∗ 0.116∗∗ 0.048∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.050) (0.027) (0.052)
War (t) -0.011
(0.068)
Elderly (t) 0.085
(0.133)
Constant -0.466∗ 2.858∗ -1.958 6.282∗∗∗
(0.271) (1.583) (1.621) (1.117)
N 43 26 43 43
R2 0.67 0.74 0.64 0.70
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.24: Electoral decidability and policy responsiveness to public preferences: LDV
Defence Defence Education Education Welfare Welfare
(a) (b) (a) (b) State (a) State (b)
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Gov’t Spending (t-1) -0.269∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ -0.690∗∗ -0.649∗∗ -0.050 -0.054
(0.084) (0.076) (0.275) (0.230) (0.139) (0.136)
Public Preferences (t-1) -0.005 -0.005 0.024 0.010 0.009 0.012
(0.004) (0.003) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014)
VWPSD (t) 0.149∗∗∗ 0.815 0.010
(0.046) (0.710) (0.132)
Preferences (t-1)×VWPSD (t) 0.004∗∗∗ -0.011 0.001
(0.001) (0.009) (0.002)
SWPSD (t) 0.299∗∗∗ 0.281 0.042
(0.072) (2.080) (0.176)
Preferences (t-1)× SWPSD (t) 0.009∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.000
(0.003) (0.029) (0.004)
Left (t-1) -0.451∗∗∗ -0.431∗∗∗ -0.410 -0.330 -0.304 -0.292
(0.098) (0.099) (0.296) (0.269) (0.252) (0.221)
LSq (t) 0.029 0.032 -0.050 -0.083 -0.069 -0.082
(0.023) (0.020) (0.078) (0.068) (0.056) (0.050)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.244∗∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.273 0.267 -0.229 -0.247
(0.106) (0.104) (0.500) (0.469) (0.278) (0.278)
Inflation (t) -0.006 -0.009 0.016 -0.000 0.110 0.103
(0.028) (0.027) (0.082) (0.073) (0.075) (0.076)
Unemployment (t) -0.007 -0.009 0.172∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.064 0.073
(0.039) (0.040) (0.069) (0.069) (0.084) (0.081)
War (t) -0.004 -0.012
(0.06) (0.062)
Constant 0.462 0.525∗ 1.264 2.641 0.442 0.567
(0.283) (0.298) (2.554) (2.298) (2.775) (2.790)
N 48 48 27 27 48 48
R2 0.68 0.68 0.62 0.61 0.38 0.38
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.25: Electoral proximity and policy responsiveness to public preferences: LDV
Defence Education Health Welfare
Dependent variable: Government expenditure as percentage of GDP (differenced)
Gov’t Spending (t-1) -0.183∗∗ -0.683∗∗∗ 0.074 -0.706∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.158) (0.057) (0.127)
Public Preferences (t-1) 0.004∗ -0.007 0.007∗ -0.006
(0.002) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006)
Election Year (t) 0.148∗ 3.903∗∗∗ -0.460∗ 0.045
(0.076) (1.111) (0.234) (0.086)
Preferences (t-1)× Election Year (t) 0.007∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.000
(0.003) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003)
Left (t-1) -0.170∗ 0.094 -0.180∗∗ 0.180
(0.094) (0.226) (0.067) (0.137)
LSq (t) 0.025 -0.107∗∗ 0.003 -0.059∗∗
(0.023) (0.045) (0.021) (0.022)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.294∗∗ -0.082 -0.010 -0.213∗
(0.117) (0.357) (0.092) (0.117)
Inflation (t) 0.057∗∗ 0.095∗ 0.057∗∗∗ -0.044
(0.022) (0.051) (0.021) (0.032)
Unemployment (t) 0.081∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.022 0.237∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.051) (0.028) (0.052)
War (t) -0.002
(0.074)
Elderly (t) 0.022
(0.133)
Constant -0.404 3.585∗∗ -1.302 5.255∗∗∗
(0.279) (1.655) (1.495) (1.018)
N 48 27 48 48
R2 0.57 0.78 0.54 0.63
OLS with country-fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.26: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Expenditure defence 107 2.6 1.4 1.1 6.6
Expenditure education 85 5.2 1.3 3.2 9.1
Expenditure health 107 6.1 1.1 3.8 8.2
Expenditure housing 107 0.5 0.5 0 1.8
Expenditure unemployment 107 1.8 1.1 0.4 5.2
Expenditure social welfare 107 1.1 2.4 7.8 16.4
Expenditure welfare domains 107 1.8 3.3 12.4 24.9
Public priorities defence 100 8.8 10.1 1.1 56.1
Public priorities education 81 4.3 3.9 0.0 14.7
Public priorities health 87 7.9 7.8 0.1 34.7
Public priorities housing 67 2.6 2.8 0.0 13.3
Public priorities unemployment 92 21.8 19.0 0.4 81.2
Public priorities social welfare 98 4.3 2.7 0.7 14.1
Public priorities welfare domains 99 5.5 4.0 0.6 21.2
Public preferences defence 50 -9.2 21.9 -48 49.0
Public preferences education 50 62.5 9.9 43 82
Public preferences health 50 63.3 15.2 30.7 87
Public preferences welfare 49 -4.8 39.8 -49.1 85
Gov’t electoral vulnerability 106 4.4 19.6 -45.5 50.8
UPSD defence 107 1.9 1.6 0.5 6.1
VWPSD defence 107 1.9 1.6 0.5 6.1
SWPSD defence 107 0.8 0.7 0.1 2.5
UPSD education 107 2.3 1.1 0.1 5.4
VWPSD education 107 2.6 1.4 0.3 5.4
SWPSD education 107 0.9 0.5 0.0 1.7
UPSD welfare 107 3.2 1.8 1.0 9.6
VWPSDwelfare 107 3.6 1.7 1.0 8.1
SWPSD welfare 107 2.0 1.5 0.3 7.7
Distance defence 107 3.8 3.3 0 12.2
Distance education 107 2.7 2.1 0.1 7.7
Distance welfare 107 4.8 3.3 0.4 13.1
Election year 107 0 1
Left 107 0 1
LSq 107 9.1 5.3 1.9 17.8
US 2nd term 107 0 1
Inflation 107 3.2 2.1 -.3 13.5
Unemployment 107 9.3 4.8 4.0 24.2
War 107 0 1
Elderly 107 14.4 2.1 10.9 19.3
Appendix D
Appendix Chapter 6
Data Sources
Enacted Laws
Comparative Agendas Project
Most Important Problem/Issue
Spain: CIS Barometer
United Kingdom: Gallup; Ipsos-MORI (UK Policy Agendas Project)
United States: Gallup (Roper Center)
Vote Intentions/Presidential Approvals
Spain: CIS Barometer
United Kingdom: WJFFP dataset (see Wlezien et al. 2013; Green and Jennings 2012b)
United States: Gallup (Roper Center)
Political Constraint Index
POLCONIII (see Heinsz 2002)
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Economic Indicators
Unemployment rate as percentage of civilian labour force (OECD)
Inflation as consumer prices as percentage change on the same period of the previous year (OECD)
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Table D.1: Correlation table for laws and priorities
Variables law_def law_eco law_edu law_env law_hea law_hou law_law law_wel mip_def mip_eco mip_edu mip_env mip_hea mip_hou mip_law mip_wel
law_def 1.000
law_eco -0.448 1.000
law_edu -0.120 0.225 1.000
law_env -0.173 -0.090 0.049 1.000
law_hea -0.167 -0.036 -0.081 0.079 1.000
law_hou -0.287 0.270 0.034 -0.060 -0.011 1.000
law_law -0.526 0.404 0.014 -0.028 0.170 0.425 1.000
law_wel -0.252 0.209 -0.024 0.081 0.056 0.132 0.248 1.000
mip_def 0.582 -0.282 -0.196 -0.128 -0.175 -0.330 -0.353 -0.283 1.000
mip_eco -0.192 -0.002 0.045 0.016 0.088 0.417 0.123 0.265 -0.518 1.000
mip_edu -0.194 0.044 0.024 0.053 0.271 -0.036 0.345 0.034 -0.156 -0.313 1.000
mip_env -0.019 0.167 0.013 0.030 0.004 0.122 0.034 0.046 0.056 -0.163 -0.085 1.000
mip_hea -0.071 -0.045 0.055 0.147 0.256 -0.123 0.173 0.076 -0.127 -0.243 0.533 0.031 1.000
mip_hou -0.299 0.054 0.117 0.075 -0.053 0.125 0.120 -0.063 -0.049 -0.194 0.142 0.025 -0.083 1.000
mip_law -0.249 0.137 0.017 0.057 -0.052 -0.223 0.035 -0.088 -0.197 -0.509 0.444 0.004 0.063 0.053 1.000
mip_wel -0.052 -0.288 -0.010 0.067 0.069 -0.224 -0.220 -0.131 -0.099 -0.320 0.381 0.024 0.241 0.551 0.474 1.000
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Table D.2: Legislative Responsiveness
All Countries Spain UK US
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Legislation
MIP (t-1) 0.100∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.019) (0.088) (0.034) (0.021)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.017∗ 0.024 0.006 -0.020∗
(0.009) (0.051) (0.017) (0.011)
Election Year (t) 0.745∗∗∗ 1.911∗∗∗ 0.474∗ 1.046∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.620) (0.287) (0.368)
Left (t-1) -0.064 -0.204 0.906 -0.529
(0.347) (1.675) (0.711) (0.545)
LSq (t) 0.087 0.667∗ 0.108 0.003
(0.055) (0.376) (0.086) (0.090)
Political Constraint (t) 4.923 -0.563 7.046 -28.43∗
(5.332) (10.39) (15.22) (16.45)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.318 -0.191
(0.449) (0.482)
Unemployment (t) 0.009 -0.031 0.097 0.226
(0.056) (0.116) (0.109) (0.161)
Inflation (t) 0.009 -0.630∗ 0.075 -0.070
(0.039) (0.327) (0.048) (0.088)
UK 0.632
(1.062)
US -2.145∗∗∗
(0.700)
Constant 1.824 3.189 -0.672 12.96∗
(2.414) (3.704) (5.064) (6.654)
N 706 117 286 303
R2 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.07
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure. Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
Model All Countries with country dummies (Spain reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.3: Electoral Vulnerability and Legislative Responsiveness: Robustness checks
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Legislation
MIP (t-1) 0.102∗∗∗ 0.028 0.048∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.030) (0.014)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.025∗∗ -0.022∗ -0.009
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
MIP (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Left (t-1) -0.254 -0.305 -0.0828
(0.362) (0.331) (0.273)
LSq (t) 0.078 0.059 0.068
(0.056) (0.052) (0.051)
Political Constraint (t) 3.346 2.843 3.035
(5.670) (5.136) (4.460)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.523 -0.577 -0.377
(0.460) (0.443) (0.417)
Unemployment (t) 0.000 -0.007 -0.032
(0.057) (0.052) (0.045)
Inflation (t) 0.074∗ 0.065 -0.009
(0.044) (0.041) (0.030)
Trend 0.038∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.013)
UK 0.088 0.500 -0.220
(1.102) (1.020) (0.922)
US -3.194∗∗∗ -3.121∗∗∗ -1.304∗∗
(0.856) (0.775) (0.577)
Macroeconomics 3.474∗∗∗
(1.121)
Education -1.976∗∗
(0.771)
Environment -1.255
(1.040)
Health -1.004
(0.866)
Housing -1.976∗∗
(0.876)
Law and Crime 4.185∗∗∗
(1.172)
Welfare -2.275∗∗∗
(0.819)
LDV 0.539∗∗∗
(0.063)
Constant 2.119 3.192 1.136
(2.565) (2.430) (2.063)
N 706 706 706
R2 0.10 0.21 0.36
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure (Models 1-2); OLS with lagged dependent variable (Model 3)
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
Baseline category for country dummies: Spain. Baseline category for policy dummies: Defence
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.4: Electoral Connection and Legislative Responsiveness: Robustness checks
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Legislation
MIP (t-1) 0.083∗∗∗ 0.013 0.029∗
(0.020) (0.030) (0.016)
Election Year (t) -0.140 -0.092 -0.008
(0.353) (0.366) (0.393)
MIP (t-1)× Election Year (t) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.080∗∗
(0.029) (0.030) (0.032)
Left (t-1) -0.094 -0.156 -0.046
(0.356) (0.326) (0.261)
LSq (t) 0.099∗ 0.082 0.073
(0.055) (0.051) (0.047)
Political Constraint (t) 2.343 2.025 2.615
(5.341) (4.868) (4.047)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.447 -0.538 -0.367
(0.470) (0.457) (0.396)
Unemployment (t) -0.005 -0.015 -0.035
(0.055) (0.050) (0.042)
Inflation (t) 0.030 0.024 -0.018
(0.041) (0.039) (0.029)
Trend 0.026∗ 0.024∗
(0.013) (0.013)
UK -0.436 -0.041 -0.378
(1.020) (0.937) (0.783)
US -2.583∗∗∗ -2.546∗∗∗ -1.164∗∗
(0.791) (0.720) (0.546)
Macroeconomics 3.465∗∗∗
(1.164)
Education -1.904∗∗
(0.770)
Environment -1.182
(1.044)
Health -0.951
(0.868)
Housing -1.913∗∗
(0.885)
Law and Crime 4.188∗∗∗
(1.201)
Welfare -2.224∗∗∗
(0.833)
LDV 0.545∗∗∗
(0.062)
Constant 2.862 3.803∗ 1.272
(2.380) (2.283) (1.854)
N 706 706 706
R2 0.11 0.22 0.37
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure (Models 1-2); OLS with lagged dependent variable (Model 3)
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
Baseline category for country dummies: Spain. Baseline category for policy dummies: Defence
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.5: Ideological Proximity and Legislative Responsiveness, Right-wing Issues andRight-wing
Govts: Robustness checks
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Legislation
MIP (t-1) 0.078 0.215∗∗∗ 0.026
(0.063) (0.072) (0.050)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.037 -0.030 0.001
(0.026) (0.026) (0.023)
Election Year (t) 1.294∗ 1.241 1.465
(0.774) (0.766) (0.944)
LSq (t) -0.045 -0.021 -0.137
(0.235) (0.227) (0.209)
Political Constraint (t) -24.91 -25.37 3.237
(42.97) (42.38) (38.47)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.270 -0.947 -1.094
(1.211) (1.192) (1.118)
Unemployment (t) 0.480 0.478∗ 0.330
(0.303) (0.288) (0.246)
Inflation (t) -0.090 -0.036 -0.228
(0.210) (0.200) (0.159)
UK 1.677 3.184 4.444
(7.883) (7.748) (6.841)
US -2.241 -1.310 2.564
(5.134) (5.014) (4.234)
Trend 0.069 0.066
(0.046) (0.044)
Law and Crime 6.374∗∗∗
(1.671)
LDV 0.586∗∗∗
(0.099)
Constant 11.14 5.347 -2.122
(22.15) (21.66) (19.25)
N 116 116 116
R2 0.10 0.21 0.40
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure (Models 1-2). OLS with lagged dependent variable (Model 3)
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
Baseline category for country dummies: Spain. Baseline category for policy dummies: Defence
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.6: Ideological Proximity and Legislative Responsiveness, Right-wing Issues and Left-wing
Govts: Robustness checks
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Legislation
MIP (t-1) 0.082 0.097 0.034
(0.061) (0.065) (0.051)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.014 -0.011 0.004
(0.038) (0.037) (0.027)
Election Year (t) -0.065 -0.082 -0.511
(0.582) (0.579) (0.712)
LSq (t) 0.630∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.308∗
(0.216) (0.204) (0.170)
Political Constraint (t) -19.60 -22.22 -13.83
(21.58) (21.70) (20.44)
US 2nd Term (t) -3.868∗∗ -3.725∗ -1.134
(1.953) (1.973) (1.671)
Unemployment (t) 0.213 0.240 0.166
(0.287) (0.293) (0.302)
Inflation (t) 0.111 0.092 0.016
(0.163) (0.161) (0.105)
UK -2.259 -0.964 -0.271
(3.691) (3.674) (3.453)
US 2.907 3.311 2.926
(3.390) (3.374) (2.901)
Trend 0.062 0.048
(0.055) (0.053)
Law and Crime 3.674∗
(1.983)
LDV 0.588∗∗∗
(0.123)
Constant 3.793 3.178 2.757
(6.018) (5.842) (4.076)
N 86 86 86
R2 0.19 0.24 0.44
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure (Models 1-2). OLS with lagged dependent variable (Model 3)
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
Baseline category for country dummies: Spain. Baseline category for policy dummies: Defence
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.7: Ideological Proximity and Legislative Responsiveness, Left-wing Issues and Right-wing
Govts: Robustness checks
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Legislation
MIP (t-1) 0.072 0.048 0.103
(0.071) (0.068) (0.069)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.020∗ -0.020∗ -0.010
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Election Year (t) -0.109 -0.088 -0.020
(0.306) (0.312) (0.340)
LSq (t) 0.009 0.023 -0.037
(0.074) (0.071) (0.080)
Political Constraint (t) -0.837 -2.983 19.43
(14.57) (13.84) (13.61)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.447 0.424 0.557
(0.624) (0.614) (0.669)
Unemployment (t) -0.026 -0.039 0.088
(0.083) (0.079) (0.079)
Inflation (t) 0.046 0.045 -0.014
(0.061) (0.058) (0.065)
UK 0.944 0.559 4.714∗
(2.637) (2.524) (2.554)
US -1.678 -1.782 2.273
(1.879) (1.751) (1.442)
Trend 0.067∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.016)
Environment 1.222∗
(0.682)
Health 1.475∗∗
(0.670)
Housing 0.619
(0.548)
Welfare -0.655
(0.446)
LDV 0.097
(0.093)
Constant 1.856 2.680 -8.186
(7.374) (6.974) (6.886)
N 229 229 229
R2 0.08 0.18 0.06
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure (Models 1-2). OLS with lagged dependent variable (Model 3)
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
Baseline category for country dummies: Spain. Baseline category for policy dummies: Education
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.8: Ideological Proximity and Legislative Responsiveness, Left-wing Issues and Left-wing
Govts: Robustness checks
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Legislation
MIP (t-1) 0.107∗ 0.114∗ 0.107∗
(0.058) (0.067) (0.056)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.006 -0.008 -0.006
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011)
Election Year (t) -0.443 -0.447 -0.442
(0.281) (0.290) (0.284)
LSq (t) -0.004 -0.005 0.001
(0.067) (0.067) (0.064)
Political Constraint (t) 6.556 6.887 6.259
(7.675) (7.650) (7.130)
US 2nd Term (t) -1.038∗ -1.097∗ -0.956
(0.586) (0.574) (0.591)
Unemployment (t) -0.114 -0.124 -0.112
(0.087) (0.085) (0.085)
Inflation (t) 0.157∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.041)
UK 0.541 0.584 0.473
(1.103) (1.098) (1.087)
US -1.167 -1.092 -1.124
(1.026) (1.017) (0.778)
Trend 0.001 -0.003
(0.017) (0.018)
Environment 1.130∗∗
(0.539)
Health 0.872
(0.727)
Housing 0.843
(0.803)
Welfare 0.582
(0.530)
LDV 0.036
(0.104)
Constant 0.489 -0.109 0.491
(2.159) (2.176) (1.794)
N 172 172 172
R2 0.148 0.172 0.157
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure (Models 1-2). OLS with lagged dependent variable (Model 3)
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
Baseline category for country dummies: Spain. Baseline category for policy dummies: Education
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.9: Electoral Pressure and Legislative Responsiveness (MIPmean value previous three years)
Electoral Vulnerability Model Electoral ConnectionModel
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Legislation
MIP (mean 1/3) 0.113∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.013
(0.010)
MIP (mean 1/3)×Vulnerability (t-1) -0.000
(0.001)
Election Year (t) -0.399
(0.320)
MIP (t-1)× Election Year (t) 0.083∗∗∗
(0.026)
Left (t-1) -0.156 -0.046
(0.348) (0.353)
LSq (t) 0.094∗ 0.100∗
(0.053) (0.053)
Political Constraint (t) 3.045 2.307
(6.077) (5.898)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.535 -0.429
(0.425) (0.440)
Unemployment (t) 0.024 0.020
(0.057) (0.057)
Inflation (t) 0.022 0.006
(0.035) (0.035)
UK 0.265 -0.152
(1.153) (1.057)
US -2.120∗∗∗ -1.977∗∗∗
(0.733) (0.739)
Constant 2.561 3.095
(2.770) (2.657)
N 795 795
R2 0.10 0.11
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Spain reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.10: Ideological Proximity and Legislative Responsiveness (MIP mean value previous three
years)
Right-wing Issues Right-wing Issues Left-wing Issues Left-wing Issues
Right-wing Govts Left-wing Govts Right-wing Govts Left-wing Govts
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Legislation
MIP (mean 1/3) 0.052 0.108 0.162∗∗ 0.127∗∗
(0.073) (0.072) (0.071) (0.053)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.024 0.004 -0.004 0.003
(0.025) (0.030) (0.011) (0.012)
Election Year (t) 1.187 -0.364 -0.320 -0.291
(0.765) (0.635) (0.309) (0.338)
LSq (t) -0.086 0.561∗∗ -0.026 0.003
(0.232) (0.222) (0.071) (0.061)
Political Constraint (t) -33.63 -31.12∗ 4.315 3.493
(41.17) (17.36) (12.98) (8.421)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.119 -2.614 0.095 -0.933
(1.144) (1.788) (0.540) (0.622)
Unemployment (t) 0.457 0.391 0.124∗ -0.056
(0.298) (0.249) (0.065) (0.112)
Inflation (t) -0.183 0.039 0.012 0.116∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.132) (0.052) (0.041)
UK 0.791 0.192 2.467 0.935
(7.754) (3.638) (2.360) (1.379)
US -2.173 5.383∗∗ 1.157 -0.346
(5.034) (2.642) (1.298) (1.058)
Constant 18.35 7.659 -0.979 0.781
(21.14) (5.340) (6.538) (2.486)
N 120 93 267 203
R2 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.11
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses and country dummies (Spain reference category)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Right-wing issues: defence, foreign affairs, law and crime
Left-wing issues: education, environment, health, housing, welfare
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Table D.11: Electoral Pressure and Legislative Responsiveness by Country
Spain UK US
MIP (t-1) 0.050 0.032 -0.029
(0.106) (0.054) (0.035)
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.036 -0.026 0.009
(0.078) (0.023) (0.014)
MIP (t-1)×Vulnerability (t-1) 0.007 0.003∗∗ -0.002∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.002) (0.001)
Election Year (t) 0.414 -1.152∗∗ 0.488
(1.186) (0.483) (0.481)
MIP (t-1)× Election Year (t) 0.214 0.153∗∗∗ 0.043
(0.136) (0.046) (0.029)
Left (t-1) -0.203 0.838 -0.587
(1.735) (0.729) (0.536)
Unemployment (t) -0.035 0.088 0.233
(0.121) (0.114) (0.161)
Inflation (t) -0.669∗∗ 0.091∗ -0.092
(0.314) (0.051) (0.088)
LSq (t) 0.662∗ 0.125 0.017
(0.362) (0.091) (0.090)
Political Constraint (t) 0.748 5.096 -30.80∗
(10.89) (16.07) (16.34)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.305
(0.482)
Constant 3.945 1.076 14.71∗∗
(3.847) (5.339) (6.620)
N 117 286 303
R2 0.06 0.15 0.10
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.12: Ideological Proximity and Legislative Responsiveness by Country: Right-wing Issues
Spain UK US
MIP (t-1) -0.084 0.059 0.154∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.112) (0.052)
Left (t-1) -11.77∗ 1.629 0.382
(6.162) (3.105) (1.293)
MIP (t-1)× Left (t-1) 0.249 -0.154 -0.018
(0.372) (0.178) (0.068)
Vulnerability (t-1) 0.219 0.031 -0.042∗∗
(0.139) (0.047) (0.019)
Election Year (t) 0.545 -1.754∗∗ 2.691∗∗∗
(1.625) (0.720) (0.732)
Unemployment (t) 0.189 0.348 0.859∗∗∗
(0.284) (0.363) (0.290)
Inflation (t) -0.332 -0.093 -0.008
(0.840) (0.156) (0.153)
LSq (t) 2.861∗∗∗ 0.214 0.018
(0.913) (0.206) (0.157)
Political Constraint (t) -65.69∗∗∗ 8.870 -70.44∗∗∗
(23.71) (53.01) (26.94)
US 2nd Term (t) -0.622
(0.816)
Constant 24.17∗∗∗ -0.178 25.33∗∗
(7.831) (18.71) (10.90)
N 32 74 96
R2 0.24 0.10 0.34
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.13: Ideological Proximity and Legislative Responsiveness by Country: Left-wing Issues
Spain UK US
MIP (t-1) -0.131 0.210∗∗∗ 0.113
(0.187) (0.069) (0.099)
Left (t-1) -1.456 0.242 -0.154
(1.146) (0.716) (0.907)
MIP (t-1)× Left (t-1) 0.255 -0.033 -0.253
(0.257) (0.088) (0.171)
Vulnerability (t-1) 0.018 0.014 0.000
(0.033) (0.016) (0.013)
Election Year (t) -0.238 -0.309 0.040
(0.389) (0.361) (0.462)
Unemployment (t) -0.086 0.106 0.137
(0.068) (0.099) (0.181)
Inflation (t) 0.188 0.179∗∗∗ -0.045
(0.238) (0.046) (0.096)
LSq (t) 0.237 0.067 -0.065
(0.216) (0.080) (0.107)
Political Constraint (t) -0.145 -11.40 10.39
(6.146) (13.94) (20.78)
US 2nd Term (t) 0.071
(0.555)
Constant 2.604 4.546 -1.611
(2.264) (4.369) (8.227)
N 69 173 159
R2 0.07 0.10 0.06
OLS with AR1 autocorrelation structure
Correlated panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table D.14: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs
Laws Defence 5.8 5.6 0 23.9 139
LawsMacroeconomics 9 8.6 0 35 139
Laws Education 2.8 2.6 0 15 139
Laws Environment 2.9 2.6 0 14.5 139
Laws Health 3.6 3.2 0 20 139
Laws Housing 2.5 3.1 0 18.9 139
Laws Law and Crime 9.2 6.4 0 31.5 139
LawsWelfare 2.1 2.3 0 11.5 139
Public Priorities Defence 18.1 15.7 0 64.8 128
Public Priorities Macroeconomics 32.4 22.4 3.8 84.7 125
Public Priorities Education 2.6 2.5 0.1 11.7 112
Public Priorities Environment 1.6 1.8 0.1 12.1 76
Public Priorities Health 6.2 6.8 0 34.7 94
Public Priorities Housing 2.8 3.2 0.1 15.3 77
Public Priorities Law and Crime 8.7 7.6 0.2 32.7 115
Public Priorities Welfare 3.7 2.5 0.1 12.1 114
Gov’t Electoral Vulnerability 4.1 24.9 -43.6 66.8 139
Gov’t Ideology 0 1 139
Election Year 0 1 139
Least Squares Index 8 4.8 0.6 17.8 139
Political Constraint Index 0.4 0 0.3 0.5 139
US Second Term 0 1 139
Unemployment 8 5.4 1.1 24.2 132
Inflation 4.9 4 -0.4 24.2 131
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